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LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=de=n~t ___________ ) 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this her List of Exhibits in Support of Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and In Opposition to Motion for Summary Dismissal: 
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Exhibit Number 
1. Affidavit of Mark Rader, Co-Counsel for Bob Pangburn 
2. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn, Investigator for Defense 
3. Suspended Status of Attorney Bobby Eugene Pangburn (Idaho Bar Association) 
4. Disciplinary Order Idaho Supreme Court Bobby E. Pangburn 
5. Written Statement by Mathew Johnson & Cell Phone Minutes Log 
6. Idaho State Police Report 12117/2003 
7. Transcript of Interview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003 
8. Transcript ofInterview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003 
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 1 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
9. Transcript of Interview with Mel Speegle 10/9/2003 
10. Transcript ofInterview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003 
11. Transcript of Interview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003 
12. Transcript ofInterview with Consuelo Cedeno & Jane Lopez 9112/2003 
13. Blaine County Sheriffs Report ofInterview with Bruno Santos 9/2/2003 
14. Transcript of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/3/2003 
15. Affidavit and Resume of Robert J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert 
16. Voluntary Written Statement of Terri Sanders 9/9/2003 
17. Report of Police Officer Ed Fuller of Second Interview with Terri Sanders 10112/200.3 
18. Voluntary Written Statement of Stephanie Hoffman 9/15/2003 
19. Summary of Statements by Neighbors of Alan and Diane Johnson 
20. Transcript ofInterview with Linda O'Conner 10116/2003 
21. Scientific Journal Article: Parricide: A Comparative Study of Matricide versus Patricide 
22. Affidavit of Dr. Richard Worst, Forensic Psychiatrist 
23. Press and Journal Articles relating to Theories of Why Children Kill Parents 
24. CNN Transcripts of Nancy Grace Television Programs with Bobby Pangburn 
25. Letter dated 9/2/03 from Doug Nelson regarding Representation of Sarah Johnson 
26. Supreme Court ofIdaho Opinion: State vs. Johnson 188 P.3d 912 
27. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes 
28. External and Internal Chain of Custody form 
29. Affidavit of Robert J. Kerchusky in Support of Newly Discovered Evidence 
30. Order Relating to Newly Discovered Evidence 
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 2 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
31. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints 
32. Blaine County Sheriff's Report 2/3/2009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher 
Kevin Hill 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Exhibit Number 
33. Affidavit of Steven Dana Pankey 
34. Letter from Steven Dana Pankey to the Honorable Barry Wood 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Exhibit Number 
35. Photograph of Diagram of Glen Aspen Drive 
36. Photograph of Murder Weapon at Scene 
37. Photograph of Trash Can Johnson Residence 
38. Photograph of Removed Rifle Scope on Guest Bed Johnson Residence 
39. Photograph of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges 
40. Transcript from Grand Jury Proceedings 
41. Supplemental Report Blaine County Sheriff's Office Interview with Dell Speegle 
9/3/2003 
42. Transcript ofInterview with Mel Speegle 10/9/2003 
43. Blaine County Sheriff's Report 2/3/2009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher 
Kevin Hill 
44. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints 
45. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints 
46. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints 
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 3 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
47. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints 
48. Blaine County Sheriffs Supplemental Report 11/2/2009 Regarding Christopher Kevin 
Hill Missing Statement 
49. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Notes Regarding Hill Investigation 
50. Audio Recording of Interview with Mel Speegle 211 0/2009 
51. Audio Recording of Interview with Christopher Kevin Hill 2/12/2009 
52. Blaine County Sheriffs Supplemental Report 4/312009 regarding Major Case Prints for 
Christopher Kevin Hill 
53. Blaine County Sheriffs Supplemental Report 7114/2009 Regarding Hill Fingerprinting 
54. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis report - Fingerprints 
55. Transcript of Robert J. Kerchusky Deposition 8/27/2009 
56. National Academy of Science Journal Article Badly Fragmented Forensic Science 
Systems Needs Overhaul: Evidence To Support Reliability Of Many Techniques Is Lacking 
57. Laboratory Report Forensic Identification Orchard Cellmark Company 5113/2004 
60. Un-numbered Exhibit. Volumes 1 - 9 Transcript on Appeal 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Exhibit Number 
58. Mark Rader Deposition Transcript (with Deposition Exhibits 1,2 and 3) 
59. Patrick Dunn Deposition Transcript 
60. Orchid Cellmark Fed Ex Receipt with Hand Written Notation 
61. Bruno Santos Interview Transcript September 3,2003 
62. Police Report of Carlos Ayala Interview 
63. Bruno Santos - Nikki Settle Transcript of Taped Telephone Call 
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 4 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
64. Affidavit of Christopher P. Simms, Attorney at Law 
65. Bob Pangburn Deposition Transcript 
EY AT LAW 
R STOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DATED 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5" day of /7l4I2c;t 2010, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting 
Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 
208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy 




___ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 5 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
MAR. 5.2010 1:43PM HO AiiY GENERAL-SPU 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Idaho Attorney General 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Chief. Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO IS8 #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise. Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074 
NO. 474-P, 2 
FILED ~~ / ~7rjJP 
GAR 05 2fIII -.~ 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
COurt Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIiE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNiY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-06-324 
) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho. by and through its counsel acting as 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys for Blaine County. and hereby submits this brief in 
opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition (Hereinafter "Motion"). 
In her Motion Johnson asks for judgment on all her claims (save one which is 
waived). In her Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Disposition (hereinafter "Memorandum"). however, she addresses only 
the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence 
related specifically to fingerprint evidence. The state will rely upon the briefing 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOrlON FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
1 
MAR. 5.2010 1 :43PM HO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO. 474 P. 3 
submitted in its own motion for summary dismissal in relation to Johnson's un-
briefed claims. The state submits the following in relation to the issues 
addressed In Johnson's Memorandum. 
I. 
Johnson Has Falled To Show That She Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of 
Law On Her Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Johnson argues that she has demonstrated that her counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present at trial certain testimony from Johnson's trial 
fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky, that he was willing to offer. (Memorandum, 
pp. 11-13.) Review of the evidence presented and relied on by Johnson, 
however, shows that she has not made even a prima facie showing of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, much less a shC?wing that would entitle her to judgment on 
summary proceedings. 
B. Johnson Has Failed As A Matter Of Law To Show Deficient Performance 
As A Matter Of L§!6' 
The first prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is deficient 
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To 
establish deficient performance, the petitioner must demonstrate that her 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 J 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986). A claim of 
deficient performance "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "Because of the distorting 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
2 
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effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged 
conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 
401.406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689~90). A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the 
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes "trial counsel was competent and 
that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 
772,791-92,948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). 
What evidence or testimony an attorney decides should be presented to 
the jury to best support a defense theory Is a tactical decision that ordinarily will 
not be second-guessed on review. Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 
P.2d 348 (1997). Tactical decisions of counsel are presumed competent, which 
presumption is overcome only upon showing an objective shortcoming such as 
failure to investigate or ignorance of the law. State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901, 905, 
539 P.2d 254, 258 (1975). 
Despite this well~established law that counsel is presumed to have been 
effective and that petitioner has the burden of proving a subjective shortcoming 
through admissible evidence, Johnson asks this Court to simply presume 
deficient performance. She first phrases the question as follows: "How is it that 
trial counsel could forget to elicit opinion testimony on such an important topiC? 
Only ill preparedness can answer that question." (Memorandum, pp. 9-10.) By 
her framing of the question Johnson is simply asking this Court to assume that 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
3 
MAR, 5,2010 1:44PM AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO, 474 
p, 5 
counsel was not prepared. Such an assumption is exactly contrary to the 
applicable legal standards, however. 
Johnson continues, again asking this Court to presume incompetence 
instead of comp'etence: uWhat possible trial strategy could counsel have been 
applying to make an informed decision not to elicit such critical evidence?" 
(Memorandum. p. 11.) A rhetorical question is not evidence, much less proof. 
liThe constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not 
the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long series of 
examples of how the case might have been tried better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 
77,80, 844 P.2d 706,709 (1992). That Johnson or her post-conviction counsel 
belieVes that the testimony of her fingerprint expert could have been better 
presented is not a legally sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Because there is no evidence that the tactical decisions associated with 
presenting Kerchusky's testimony were based on any objective deficiency, 
Johnson has failed to prove her claim of deficient performance. 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Prove Her Claim Of Deficient Performance As A 
Matter Of Fact 
Johnson has also failed to present evidence sufficient to prove her claims. 
In relation to the fingerprint evidence, Johnson first claims that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in failing to conduct, or compel the state to conduct, 
further investigation into the identity of whoever had left unidentified fingerprints 
on Items related to the murder weapon and scene. (Petition, '1l 18(i)-(iii).) 
Johnson next claims that her trial counsel's performance was deficient in failing 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
4 
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to elicit certain testimony from the defense fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky. 
(Petition, W 18(vi)-(viit).1) The specific allegations of detleient performance 
related to the fingerprint evidence are unsupported by evidence to prove the 
claim, as set forth below. Thus, Johnson is not entitled to summary judgment in 
her favor. 
1. Failure To Take Steps To Identify The Source Of Prints 
Johnson tlrst alleges that it would, have been possible to conduct a more 
thorough search for unidentified fingerprints in this case in fingerprint databases 
than the search conducted by the police prior to trial. (Petition, ~ 18(i), ~ 18(v).) 
Likewise, trial counsel elected not to pursue further investigation by the defense 
expert of fingerprint evidence at the scene or where possible fingerprints might 
be found. (Petition, ~ 18(iii).) Rather than ask for a continuance to conduct a 
more thorough search of fingerprint databases or ask the defense expert to do a 
more thorough investigation, counsel elected instead to present the theory that 
the police search and investigation were inadequate. (Petition, 'U (18(;i): Affidavit 
of Mark Rader, p. 4.) 
The decision to pursue the defense theory that the police search was 
"horribly inadequate" (Affidavit of Mark Rader. p. 4) instead of seeking a 
continuance to try to get the police to perform a more thorough investigation or 
1 Johnson has withdrawn the allegation that Kerchusky was not asked about 
possible fingerprints on a trashcan lid (Petition, ,-r 18(iv») because, despite 
Kerchusky's sworn affidavit stating he had not been asked about this at trial, in 
fact he was so asked. (Compare Kerchusky affidavit, p. 2 with Trial Tr., vol. VII, 
p. 5124, Ls. 6-23.) This obviously false statement under oath is reason to believe 
that other parts of Kerchusky's testimony may lack credibility. Of course his 
credibility is something that would have to be determined at a hearing on the 
merits. 
MEMOMNDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
5 
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perform a more thorough investigation by t~eir own expert was clearly a tactical 
decision. Johnson has failed to present any evidence whatsoever that this was 
an unreasonable tactical decision I much less that it was a decision based upon 
inadequate preparation or any other objective shortcoming. Certainly the 
defense that the police investigation was inadequate would have been severely 
undermined if the defense had compelled or conducted further investigation that 
merely uncovered more incriminating evidence. It was perfectly reasonable to 
decide to present the defense already available Instead of take the far riskier 
course of filling in possible gaps in the pOlice investigation. 
2. Failure To Elicit Testimony That Prints On The Rifle. Scope, Box Of 
Ammunition, and Doorknobs Were Or Would Be "Fresh" 
Johnson next claims that trial coun~el was deficient for not eliciting expert 
testimony regarding aspects of the fingerprint evidence adduced at trial. These 
claims fail because they are contradicted by the record. Trial Counsel generally 
eiicited testimony about how long a fingerprint will last on a particular surface and 
what sort of factors should be conSidered. (Trial Tr., vol. VII, p. 5064, L 19 - p. 
5076, L 9.) In addition, trial counsel elicited testimony about the very issues 
Johnson currently claims he did not. 
First, Johnson claims that trial counsel failed to elicit testimony that a palm 
print on the rifle itself "was a fresh print." (Petition, 1l 18(vi).) Review of the 
testimony at trial, however, shows that trial counsel in fact elicited testimony from 
Kerchusky at trial that the palm print was likely of recent origin because fingerprints 
tend to fade over time. (Trial Tr., vol. VII, p. 5069 L. 11 - p. 5070, L. 18 (palm print 
on gun likely to evaporate rather quickly); p. 5075, L. 15 - p. 5078. L. 9 (palm print 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETrTIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
6 
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on rifle likely from last person to load gun); p. 5128, L 18 - p. 5129, L. 4 (in his 
experience a print on a gun would n'ot last more than a year).) This was in 
response to testimony from the state's expert that she could not date the print on 
the gun. (Trial Tr., vol. V, p. 3028, Ls. 2-17.) Johnson has simply presented no 
evidence of actually deficient performance, much less of objectively deficient 
performance as opposed to tactical decision-making. 
Johnson next alieges that trial counsel was deficient for failing to elicit 
Kerchusky's opinion that the fingerprints on the scope and the box of ammunition 
left in Mel Speegle's room matched, and were of recent origin. (Petition, 11 18(vii),2) 
The record, however, shows that testimony that the prints on an insert in the 
ammunition box and the scope matched and was likely of recent origin was in fact 
elicited. {Trial Tr., vol. VII, p. 5074, L 10 - 5075, L 14; p. 5083, L.1 - p. 5084, L. 9; 
p. 5090 L 18 - p. 5092, L. 19; p. 5126, L. 25 - p. 5128, L. 17.) In addition, 
Kerchusky was cross-examined extensively on the topic. (Trial Tr., vol. VII, p. 
5105, L. 9-p. 5113, L. 25; p. 5115, L.i6-p. 5116, L 18.) 
Finally, Johnson alleges that trial ~bUl,sel failed to elicit testimony regarding 
whether fingerprints on doorknobs would indicate the last person to use that 
doorknob. (Petition, 11 18(viii).) Again, review of the trial transcript shows that such 
testimony was elicited. (Trial Tr., vol. VIl, p. 5064, L. 19 - p. 5067, L. 3; p. 5108, L. 
10-p. 5109, L,17.) 
2 Johnson also alleges that trial counsel failed to "highlight" or "address" the fact 
that prints On the scope and box of ammunition did not match Johnson or other 
identified persons associated with the case. (Petition, 1f 18(vil).) The state's 
expert specifically testified to this, however. (Trial Tr., vol. V, p. 3042, L. 1 - p. 
3053, L. 11.) Johnson has failed to prove that his counsel was deficient for 
falling to present evidence already presented by the state in its case-In-chief. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
7. 
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The record in this case demonstrates that all of the topics Johnson believes 
her counsel should have addressed with Kerchusky were in fact addressed at trial. 
That Johnson currently believes that these topics should have been approached 
differently and that the approach she currently prefers is superior to that taken by 
trial counsel is not actual evidence of deficient performance. More importantly, that 
the approach taken by trial counsel was the result of an objective shortcoming is 
completely unsupported by evidence in the record . 
. D. Johnson Has Failed To Present Any Actual Evidence Of Prejudice, But 
Instead Relies On Bare Assertions And Mere Speculation 
To establish prejudice, Johnson must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); 
Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999); Roman v. 
State, 12.5 Idaho 644,849, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). At the evidentiary 
hearing Johnson must carry the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she was prejudiced by her attorney's deficient performance. See 
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. state, 111 Idaho 430, 436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). 
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make 
out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 
649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 
given to the testimony are matiers within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v. 
State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
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Johnson supports her claim of prejudice with nothing other than bare 
assertions and speculation. She first alleges, "But for Trial Counsel's failures as 
articulated above, all useable prints would have been properly submitted to relevant 
identifying systems such that the person who actually handled the murder weapon 
and ammunition found at the scene. and who removed the scope of the murder 
weapon, would likely have been identified. (See Affidavit of Robert Kerchusky.)" 
Petition, 'fi 18(ii). "But for this omission or tanure of Trial Counsel [to get more prints 
run through the fingerprint databases} a reasonable probability exists that Petitioner 
would have been found not guilty," (Petition,,-r 18(v),) Despite the reference to 
KerchuskYs affidavit, there is no evidence whatsoever that these allegations are 
true. 
On the contra!),. the trial record shows that at least three of the prints later 
identified as belonging to Christopher Hill were in fact checked against the relevant 
fingerprint databases and were not identified. (Trial Tr., vol. V, p. 3041, L. 21 - p. 
3046, L 10; p. 3051, L. 10 - p. 3053, L 11; vol. VII, p. 5081, L. 23 - p. 5084. L. 22.) 
Johnson presents no evidence whatsoever about why Hill was not identified before 
trial based on three of his fingerprints being run through the automated databases, 
and only speculates that if his attorneys would have pursued It they would have had 
more success than the Idaho State lab. In short, there is no evidence in this record 
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, 
suggesting it would have even been pos~ible to identify Hili as the source of any of 
the fingerprints before the trial.3 
Johnson next alleges that the claimed failures to elicit testimony on certain 
points from the defense fingerprint expert create a "reasonable probability that 
Petitioner would have been found not guilty," (Petition, 1T 18(vl); see also m:r 18(vii) 
and (viii).) This claim is merely a bare assertion and speculation that Johnson was 
prejudiced. As noted above, all of the topiCS Johnson alleges should have been 
covered were, in fact, covered. That Johnson wishes that they had been covered in 
more detail or in a different fashion does not show that the trial would have any 
probability of coming out differently. 
D. Johnson Has Failed To Prove Prejudice Because She Has Failed To Show 
That The Trial Would Have Been Conducted Differentl'¥: In Any Meaningful 
Way But For The Alleged Deficient Performan~ 
To show prejudice a petn:ioner must prove there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been 
different. Strickland v. WaShington, 466 U.S. 668, 687--88 (1984); LaBelle v. State, 
130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997). Here there is no evidence 
that but for the alleged deficiency of trial counsel's perfoliTlance the trial would likely 
have come out differently. 
At trial the primary defense pursued by trial counsel was that the police had 
done an inadequate investigation and that the evidence they gathered failed to 
3 In fact, the fingerprints identified in the database search were fingerprints of Hill 
taken on March 1,2007. (See Discovery Documents 51PC and 54PC, attached.) 
There is no evidence Hill's prints were in the database before or during the 2003 
trial in the underlying criminal case. 
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show Johnson was the killer. (Trial Tr., p. 4603, Ls. 4 - p. 4611 f L. 1 (opening 
argument).) As it had In relation to all the physical evidence presented at trial, the 
defense contended the fingerprint evidence was inconsistent with Johnson's guilt, 
taking the tactical position that the police investigation regarding the fingerprint 
evidence had been inadequate and falled'to exclude the unknown person who left . . 
prints on the rifle, the scope and the ammunition box as the killer. (06124/09 
Pangburn Depo.; p. 106, L. 24 - p. 107, L. 18.) 
In post-conviction, Johnson's theory is that counsel should have pursued 
investigation she believes the police inadequately conducted, learned that 
Christopher Hill was the source of some of the fingerprints found during the 
investigation of the murders, and extracted different testimony from the defense 
expert regarding fingerprints. However, what is totally lacking in this case is how 
any of this evidence that supposedly would have been presented but for counsel's 
deficient performance would have changed how the jury perceived this case at a/l. 
.. , 
The Jury in this case was presented with evidence that an unknown person 
left finger or palm prints on the rifle, the scope, and an insert in an ammunition box. 
They were presented with evidence that fingerprints on such things generally do not 
last long, and would be rubbed off by someone again touching those items in those 
places. They ultimately concluded that this evidence did not create reasonable 
doubt. 
The way that the trial would look different if Johnson had actually 
demonstrated deficient performance of counsel was that the jury would have been 
informed that the prints in fact belonged to Christopher Hill, a friend of Mel Speegle 
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with no known connection to the Johnsons, and that he had touched the rifle and 
scope while either moving it to Speegle's house or when sighting it In at a rifle 
range. This evidence does not make an acquittal more likely. On the contrary, it 
makes an acquittal less likely. 
Johnson argues, "To be confident Sarah committed this crime one would 
have to believe she had the physical strength and skill, and the emotional fortitude 
to shoot her sleeping mother, point blank, hand crank [sic] and palm the round, 
reload [sic] and then face her father down; all without getting a drop of blood on her, 
in a room otherwise dripping and humid with gore." (Memorandum. p. 13.) To the 
extent Johnson's factual assertions are accurate,4 the jury in fact did decide that 
none of Johnson's present argument created a reasonable doubt. That Christopher 
Hili was the source of previously unidentified fingerprints has nothing whatsoever to 
do with the argument Johnson Is currently providing to claim prejudice. Johnson's 
argument regarding prejudice fails because it is not causally connected to the 
deficient perlormance she claims. 
Johnson has falled to demonstrate that that she is entitled to relief, much 
less that she is entitled to relief without even a hearing. 
11 As detailed elsewhere the state presented evidence that Johnson had worn her 
bathrobe backward during the commission of the crime and then deposited it in a 
trash can along with the gloves she wore. The evidence included that the inside of 
the r?be had paint chips matching th~se on the shirt Johnson was wearing that 
mornIng and that blood and tissue from her parents was on the outside of the robe. 
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II. 
Johnson Has Failed To Show That She Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of 
Law On Her Claims Of Newly Discovered Evidence 
A petitioner may obtain a new trial "rwJhen new evidence is discovered 
material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced at the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). To obtain a new trial on 
the basis of newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must prove: (1) that the 
newly discovered evidence was unknown to him at the time of trial; (2) that the 
evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that the evidence will 
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that the failure to learn of the evidence was 
due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 
24,30,995 P.2d 794,800 (2000); State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 
972, 978 (1976). 
The state concedes that the first and fourth elements are met here. The 
evidence that Christopher Hili is the source of fingerprints on items associated with 
the murders and his subsequent statement are newly discovered 5 and the failure to 
learn this was not due to a lack of diligence by the defense. (The state notes that 
Johnson has alleged the mutually exclusive theory that defense counsel could and 
should have learned of this evidence in his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Of these two mutually exclusive theories alleged by Johnson, the only one 
with evidentiary support, as shown above, is that it was not possible to learn that 
Hili was the source of the fingerprints because the state's expert learned of Hill by 
5 The state does not concede that there is any additional evidence that could be 
considered newly discovered, and it is important to remember exactly what 
evidence is newly discovered for the analysis'herein. 
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doing exactly what she had done before trial: she re-ran the same print samples 
through the fingerprint databases.) 
The two elements Johnson has failed to prove (or even support by evidence) 
is that the new evidence is material and would probably produce an acquittal. As 
stated in the memorandum supporting the state's motion for summary judgment 
and above, leaming that the previously unknown source of the prints is Hill 
undermines the defense. At trial the defense could (and did) claim that the state 
could not establish whose fingerprints were on those items or when they were 
made. Now we now exactly who made the' prints (a person with no connection to 
the case or the victims whatsoever and no motive or opportunity to commit the 
crimes) and when (years before the crimes occurred when he helped move the rifle 
and other things into Mel Speegle's home and when he sited in the rifle). Suoh 
knowledge merely impeaches Kerchusky's view that the prints were of recent origin 
and greatly reduces the value of the print evidence to the defense. 
Counsel for Johnson argues that this evidence was material and would likely 
have produced an acquittal through innuendo and hypothetical questions. First, he 
cites Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 30, 995 P 2d 794. 800 (2000), and claims this 
Court should reach the "same conclusion." (Memorandum. p. 14.) The state notes 
that the conclusion in Grube was denial of post-conviction relief. Grube, 134 Idaho 
at31, 995 P.2d at 801. 
Counsel then states, "Curiously, it appears the same lead investigator, Scott 
Birch, was involved, as lead investigator, in both cases." (Memorandum, p. 14. 
This is a blatantly false (and grammatically Odd) statement. Scott Birch is an 
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investigator with the office of the attorney general. (Trial Tr., vol. VI, p. 4061, Ls. 1-
10.) In Grube Mr. Birch was not the "lead investigator, n but assisted the prosecutor 
to prepare for trial by interviewing witnesses disclosed by the defense and then 
following up on those statements. See generally, Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 
P.2d 794 (2000). The prosecutor failed to tum over Mr. Birch's reports to the 
defense, leading to the post-conviction claim of withholding exculpato!)' evidence 
(later deemed cumulative). Id. In the present case Mr. Birch's role was likewise to 
assist the prosecutors with trial preparation. (Trial Tr., vol. VJ, p. 4061, Ls. 14-18,) 
His only testimony in the case was about the physical layout of the Johnson home 
and surroundings, including lighting, based on observation long after the primary 
investigation. (Trial Tr., p. 4061, L. 1 - p. 4070, L. 25.) Counsel's claim that Mr. 
Birch was the «lead investigator" in either case is speoious. He can not in good faith 
claim that Mr. Birch had anything whatsoever to do with the newly discovered 
fingerprint evidence in this case. Counsel is making a clearly ridiculous attempt to 
slander Mr. Birch and the office of the attorney general currently handHng this case. 
Counsel continues the Innuendo in his attempt to slander when he states, 
"Here, we have clearly false and misleading testimony regarding latent fingerprints 
offered at grand jury, then again during trial, late disolosure of critical evidence, 
failure by the State to diligently use its best investigative tools, and now discovery of 
new fingerprint evidence.n (Memorandum, p. 14.) All of these claims (except the 
discovery of new evidence claim) are without evidentiary support, as shown by the 
state's motion to dismiss and as set forth above. Even if they were debatable, 
these claims are irrelevant to the issue of whether Johnson is entitled to a new trial. 
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Clearly counsel would rather attempt to besmirch the conduct of state agents than 
discuss the relevant law and evidence. 
When he finally gets around to discussing the issue of newly discovered 
evidence, counsel does not discuss the newly discovered evidence, but instead 
asks a series of Irrelevant hypothetical questions. (Memorandum, p. 15.) 
Why are Hill's prints on the scope in a pattern indicating removal of 
the scope from the rifle, not mere handling of the scope? How could 
Hill's prints still be on the tools of murder [sic] many years later, after 
being handled while moving them, and then handled by Speegle in 
the weeks prior to the murder? Wouldn't Hill's prints have dissipated 
or been lost due to intermediate handling? If indeed Speegle handled 
the murder weapon in weeks prior to the shootings why aren't his 
prints on the gun? 
(Memorandum, p. 15.) The problem with this argument by hypothetical is that all of 
these questions and the evidence both raising and answering them were presented 
at trial. The only new evidence is that the fingerprints that were of unknown origin 
at the time of trial are now known to have been made by Christopher Hili, who 
states he probably made them when sighting in the rifle and was camping some 
distance from the murder scene on the morning in question .. Put another way, if we 
substitute the information known at trial for the new evidence included in the 
hypothetical questions we get the following questions that were actually asked and 
answered at trial: 
Why are [an unknown person'sl prints on the scope in a pattern 
indicating removal of the scope from the rifle, not mere handling of 
the scope? How could ran unknown person'sJ prints still be on the 
tools of murder [sic] many years later, after being handled while 
moving them, and then handled by Speegle in the weeks prior to the 
murder? WOUldn't [the unknown person's] prints have dissipated or 
been lost due to intermediate handling? If indeed Speegle handled 
the murder weapon in weeks prior to the shootings why aren't his 
prints on the gun? 
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The newly discovered evidence simply does not support the defense. It 
introduces no questions that were not already answered by the jury's verdict. The 
jury found Johnson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt even knowing that there were 
fingerprints from an unknown person on the scope, the insert in the ammunition 
box, and the stock of the rifle. The jurors were presented evidence that such prints 
were, in the defense's opinion, of recent origin. The jury already necessarily 
rejected the theory that the person who left those prints was likely the murderer. In 
short, the fingerprint evidence did not create reasonable doubt in the trial, and there 
is no reason to believe that knowing who made the prints is more likely to lead to an 
acquittal. 
CONCLU~ION 
Johnson's motion fails to establish that she would be entitled to summary 
disposition in her favor as a matter of law, even assuming there were no material 
Issues of fact. In the alternative, Johnson has failed to present evidence 
establishing that there are no material issues of fact by which she could prevail 
on her claims. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2010. 
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) Case No. CV..o6-324 
) 
) REPLY IN. SUPPORT OF 
) RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
) OF PETITIONER'S SECOND 
) AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST -CONVICITON RELIEF 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through its counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attorneys for Blaine County, and hereby submits this reply brief in support 
of the state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's ("Johnson") petition for post-
conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c), 
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The State Is Entitled To Summa['l Dismissal Of All The Claims In Johnson's Petition 
A. Claim One - "PetItioner Is Innocent" 
1. Claim One Is Untimely 
In this case, judgment was entered on June 30. 2005, and, as previously noted, 
Johnson failed to file a timely appeal. Johnson's actual innocence claim did not appear 
in her original petition; rather, she first alleged her claim of actual innocence In her first 
amended petition, which was not filed until March 16, 2009, nearly four years after 
judgment was entered. Johnson nevertheless contends her "actual innocence" claim is 
timely because her first amended petition was filed "within the statutory deadline of one 
year from the determination of the appeal." (Petitioner's Memorandum Response to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal ("Response"), p.5.)1 While this argument 
may make sense as applied to causes of action that arOSe out of the appeal itself, it 
would be inappropriate for the statute of limitations to bar claims that arose only after 
the statute had run, and Johnson has not explained why the granting of partial summary 
Judgment in her favor to reinstate her appellate rights waived or tolled the applicable 
statute of limitations. Indeed, there is no reason why Johnson did not bring the claims 
that were known or should have been known in the original petition or In an amended 
petition brought within one year of the judgment becoming final. In short, Johnson has 
failed to show why reinstatement of appellate rights in this or any case has the 
1 Johnson also implies that the state previously lost the statute of limitation argument in 
an "unsuccessful Motion to Strike." (Response, pA.) This is incorrect. The state 
previously raised the timeliness of the claims raised in Johnson's amended petitions 
but, after the Court expressed a preference for permitting the amendments and 
addressing all defenses at one time, the state withdrew its objections to the 
amendments without prejudice to raising the defense in its motion for summary 
dismissal. (See state's Withdrawal of Obj~ctions to First Amended Petition filed June 
10,2009.) 
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automatic effect of restarting an already running or expired statute of limitation. As 
such, any claim that was not raised in Johnson's origin a! petition but could have been, 
does not relate back to her original petition, or does not arise from the appeal (e,g., 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel), is untimely and should be dismissed on this 
basis. Because Claim One could have been raised in Johnson's original petition, does 
not relate back to her ong inal petition, and is completely unrelated to any alleged error 
occurring in relation to her appeal, the claim should be dismissed as untimely. 
2. Claim One Fails To State A Cause Of Action 
Even if this Court concludes Johnson's first claim is not untimely, it should be 
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Johnson in no way refutes this assertion 
in her Response. The state, therefore, relies on the argument made in its Memorandum 
in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Second 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief C'Memorandum',). for the reasons Claim 
One should be dismissed on this basis. (Memorandum, pp.12-13.) 
B. Claim Two - "Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Try. Convict And Sentence 
P~titioner" 
1. Claim Two Is Untimely 
Johnson asserts Claim Two is timely for the same reasons Claim One is timely. 
For the reasons set forth in Section A.1, Claim Two is also untimely and should be 
dismissed on this basis. 
2. Claim Two Fails As A Matter Of Law 
Even if not dismissed as untimely, Johnson's second claim should be dismissed 
because the claim fails as a matter of law. Pursuant to I.C. § 20-509(1)1 Johnson was 
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not entitled to a waiver hearing because she committed an offense that automatically 
waived her into adult court. In arguing otherwise, Johnson asserts: 
The State quotes I.e. Section 20-509(1) but omits the conflicting 
provision of I.C. 20·508 which on its face, affords all juveniles the right to 
full investigation, a hearing and the dIscretion of a magistrate to waive 
jurisdiction under the juvenile corrections act over the juvenile and order 
the juvenile be held for adult criminal proceedings when a juvenile is 
alleged to have committed any of the crimes enumerated in section 20-
509. 
(Response, p.6.) 
Johnson)s interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Juvenile 
Corrections Act is incorrect. Basic rules of statutory construction require a court, 
"rw]hen analyzing the language and application of a statute," to "give the words their 
plain, usual. and ordinary meaning, and [toJ give effect to the statute's every word and 
clause." State v. Maynard, 139 Idaho 117, 12Q, 73 P.3d 731, 734 (Ct. App. 2003) (Citing 
State v. Swader. 137 Idaho 733, 738, 52 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct.App.2002»). The plain 
language of I.C. § 20-505 states, "the court shall have exclusive, Original jurisdiction 
over any juvenile" in the types of cases enumerated therein. Subsection (4) of that 
same provision states, "This chapter shall not apply to the violent juvenile offender, as 
defined in this chapter." LC. § 20-505(5). Violent juvenile offenders are defined as 
those juveniles, "age fourteen (14) years to age eighteen (18) years" who are "alleged to 
have committed" certain violent crimes, including "Im]urder of any degree." I.e. § 20-
509(1)(a). Idaho Code § 20-508(1){b) provides that a "court may waive jurisdiction 
under the juvenile corrections act over the juvenile and order that the juvenile be held 
for adult criminal proceedings when," the '1uvenile Is alleged to have committed an act 
other than those enumerated in section 20-509, Idaho Code." (Emphasis added.) The 
reason the court cannot "waive jurisdiction" over juveniles "alleged to have committed 
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an act" enumerated in I.C. § 20-509 is because the court has no jurisdiction over such 
juveniles. As explained in §tate y. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454,458,700 P.2d 76,80 (Ct. 
App. 1985), which interpreted the same provisions of the Juvenile Corrections Act 
previously codified under Title 16, the waiver requirements for juveniles are "operative 
only when the juvenile court has jurisdiction to proceed and, because section 16-1806A 
[now I.C. § 20-509], excludes certain crimes ab initio from Juvenile court jurisdiction," the 
waiver provisions of the act do not apply. See In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248, 207 P .3d 
974, 979 (2009) (recognizing "[a]n adult court may, however, obtain criminal jurisdiction 
over a juvenile when the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction under the JCA or enters an 
order waiving such jurisdiction. I.C. §§ 18-216(1), 20-508 & 20-509"). In addition, the 
Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged the automatic waiver provisions of I.C. § 20-509 in 
State v. Bymight, 132 Idaho 654,978 P.2d 214 (1999). 
The lack of juvenile jurisdiction is also apparent in the very statute upon Which 
Johnson relies - I.e. § 20-508. The very first words In that section (after the title) are, 
"After the filing of a petition and after full investigation and hearing, the court may 
waive jurisdiction ... ." I.C. § 20-508(1) (emphasis added). Thus, a prerequisite to 
waiver of jurisdiction under the act is that jurisdiction under the act was invoked by the 
filing of a petition. Because I.e. § 20~509 specifically provides that someone in 
Johnson's position (over fourteen and having committed a homicide) "shall be charged, 
arrested, and proceeded against by complaint, indictment or information as an adult," 
I.C. § 20·509(1), the state did not, and in fact was statutorily precluded from, filing a 
petition. The Juvenile Corrections Act, therefore, did not apply to Johnson's case. 
Although Johnson cites Bumight, she does not cite it for the proposition that 
certain crimes are automatically waived pursuant to I.e. § 20-509. (Response, p.7.) 
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Rather, she states: "In Bumight. the Court very clearly held that a juvenile's failure to 
challenge jurisdiction acts as a waiver." (Response, p.7.) The Court in Burnight did 
indeed hold as much, and such holding is fatal to Johnson's substantive claim that the 
court lacked jurisdiction to try her. Johnson nevertheless attempts to avoid the 
consequences of the Court's holding in Burnight by emphasizing that she has also 
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the jurisdictional claim prior 
to trial. (Response, p.7.) While such an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could 
defeat that portion of Bumight that holds a challenge to juvenile jurisdiction is waived if 
not raised before the trial court, it does not defeat that portion of Burnight which 
expressly acknowledges certain crimes are automatically waived, or the plain language 
of the Juvenile Corrections Act. In other words, because there was never any Juvenile 
jurisdiction over Johnson's case, which could have been waived, Johnson's olaim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the court's jurisdiction fails as a matter of 
2 Johnson also relies on State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.3d 1083 (2003), and 
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), (Response, p.?) However, neither of 
these cases support her jurisdictional argument. Kavaiecz did not involve any crime 
automatically waived under I.e. § 20-509; it involved an allegation of lewd conduct. 139 
Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. Moreover, the Court in Kavajecz adhered to Its holding 
in Bumight "that a juvenile defendant who fails to challenge a district court's jurisdiction 
over him prior to trial waives this right on appeal." .ht. at 485, 80 P.3d at 1086. 
Kavajecz, therefore, affords no support for either of Johnson's jurisdidional claims. The 
same is true for Kent. Kent, by its own terms, applies only when the defendant is 
statutorily entitled to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court absent an affirmative 
waiver. The Supreme Court concluded that before this statutory right was removed, 
Kent was entitled to counsel and a hearing. liL. at 557. Because, unlike in Kent, there is 
no statutory right in Idaho to juvenile jurisdiction In certain cases involving violent 
offenses, such as murder, Kent is inapplicable. 
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Because Johnson's jurisdictional argument fails as a matter of law regardless of 
whether it is a substantive claim or an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Claim 
Two should be dismissed. 
C. Claim Three -lVJolation Of Petitioner's Right To Due Process Of Law" 
Johnson has conceded she is not entitled to relief on her claims based on judicial 
bias (Response, pp.3-27); therefore, no further argument need be presented, and the 
state is entitled to summary dismissal of the judicial bias allegations contained in Claim 
Three. 
Johnson's third claim a1s.0 Includes an allegation that the district court erred in 
imposing a I'constitutlonal [sic] impermissible limitatio'n" on her right to cross-examine 
Bruno Santos. (Petition, p.6, '14.) Johnson maintains she is entitled to relief on this 
portion of Claim Three. Johnson is Incorrect. 
1. Johnson's Confrontation Clause Claim Is Untimely 
Like Johnson's first two claims, Johnson's confrontation claim waS not raised 
until Johnson filed her amended petition. For the reasons set forth in Section A.1. 
Johnson has failed to establish this portion of Claim Three is timely; the claim should 
therefore be dismissed for failing to comply with the one-year statute of limitation. 
2. Johnson's Confrontation Clause Claim Is Barred By I.C. § 19-4901 (b) 
In addition to being untimely, as asserted in the State's Memorandum, Johnson's 
confrontation clause claim is barred by Le. § 19-4901(b) because Johnson could have 
raised it on direct appeal and she has failed to show "that the asserted basis for relief 
raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt" or that the claim 
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"could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." 
(Memorandum, pp.21-22.) In her Response, Johnson acknowledges "a plain reading of 
the statute and the lion's share of the case law supports the State's position," but 
contends there are "two exceptions" to this "blanket prohibition," which she claims were 
articulated in Beam v. State, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), and Hoffman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 188, 868 P.2d 516 (1994). 
Johnson argues that, in Beam, the Court "drew a distinction between factual 
material issues, and purely legal issues," and "proceeded to consider the 
constitutionality of I.C. [§] 19-2719." (Response, p p.8w 9.) There are at least mo 
reasons why this argument fails to establish the bar in I.C. § 19-4901 (b) does not apply 
to Johnson's confrontation clause claim. First, why any "distinction between factual 
materials issues, and purely legal issues," renders Johnson's confrontation clause claim 
one that could not have been raised on direct appeal is a mystery because an alleged 
confrontation clause violation is not "purely [a] legal issue[ ]," as is the constitutionality of 
a statute, which was tne issue the Court addressed in Beam. Second, the Court In 
Beam could not have declined to consider the constitutionality of I.e. § 19-2719 based 
upon I.e. § 19-4901(b). Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth "special appellate and post 
conviction procedure rules for capital cases, n including the requirement that a post-
conviction petition be filed within 42 days "of the filing of the judgment imposing the 
punishment of death." Beam, 115 Idaho at 211, 766 P .2d at 681. The constitutionality 
of this requirement could necessarily only be litigated in relation to Beam's post-
conviction petition, not in relation to his prior appeal. Beam does not, therefore, support 
Jonnson's argument. 
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Hoffman also does not support Johnson's claim that she is entitled to an 
I'exception" to the requirements of I.e. § 19-4901(b). As Johnson correctly notes, the 
Court in Hoffm~n stated: "The [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act], is available 'to 
cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect either the jurisdiction of the 
court or the validity of the judgment. even though these errors could have been raised 
on dlreot appeal.'" 125 Idaho at 190, 868 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted). What 
Johnson fails to do is quote the very next sentenoe in Hoffman, Which reads, liThe 
[Uniform Post-Conviotion Procedure Act], however, oannot be otherwise used as a 
substitute for an appeal, and any issue which could have been, but was not, raised on 
dlreot appeal is forfeited and cannot be considered in a post-conviction proceeding." Id. 
(citations omitted). The Court, applying these standards to Hoffman's case, agreed with 
the district court's conclusion "that both the challenge to the inadvertent prior conviction 
testimony and the allegation of failure to disclose witnesses prior to trial oould have 
been raised on direot appeal," and affirmed summary dismissal of these claims on this 
basis. kL. at 190-191,868 P.2d at 518-519. 
Although Johnson doe.s not explain how her oonfrontation olause claim falls 
within the "exception" noted in Hoffman (or, for that matter, in Beam), to the extent she 
is suggesting the claim is the type of error that "affect[s] either the jurisdiotion of the 
court or the validity of the judgment" against her, she is incorrect. Like the claims in 
Hoffman, Johnson's confrontation olause claim is a claim that oould have been raised 
on direct appeal. Becau.se Johnson failed to raise the claim on direct appeal, it is 
barred by I.e. § 194901(b) and should be dismissed on this basis. 
Johnson also argues that, "[i]n any event, this issue is also framed as an 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim," the "substantive merits of [which] were 
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argued with supporting citation in Petitioners Memorandum of Law in Support of First 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed March 17, 2009." (Response, p.9.) 
Johnson fails to identify on what pages of her memorandum she believes she 1ramed" 
this issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel (id.), nor can the state find such an 
argument in her memorandum under the section entitled "Violation of Confrontation 
Clause" (id. at pp.6-11), or in the section entitled "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel" (id. 
at pp .11-18). While there is an assertion that counsel was ineffective for falling to 
adequately cross-examine certain witnesses (id. at pp.17-18), this is hardly the 
equivalent of a confrontation clause claim. Moreover, all claims must be raised in 
Johnson's petition, not In her supporting memoranda. 
Because Johnson's confrontation clause claim is untimely and barred by I.C. § 
19-4901(b). It must be dismissed. 
D. Claim Four- "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel" 
1. Failyre To Move For A Continuance. Object To The Re-Enactment By State, 
Or Adequately Investigate Scientific Basis For Proffered Coconut Experiment 
Johnson contends counsel were deficient for failing to request a continuance 
after discovering that the comforter on the bed where Diane was murdered was not 
collected as evidence. (Petition. pp.7~8~ ~ 15.a.) According to Johnson, she was 
prejudiced by counsels' failure to do so because It left counsel "inadequately prepared 
to cross-examine the State's witnesses about the alleged comforter" and U(s]pecifically, 
whether a hole on the comforter was a bullet hole and whether a sheet and or comforter 
covered the head of Diane Johnson thereby effecting blood spatter." (Petition, p.8, 1T 
15.a; see also Petition, p.9, 11 15_d (alleging counsel were ineffective in "failing to 
provide expert testimony as to comforters").) Johnson also alleges counsel should have 
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also requested a continuance in order to provide more time to prepare sO they could 
"discredit" the statels expert forensic witness, Rod Englert. (Petition, p.S, 'U is.b.) 
Johnson further alleges trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the re-
enactment proffered by Mr. Englert as without adequate foundation and as invading the 
province of the jury (id.), and for failing to "present adequate support" for their coconut 
experiment (Petition, p.S, ~ 15.c). 
The state moved for summary dismissal of these claims because Johnson failed 
to allege exactly how counsel could have been more prepared to cross-examine the 
state's witnesses had they obtained a continuance, failed to allege how Mr. Englert's re-
enactment or opinion was improper, failed to allege precisely what counsel could have 
done differently vis-a-vis the coconut experiment, and failed to establish a prfma facie 
case of prejudice as a result of counsels' failure to request a continuance. 
(Memorandum, pp.24-29.) 
In response, Johnson argues counsel "could have" (1) "properly researched and 
found the exact same type of sheet and comforter with which to conduct the 
experiment;" (2) "constructed a proper setting that accurately replicated the conditions 
at the scene;" and (3) j'fjled a motion in limine to gauge the Court's receptiveness to 
admission of alternative tests." (Response, p.10.) Johnson further argues, "[I]f 
admissible tests had formulated [SIC], then the cross examination of the State's 
witnesses, would obviously have been different." (Response, pp.10-11.) These 
allegations still fail to establish a prima facie case that counsel were ineffective for 
failing to seek a continuance. 
The possibility that counsel may have been able to find "the exact same type of 
sheet and comforter" with which to "construct[ ] a proper setting that accurately 
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replicated the conditions at the scene" is purely speculative. Indeed, to this date, 
Johnson has failed to provide any evidence that the "exact same type of sheet and 
comforter" could have been purchased for use in such an experiment. As for the 
assertion that counsel were ineffective for failing to object to Mr. Englert's re-enactment 
or to his opinion, Johnson has still failed to identify how the foundation was inadequate 
or how Mr. Englert's opinion impermissibly invaded the province of the jury. Instead, 
she focuses on the possibility that trial counsel could have done more in relation to their 
own coconut experiment. (Response, pp.10-12.) Any alleged inadequacies on 
counsels' part in relation to conducting a different experiment do not establish a prima 
facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation Mr. Englert's re-enactment or 
opinion. 
With regard to the alleged deficiencies in relation to the coconut experiment, 
Johnson's Response fails to describe what counsel should or could have done. 
Instead, Johnson quotes the following exchange from the deposition of Mr. Rader: 
Q_ The record reveals that that evidence [defense crime 
reconstruction scientific experiment evidence] was in fact - the objection 
was the motion in limine was sustained and that it was kept out. Do you 
know now, as you're sitting here, the proper foundation for admission of 
scientific evidence in a court of Jaw in a criminal matter in the state of 
Idaho? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the question I've got to you [sic] is, what, if any, legal 
research did you do at that time in preparation for admission of those 
tests? And we will do it one at a time. The test No.1 being the coconut 
blood spatter test. 
A. I didn't do any legal research on the grounds for foundation. 
Q. Okay. And why didn't you? 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 12 
MAR,19,2010 4:04PM DAHO AiTY GENERAL-SPU NO, 545 p, 14 
A. I thought I knew them. 
(Response, pp.11-12 (quoting Tr., Deposition of Mark S. Rader, dated June 5, 2009, 
p.123, L17-p.124, L.12).) 
Exactly why Johnson believes this deposition testimony reveals counsel was 
deficient is unclear. In fact, if anything, it indicates counsel knows how to lay foundation 
for scientific evidence. Even if it does not indicate such an ability, it certainly does not 
provide any explanation of what counsel could have done differently In terms of laying 
foundation for the coconut experiment. 
Johnson's claims of prejudice are equally as speculative as her claims of 
deficient performance - a point she acknowledges in admitting she cannot explain 
"[eJxactly how" any of the things counsel "could have" done would have made a 
difference. 
Johnson's reliance on Mr. Rader'S willingness to concede his own ineffectiveness 
and apparently Mr. Pangburn's as well also fails to establish either deficient 
performance or prejudice. See Edwards v. LaMarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2007) (the court is "not obligated to accept a self-proclaimed assertion by trial counsel 
of inadequate performance"); Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998) 
("admissions of inadequate performance by trial lawyers are not decisive in ineffective 
assistance claims"). Indeed, not even Mr. Rader could articulate precisely how he or 
Mr. Pangburn were defiCient, much less how Johnson was prejudiced as a result, he 
just "agreed" that he should have moved for a continuance. (See Response, p.11.) 
Absent admissible evidence supporting her allegations, Johnson's claims must 
be dismissed. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272,61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002) 
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review denied (2003). Because Johnson's allegations are bare and conclusory and 
unsubstantiated by any evidence, she is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and 
summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. state. 124 Idaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253. 
1257 (Ct. App. 1993); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156. 159.715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. 
App.1986). 
2. Failure To Adequately Cross-Examine 
Johnson alleges counsel failed to adequately cross-examine a number of 
witnesses, "includ[ing] but . . . not limited to Matt Johnson, Alan & Julia Dupuis, EMT 
Schell Eliison, Sherrlf [sic] Walt Femling, Detective Steve Harkin [sic1, Bruno Santos, 
Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez (aka Juan Gonzales)[,] Jane Lopez, 
Becky Lopez and Carlos Ayala, and also include officers Raul Ornelas, and stu 
Robinson." (Petition, p.9, ~ 16.) The state moved for summary dismissal of these 
claims, asserting Johnson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that counsel 
was ineffective in relation to any of these witnesses. (Memorandum, pp.3043.) The 
state also noted Johnson failed to allege any specific deficiencies or prejudice in relation 
to Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Schell Eliison, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Becky Lopez, 
or Carlos Ayala. (Memorandum, p.30.) 
In her Response, Johnson "claims a cumulative negative impact of counsel's 
deficient performance," and represented she would clrespond[ ] specifically as to each 
witness." (Response, p.13.) Johnson's Response, however, still fails to describe any 
specific deficiencies as to Alan or Julia Dupuis, Schell Elisson, Glenda Osuno. Luis 
Ramirez, Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala. Thus, even assuming it would be appropriate 
for Johnson to include such allegations in her response to the state's motion rather than 
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in her petition, there Is still no genuine issue of material fact that counsel was ineffective 
in relation to any of these witnesses. Likewise, there is still no genuine issue of material 
fact that counsel were ineffective in relation to their strategic decisions regarding cross-
examination of Detective Harkins, Officer Ornelas, Sheriff Femling, Officer Kirtley, 
Officer Robinson, Matt Johnson, Jane Lopez, Conseulo Cedeno! or Bruno Santos. 
a, D'etective Steve Harkins 
Johnson contends counsel was ineffective in "failing to adequately cross-
examine" Detective Steve Harkins about his testimony that he "had personally spoken 
with Bruno Santos over 100 times within the last year." (Petition, p.10, 1116.a.i.) 
According to Johnson, "police reports and supplements do not support this bald 
assertion" and counsel should have attempted to impeach Detective Harkins on this 
point. (Id.) In her Response, Johnson contends that "[w]hen an Incredible claim, such 
as the large number of personal contacts with a suspect/state's cooperating witness is 
made, it must be questioned" and, according to Johnson, if it had been questioned 
"Harkins either could not have substantiated the claim, or would have had to explain the 
nature of s.uch a large number of contacts." (Response, p.14.) If Johnson would read 
the trial transcript, she would discover that Detective Harkins did explain the "large 
number of contacts" he had with Bruno. 
In resp.onse to a question by Mr. Pangburn about how many "caUs or interviews" 
he had with Bruno, Detective Harkins responded: "I don't know if I can give you an 
exact number. I talked to him a number of times. Numerous interviews. Weekly 
contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We made contact over the phone, met 
in person. I didn't document every contact I had with him," (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2192, Ls.1-
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6.} Mr. Pangburn then asked how many reports Detective Harkins wrote in reference to 
Bruno, and Detective Harkins answered, liMy best estimate, ten, maybe." (Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2192, Ls.7-15.) Detective Harkins further explained, in response to Mr. Pangburn's 
questions, that the reason he kept in touoh with Bruno was due to an agreement with 
Homeland Security, who had given Bruno temporary immigration status, whloh involved 
certain requirements with which Bruno had to comply. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2192, L16 -
p.2193, L.20.) Detective Harkins kept an "eye on 17 Bruno to make sure he was following 
those requirements. (Id.) Johnson's claim that Detective Harkins "could not have 
sUbstantiated" the number of times he contacted Bruno and her assertion that counsel 
failed to have Detective Harkins "explain the nature of such a large number of contacts" 
are belied by the record. 
Johnson's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to make "hints" to 
Detective Harkins that Santos had a "deal" with the prosecution and may have 
"'possibly" "committed the crimes, rather than Petitioner," are also belied by the record. 
Mr. Pangburn specifically elicited testimony from Detective Harkins regarding Bruno's 
arrest for drug possession and inquired as to Bruno's involvement with drug dealing, 
gangs, and the possibility that he or his associates were involved in the murders. (See 
generally Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2192-2211.) Johnson's assertion that counsel did not inquire 
into these areas is false. 
Because Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was 
ineffective in cross-examining Detective Harkins, this olaim should be dismissed. 
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b. Officer Raut Ornelas 
Johnson alleged in her Petition that counsel was Ineffective for "fafl[ing] to point 
out the [sic] Tim Richards, the neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked 
the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas," and "failed to highlight the 
fact that Ornelas concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person, 
thereby pointing blame from Petitioner alone and onto unidentified murderers." (Id.) In 
seeking summary dismissal, the state asserted it was not deficient for counsel to fait to 
"paint aut" during Officer Ornelas' testimony that "Tim Richards ... walked the very area 
of the back yard later observed by Ornelas" during Officer Ornelas' cross-examination, 
when this information was already in evidence. (Memorandum, p.32.) The state further 
asserted, "There is no requirement that counsel revisit the testimony of other witnesses 
during the cross-examination of any witness who testifies on a related matter." (Jd.) In 
Response to this assertion, Johnson states: "True enough, but most competent lawyers 
would." (Response, p.14.) Not only does the state disagree with this statement, the 
statement ignores the standards applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
As explained by the Ninth Circuit, "The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers 
would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We 
ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the 
circumstances, as defense counsel acted at triaL" Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 
1105,1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev/don other grounds, Calderon V. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 
(1998). 
Furthermore, Johnson's Response fails to provide any basis for finding prejudice 
in relation to the allegedly inadequate cross-examination of Officer Ornelas. Because 
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Johnson has failed to allege a prima faoie case that counsel was ineffecnve in cross-
examining Officer Ornelas, this claim should be dismissed. 
b. SherjffWalt Femling 
Johnson alleges counsel "fail[ed] to adequately cross-examine the Blaine County 
Sheriff who made a statement during the early stages of the investigation to the effect 
that it was vital that police find a suspect in order to prevent a negative perception of the 
Sun Valley area .... " (Petition, p.10, 11 16.a.iii.) According to Johnson, this statement 
was "vital" to her defense because, she contends, "it showed that law enforcement 
personnel were more interested in placing a suspect into custody than to find the 
perpetrator of the crimes," (Petition, p.11, 11 16.a.iIl.) In her Response, Johnson 
contends the statements made by Sheriff Femling "were inadvertently recorded by 
Officer Kirtley" but "Pangburn failed to offer the tape into evidence" after his Investigator, 
Patrick Dunn, enhanced the audio. (Response, p.15.) Johnson then asks two rhetorical 
questions: (1) "[W]hy would any competent lawyer in possession of information 
concerning that type of statement, not use rt?"; and (2) "Could it be that Mr. Pangburn 
had not familiarized himself with the enhanced quality of the tape, as stated by Dunn?" 
Johnson's rhetorical questions completely fail to establish a prima facie claim that 
counsel was deficient or that she was prejudiced as a result. Indeed, Johnson has yet 
to provide any admissible evidence of the actual contents of the statements. Moreover, 
there is no basis from which to conclude that Johnson would not have been convicted 
had counsel introduced evidence, assuming it exists, that Sheriff Femling believed, 
based upon the evidence at the crime scene, that Johnson should be focused on as a 
suspect 
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Because Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was 
ineffective in cross-examining Sheriff Femling, this claim should be dismissed. 
c. Matt Johnson 
Johnson agrees counsel made a "strategic decision not to point the finger at Matt 
Johnson" and concedes the state Is entitled to summary dismissal of this claim. 
(Response, pp.17, 27.) No further response is therefore required. 
d. Conseulo Cedeno 
Johnson alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine ConseuJo 
Cedeno, Bruno's mother, regardIng inconsistencies between her pre-trial statements 
and her testimony at trial. (Petition, p.12, ~ 16.a.v.) Specifically, before trial Ms. 
Cedeno Indicated her belief that Santos had not driven the car the morning of the 
murders because there was dew on the windshield. (Ex. 12.) At trial, however, Ms. 
Cedeno testified that she could not tell whether the car had been driven and said she 
did not "pay attention" to "things like that." (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2775, L.19- p.2776, L.S.) As 
explained in the state's Memorandum, trial counsel's decision not to cross-examine Ms. 
Cedeno was not only objectively reasonable, it was wise strategy because the defense 
would have no incentive to try and remind Ms. Cedeno that she had previously provided 
information indicating Bruno did not drive the car. To do so would have only 
strengthened Bruno's alibi. 
In Response, Johnson contends the "State's argument somehow presumes that 
both statements were innocent, but the testimony at trial was more favorable than the 
inconsistent pre-trial statement." (Response, p.1S.) To the extent the state's argument 
"presumes" Ms. Cedeno's trial testimony was "more favorable than the inconsistent pre-
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triar statement," that is because it is more favorable in terms of whether Bruno had an 
alibi. 
Johnson also argues that the "entire point" of highlighting the inconsistency 
"would be to draw into question Ms. Cedeno's veracity, and that of her son." 
(Response, p.18.) Impeaching Ms. Cedeno on whether or not she knew if Bruno had 
driven the car, however, would not have made a difference in Johnson's trial. 
Because Johnson has fai/ed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was 
ineffective in failing to cross-examine Conseulo Cedeno, this claim should be dismissed. 
f. Jane Lopez 
Johnson alleges, "a discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial testimony 
and proof to the contrary found in phone records, indicating Bruno Santos was not at his 
mother's house. Trial Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy, yet, Trial Counsel 
failed to utilize the records On cross-examination." (Petition, p.12, "16.a.v.) The state 
sought dismissal of this claim because it is bare and conclusory as to deficient 
performance and fails to allege any prejudice. More specifically, as noted in the state's 
Memorandum, Johnson failed to identify or provide what phone records are inconsistent 
with Ms. Lopez's testimony or explain how they disprove Bruno was not home at the 
time of the murders. Instead, the only "evidence" Johnson offers in support of this claim 
is a usee" oitation to Mr. Dunn's affidavit (Ex. 2), with no page reference. (Petition, p.12, 
~ 16.a.v.) However, the only portion of Mr. Dunn's affidavit that refers to Ms. Lopez (Ex. 
2. p.6, ~ 13) is just as bare and conelusory as the allegations in Johnson's petition. 
In Response, Johnson seems to acknowledge the absence of evidence in 
support of this claim, and contends: "If the Court finds an issue of material facts [sic] on 
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this basis, and allows an order of discovery said phone records will be gathered and 
presented as evidence.1t (Response, p.17.) What Johnson mayor may not be able to 
produce at an evidentiary hearing does not excuse her from the requirement that she 
produce sufficient evidence to entitle her to a hearing In the first instance. Because 
Johnson has failed to satisfy this requirement, her claim that oounsel was ineffective in 
failing to cross-examine Jane Lopez, should be dismissed. 
g. Bruno Santos 
In her Petition, Johnson asserted counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-
examine Bruno regarding his "dealing drugs)" his "gang connections," and that he had 
"oommltted the crime of statutory rape, thereby giving Santos a motive for killing to 
avoid a potentlallfte sentence." (Petition, p.13, ~ 16.d.) The state moved for summary 
dismissal of this claim because Johnson has failed to establish that oounsel's decision 
not to cross-examine Bruno was objectively unreasonable or based upon inadequate 
preparation. (Memorandum. pAO.) 
In Response, Johnson states: "To provide further background and foundation, 
many of the allegations against Mr. Santos are self professed. Trial counsel had access 
to a host of interview transcripts containing statements of Bruno Santos and various 
companions." (Response, p.18.) Johnson then goes on to list a number of topics she 
apparently believes counsel should have cross-examined Bruno on, including not only 
those topics contained in her Petition (drugs, gangs, and sex), but also on (1) the fact 
that Bruno had been to the Johnson's residence; (2) his car "could have been in area 
fsic] night of murders [sic];" (3) uBruno was out night [sic] before murders with people 
whose names who [sic] couldn't or woufdn't reveal;" (4) "Bruno initially denied Alan 
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Johnson told him to stay away from Sarah;'} (5) "Bruno admitted owning guns, traded for 
weed;" (6) "Bruno wanted to kill Alan Johnson;" (1) "Bruno offered to buy high school girl 
plane ticket [sic] to Mexico;" and (8) Bruno "insinuate[d]" he "may have done it." 
(Response, pp.18~19.) 
As an Initial matter, the state has no idea what Johnson means when she says, 
"many of the allegations against Mr. Santos, are self professed." (Response, p.18.) 
The state is, therefore, at a loss as to how to respond to this assertion, particularly as it 
relates to whether Johnson has alleged a prima faoie case that counsel was ineffective 
for falling to cross-examine Bruno. 
With respect to Johnson's numerous allegations regarding specific topics she 
contends counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into, to the extent the topics were 
not included in her Petition, she cannot now allege them as claims of Ineffectiveness. 
Even if she could, Johnson has failed to establish a prima faoie case that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to inquire into those topics. For example, Johnson's claim that 
"Bruno's car could have been in area [sic] night of murders [sicl" is based on an 
intelView of Bruno where Detective Harkins asked, "What if , told you someone said that 
they seen your vehicle in the area that morning?" (Response, p.19 (citing Exhibit 61, 
p.2873).) Detective Harkins' question, clearly designed to see if Bruno would 
incriminate himself. is hardly evidence that anyone actually said they saw Bruno's car 
in the area that night. Moreover, Bruno denied that it was. (Id.) 
Johnson's claim that Bruno "wanted to kill Alan Johnson" is also unsupported by 
the "evidence" she cites - Exhibit 63, p.2716. (Response, p.19.) A re-view of page 2716 
of Exhibit 63 reveals no such threat. Johnson's assertion that Bruno insinuated he "may 
have done if' is also unsupported by the "evidenoe" she cites - Exhibit 63. p.2736. In 
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fact, on pages 2736 of Exhibit 63, Bruno says Johnson "always say [sic] she want to kill 
her parents, because they [sic] always fighting for the money or whatever." In addition, 
on pages 2726-2727 of that same exhibit, Bruno specifically denies kUling the Johnsons. 
Regardless of what Johnson believes counsel should have asked Bruno on 
cross-examination, and regardless of whether counsel should have asked Bruno any 
questions, Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that she was prejudiced as a 
result. Johnson's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine Bruno 
Santos should therefore be dismissed. 
h. Stu Robinson 
Johnson next alleges: 'Trial Counsel was, or should have been aware of Officer 
Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted [sic) that no latent prints were found at 
the crime scene/' and that such testimony ''was inaccurate and false" because "the 
record reveals that thirty nine (39) latent prints were found at the scene .... " (Petition, 
p.13, ~ 16.b.) Because Johnson failed to provide a citation to the grand jury transcript 
wherein Officer Robinson allegedly made this statement, the state, in seeking summary 
dismissal speculated that Johnson was referring to that portion of Officer Robinson's 
testimony when he was asked, "Now based on your, I guess, investigation and as part 
of your case review, as far as you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the 
gun, the scope or the casings?" and answered, "They could not locate any prints that 
could be identified," (Grand Jury Tr., p.189, Ls.17-22.) Assuming this was the basis of 
Johnson's claim, the sated asserted. this is clearly not a statement that Uno prints were 
found" - it is only a statement that no prints could be identified. (Memorandum, pp.40-
41.) 
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In Response, Johnson cites to the following question and answer (still with no 
citation to where it can be found in the transcript): 
Q. Now, let me ask you this. Would that surprise you given the fact 
that you found this latex and leather glove? 
A. No. And, in fact it wouldn't surprise me. In the hundreds of cases 
I've investigated fingerprints are not that commonly found. 
(Response, pp .15-16.) 
Johnson then argues: "In fact more than thirty latent prints were lifted from the 
scene. The point of raising this issue with Officer Robinson would have been to 
question his veracity, and handling of the evidence generally." (Response, p.16.) The 
state cannot ascertain precisely what "issue" Johnson believes counsel should have 
raised relative to Officer Robinson's testimony that "fingerprints are not that commonly 
found" in the cases he investigates. Fingerprints were clearly found in this case, and 
extensive evidence was presented on this point. 
As for Johnson's claims regarding the comforter and the alleged failure of 
counsel to cross-examine Officer Robinson on this point, the state has two responses. 
First, it is clear from the record that the comforter from the Johnsons' bed was not 
collected. The only comforter collected, which is the comforter listed in the evidence 
logs, is the comforter from Mel Speegle's bed. Second, contrary to Johnson's claim, 
counsel did examine Officer Robinson regarding the failure to collect the comforter. 
(Tr., Vol. VII, p.4680, L.20 - p.4681 , l.9, p.4683, Ls.10-2S.) 
Johnson has failed to allege any genuine issue of material fact that counsel was 
deficient in his cross-examination of Officer Robinson or that she was prejudiced as a 
result. This claim should therefore be dismissed. 
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i. Officer Ross Kirtley 
Johnson alleges counsel was ineffective in "falling to present evidence of an 
audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross Kirtley, , , which clearly proved 
the theory that police focused on [her], to the exclusion of all other possible suspects 
and theories, because she was the easiest target." (Petition, p.13, 1f 16.c.) The state 
sought summary dismissal of this claim because it is bare and conclusory and Johnson 
has failed to offer any admissible evidence in support of her assertions. Her only 
"evidence" is another "see" reference to Mr. Dunn's affidavit with no citation to any 
particular page. (Petition, p.13, 1f 16.c.) Mr. Dunn's affidavit. in turn, contains hearsay 
about what he claims various officers said on the alleged tape. (Ex. 2, pA, 1f 10.) In her 
Response, Johnson complains she "has been left without the necessary resources to 
obtain an actual copy of the recording" and that she "believe[s] a copy Is In the 
possession of the State and Patrick Dunn." (Response, p.15.) Johnson further states 
that "[i]f afforded a hearing on this issue, and an order of discovery, the actual recording 
can be submitted into evidence." (Response, p.15.) 
The state presumes) by her Response, that Johnson believes in order to obtain a 
copy of the recording she needs an "order of discovery." Why Johnson needs this Court 
to order the investigator from her criminal trial to provide her with information from his 
investigation is unclear. if Johnsen would like Mr. Dunn to give her the tape, she should 
ask him for it. If, for some unknown reason, he thinks he cannot disclose it to her 
without a court order, Johnson should move the Court for such an order. In the 
meantime, she is not entitled to' an evidentiary hearing based upon evidence she 
"believe[s]" she might be able to produce and that might say something she thinks could 
be useful. 
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Because Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was 
ineffective in cross-examining Officer Kirtley, this claim should be summarily dismissed. 
3. Failure To Call Witnesses 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that counsel was deficient for failing to 
call her neighbors Terri Sanders, Stephanie Hoffman, Rick Olsen, or Linda O'Connor's 
thirteen (13) year old son, as witnesses because none of them had any meaningful 
testimony to offer. In her Response, Johnson states: "No strategic logic was presented 
by trial counsel for this failure to call witnesses." (Response, p.19.) Counsel was not, 
however. required to provide a "strategic logiC" for failing to call these witnesses. 
Rather, it is presumed the decision is tactical and strategic and it is Johnson's burden to 
establish the declston was objectively unreasonable. Johnson has failed to do so. 
Rather. she appears to contend that because counsel did not remember these 
witnesses at the time of his deposition, more than four years after the trial. his decision 
could not have been strategic. (Response, p.20.) Such an assertion is patently absurd, 
particularly as it pertains to the witnesses at issue. 
Because Johnson has failed to raise a genuine Issue of material fact that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to call a variety of neighbors who had nothing to contribute to 
her defense, this claim should be dismissed. 
E. Claim Five - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Dealing With Fingerprint 
Evidence Issues" 
Johnson has "concede[d] that trial counsel Pangburn provided deposition 
testimony to the effect that having unidentified prints can be a helpful thing to the 
defense," and that ''trial counsel and their fingerprint expert Kerchusky, were unable to 
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identify exactly what fingerprint evidence was disclosed on the eve of trial, that would 
have made a specific difference in the expert opinion to be rendered." (Response, 
p.20.) Thus. Johnson has "abandoned her allegation of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for failure to inquire about lack of police testing for latent prints on the trash can 
lid," and is only pursuing "fingerprint evidence issues ... relative to ineffective 
assistance of counsel . . . in failing to specifically inquire of his fingerprint expert an 
opinion regarding the 'freshness' of latent prints found on the tools of murder." 
(Response, p.20.) With respect to this claim, the state asserted in its Memorandum 
that, contrary to Johnson's assertions, counsel did in fact elicit expert opinion testimony 
regarding the "freshness" of the prints. (Memorandum, pp.45-46.) Johnson 
acknowledges this testimony but contends the ureferenced testimony is by way of 
foundation only." (Response, p.20.) A review of the relevant portions of Mr. 
Kerchusky's testimony reveals this claim is without merit. For the reasons set forth in 
the state's Memorandum (Memorandum, pp.44-46), the state is entitled to summary 
dismissal of this claim. 
F. Claim Six - "Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To Lay A Proper 
Foundation For Psycological [sic] Opinion Evidence" 
Johnson's Response does not address this claim; therefore no further argument 
is necessary. For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum, this claim should be 
dismissed. 
G. Claim Seven - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Dealing With Aiding 
And Abetting Theory Of Guilt" 
In her Response, Johnson addresses this claim simply by arguing that, during his 
deposition, Mr. Pangburn "recognized this concern prior to the time instructions were 
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actually given," but did not "explain how he defended against this theory of guilt other 
than to object to the instruction." (Response, p.23.) Whether Johnson believes Mr. 
Pangburn provided an explanation of "how he defended against this theory of guilt" is 
irrelevant to whether Johnson has alleged a prima facie case of deficient performance 
or prejudice. For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum (Memorandum, 
pp.47--49), Johnson has failed to do so and the state is entitled to summary dismissal of 
this claim. 
H. Claim Eight - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Investigating The 
Allegation Of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey" 
In her eighth claim, Johnson asserts trial counsel were ineffective "In fafling to 
investigate and follow up on a phone call received from Steven Pankey informing trial 
counsel that he had important information." (Petition. p.20, 122.) For the reasons set 
forth in the state's Memorandum (Memorandum, p.49), and Section A.1. supra, this 
claim should be dismissed as untimely. Alternatively, the claim should be dismissed 
because Johnson has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was 
ineffective in relation to Mr. Pankey. Johnson's Response falls to establish otherwise, 
but merely repeats what she has already al/eged, which. as asserted in the state's 
Memorandum is insufficient to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Claim 
Eight should therefore be dismissed. 
I. Claim Nine - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Failure To Utilize 
Readily Available Psychiatric Evidence" 
In claim nine, Johnson alleges trial counsel were ineffective "in failing to pursue 
and present a defense that included expert psychiatric testimony which would have 
informed the jury that a double patricide-matricide, is an incredibly rare phenomena" 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ~ 28 
MAR, 19, 2010 4: 06PM AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO, 545 p, 30 
and even Urarer still with a girl of tender years, such as the Petitioner, who has not been 
physically and/or sexually abused, is not schizophrenic and/or intoxicated .... " 
(Petition, pp.20·Z1, ~ 23.) According to Johnson, such testimony would have Ucreat[edJ 
reasonable doubt, and a substantial likelihood of a verdict of not guilty." (Petition, p.21, 
~ 23.) For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum (Memorandum, p.52) and 
section A 1, supra, this claim should be dismissed as untimely. 
Alternatively, Johnson has failed to establish counsel was deficient for "failing to 
pursue and present a defense" that it would be rare for someone like her to kill both her 
parents or that she was prejudiced by counsel's failure to pursue such a defense. In her 
Response, Johnson acknowledges that "[p]erhaps" this evidence "would not have been 
admnted at trial," but counsel should have "proffered the proposed testimony with an 
offer of proof anyway. (Response, p.24.) Johnson cannot meet her burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present 
evidence that mayor may not have been admissible. See Schoger v. State, _ P.3d 
_, 2010 WL 337688 "'8 (2010) C"[T]his Court will g.enerally not find deficient 
performance where counsel fails to argue a novel theory in an undeveloped area of 
law.") 
Because Johnson's ninth claim is untimely and because, even if timely, she has 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
pursue a defense based upon Dr, Worst's opinions, this claim should be dismissed 
without a hearing. 
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J. Claim Ten - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Due To Violations Of Rules 
Of Professional Conduct" 
Johnson's Response does not address this claim; therefore no further argument 
is necessary. For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum, this claim should be 
dismissed. 
K. Claim Eleven - I'lneffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel" 
In her eleventh claim, Johnson alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to (1) raise "an allegation of error by the trial court in denying the Motion to 
Suppress Statement Against Interest made subsequent to retainer of counsel. Doug 
Nelson, and Nelson's issuance of a fcease and desist' questioning letter" (Petition, p.22, 
~ 25); and (2) "argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury 
instruction" (Petition, p.22, 1l 26.) In her Response, Johnson contends these claims 
should not be dismissed because post-conviction counsel has reviewed appellate 
counsel's "entire tile, including legal research and analysis thereof," and found 
"[vlirtually no analysis of the relative strength of the issues for presentation to the 
Supreme Court." (Response, p.Z5.) Post--conviction counsel's review of appellate 
counsel's file and his opinion on what issues should have been raised fails to establish 
appellate counsel, who is highly experienced in criminal appellate practice. was 
deficient for failing to agree with his assessment. Moreover, for the reasons set forth in 
the state's Memorandum, Johnson has also failed to establish a prima facie case of 
prejudice relating to appellate counsel's performance. (Memorandum, pp.56-58.) This 
claim should therefore be dismissed. 
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L. Claim Twelve - "Newly Discovered Evidence" 
The only "newly discovered evidence" claim addressed in Johnson's Response is 
based upon Mr. Pankey's assertion that he heard Sheriff Femling say, "Well, I guess 
f've got to move evidence to make a case." (Response, pp.26~27.) Johnson's only 
contention related to this claim, other than noting that Mr. Pankey Was not 'Iinterviewed 
by police," is that the state's assertion that Sheriff Femling's comment was "perfectly 
innoouous," does not "pass[ ] the straight face test." (Response, p.27.) Obviously the 
state disagrees. No further argument is necessary in relation to this olaim and, for the 
reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum this claim should be dismissed. 
M. Conclusion 
Because all of Johnson's allegations fall as a matter of law, are untimely, and/or 
are bare and conclusory and unsubstantiated by any fact, she is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing and this Court should summarily dismiss her Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Johnson's Petition falls to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would 
entitle her to an evidentiary hearing. The state is therefore entitled to summary 
dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c). 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2010, 
CA M. LORELLO 
Attorney General 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
__________ ~R=e=sp~o=n=d=e=nt~-----------) 
COMES NOW Petitioner and files this, her MEMORANDUM REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL and in support thereof states as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner filed her Motion for Summary Disposition and memorandum in support 
thereof on February 8, 2010. Likewise, Respondent filed its Motion for Summary 
Dismissal and memorandum in support thereof, on or about February 8, 2010. Thereafter, 
on or about March 5, 2010, the parties submitted memorandums of law responding to 
said motions for summary disposition. The instant memorandum is to be the final written 
briefing on the issues presented for summary disposition. In the course of briefing, the 
issues for consideration have been narrowed. 
Petitioner has relinquished her claims for relief asserted in her Second Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, contained in the following paragraphs; 12 & 12.(a), 
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[Violation of Petitioner's Right to due Process of Law Relating to Judicial Bias & related 
claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Move for Disqualification for 
Cause], 16.a.iv., [Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Adequately Cross-
Examine Matt Johnson], and 18.i, 18ii, 18iii, I8iv, I8.v, & I8.viii, 27, 28, 28.a. [All 
allegations relating to Fingerprint Evidence except Failure of Counsel to elicit from 
Defense Fingerprint Expert Opinion Testimony that Latent Prints Found On the Tools of 
Murder Were Fresh Prints] Petitioner will also now concede her claim asserted in 
paragraph 19 of the Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. [Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in failing to lay a proper foundation for admission of 
psychological Opinion Testimony] Similarly, the claims asserted in paragraphs 20, 21 
and 25 of the Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief are now being 
abandoned. [Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Dealing with Aiding and Abetting 
Theory of Guilt] 
Issues remaining for the Court's consideration are those asserted in the 
Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contained in paragraphs 
11, 11 (a), [Lack of Jurisdiction and Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel associated 
therewith], 13, [Violation of Right to Due Process of Law due to Court's impermissible 
limitation on right to cross-examine witness], 14, IS.a., IS.b., IS.c., IS.d., I6.a.i., I6.a.ii., 
I6.a.iii., I6.a.v., 16.a.vi., 16.b., 16.c.,I6.d., 17,24, [Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
cumulatively due to lack of preparation supported by specific instances of failure to 
adequately cross-examine witnesses· and/or call witnesses], I8.vi, I8.vii, [Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel due to failure to elicit expert opinion testimony regarding the 
freshness of latent prints found on the murder weapon, ammunition, and scope removed 
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from the murder weapon], 22, [Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in failing to Investigate 
allegation of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey], 23, [Ineffective Assistance of Trial 
Counsel in Failure to Utilize Readily Available Psychiatric Evidence], 26, [Ineffective 
Assistance of Appellate Counsel in Failing to raise and challenge sufficiency of evidence 
to support Aiding and Abetting Instruction], 29 and 30. [Newly Discovered Evidence] 
ARGUMENT 
As to each of the issues remaining for the Court's consideration, there exists a 
material issue of fact, such that Petitioner is entitled to evidentiary hearing, or 
alternatively Petitioner has produced sufficient evidence for this Court to grant the relief 
requested, either in the form of a new trial, or a new direct appeal. All of the issues have 
been fully briefed and argued in Petitioner's initial Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Petitioner's Memorandum Response to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. This reply brief will be limited to direct 
review of, and counter-arguments to, the argument made by the State in its Memorandum 
in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO ADDUCE 
EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY REGARDING FRESHNESS OF PRINTS 
The State repeats the well known standard that a court will not second guess the 
tactical decisions of trial counsel, and asserts the presumption of competence. 
Unquestionably, these are accurate statements of established principles of law. Likewise, 
the exception to the general rule is recognized and even cited by the State; that the 
presumption is overcome by a showing the " ... decisions are made upon the basis of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation. Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be sufficient to show 
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deprivation of the right to effective assistance of Counsel" Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 
139, 139 PJd 741 at 747-48. (internal citations omitted) The State proceeds to argue that 
Petitioner is simply asking this Court to assume counsel was not prepared. (Memorandum 
in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Dismissal pp. 4-5) 
However, this argument overlooks the ample evidence submitted to this court 
proving trial counsel was indeed unprepared, had not completely investigated the facts, 
and was ignorant of the law. (Dunn & Rader Affidavits Exhibits 1 & 2; Dunn Deposition 
Transcript Exhibit 59 pp. 8,10,11,16,18,23,26,27,28,29,30,33; Rader Deposition 
pp. 117, 118, 119, 121, 124, 133, 135, 136) It is in fact the State that is presuming trial 
counsel somehow made a tactical decision to not ask his expert to testify specifically 
regarding his opinion as to the freshness of prints found on the tools of murder. 
Petitioner has overcome the presumption with affirmative evidence of an objective 
deficiency. The State has failed to respond. 
In addition to the flawed argument that Petitioner has not proven this claim as a 
matter of law, the State disputes she has established the claim as a matter of fact. The 
State maintains the claim is contradicted by the record. This assertion is simply not true. 
In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal, and again in its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Dismissal, the State 
cites to trial transcript pages 5069-5070, (palm print on gun likely to evaporate rather 
quickly) 5075-5078, (palm print on rifle likely from last person to load gun) 5083-5084, 
5090-5092, (same) and 5128-5129. (in his experience a print on a gun would not last 
more than a year) Furthermore, the State, in arguing trial counsel did in fact elicit expert 
testimony regarding freshness of latent prints found on the scope and ammunition, 
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together with packaging, cites the following trial transcript pages; 5074, L. 10-5075 L. 
14; 5083, L. 1 - 5084 L. 9; 5090 L.18 - 5092 L. 19; 5126 L. 25 - 5218 L. 17. Finally, the 
State claims Fingerprint Expert Kerchusky was cross-examined extensively on the topic, 
citing Trial Tr., p. 5105, L. 9 - 5113, L. 25; p.5115, L. 16 - 5116, L. 18. 
A close reading of the transcript clearly reveals Kerchusky was never asked, and 
never offered his opinion whether the latent prints found on the scope, the ammunition, or 
the murder weapon were fresh. It is difficult to see how the cited testimony could 
possibly be construed as such an opinion, even in the context of zealous advocacy. 
Reviewing the testimony in chronological order, beginning with pages 5069-5070; 
plainly, the exchange addressed generally, the concept of how long prints may last on a 
non-porous surface, like a gun, not the specific issues concerning the actual facts in this 
case: pp. 5074-5075; again, plainly, the exchange addressed generally, the concept of 
how long prints may last on a porous surface, like a box, not the specific issues 
concerning the actual facts in this case: pp. 5075-5078; it is difficult to glean how the 
State can argue the discourse contained in this portion of Kerchusky's testimony 
expresses the opinion "palm print on rifle likely from last person to load gun." 
(Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal p. 45) The 
cited testimony simply does not even come close to the topic, much less express the 
opinion stated by Respondent: pp. 5083-5084; again, it is dubious to even assert the 
testimonial exchange contained here could be argued to stand for the proposition" ... the 
prints on the insert in the ammunition box and the scope matched and was likely of 
recent origin was in fact elicited," (Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal p. 7; emphasis added): 5090-5092; Obviously, the testimony on 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 5 
the cited pages is the latent print found on the scope and the latent print on the 
ammunition insert matched, and just as obviously, contrary to the State's assertion, no 
opinion is rendered regarding the freshness of the prints: pp. 5126-5128; Here, Mr. 
Kerchusky offers a general opinion that an expert cannot tell precisely how old a 
fingerprint is or give an exact age, but never even touches on an opinion whether the 
latent prints left on the tools of murder in this case are fresh, and upon what facts in this 
case, he might base such an opinion. 
A close review of the cited cross-examination testimony reveals similar 
contradictory conclusions: pp. 5105 - 5113; Mr. Whatcott, questioning Kerchusky for the 
State, skillfully avoided asking any questions pertaining to an opinion on the facts of this 
case, concerning the tools of murder. Why would he, after the topic was forgotten or 
otherwise omitted on direct exam? Undoubtedly, the general topic of whether a latent 
print could be dated or aged, was discussed. Included in this portion of cross-
examination was heated criticism of Kerchusky' s opinion that the latent prints found on 
the scope were probably left by the same person. An opinion we now know to be 
supported by the newly discovered evidence, Christopher Hill in fact left fingerprints on 
the scope when he removed it from the murder weapon: pp. 5115 - 5116; this final 
citation to cross-examination testimony does not address aging of prints in any way. 
In summary, it is difficult to discern why the State would make the argument that 
Kerchusky gave an expert opinion, based on the facts of this case, concerning the 
freshness of prints on the tools of murder. Such an opinion is simply absent from the 
record. Trial Counsel Pangburn, when interrogated on the subject, testified generally "we 
did a good job of dealing with the state's witnesses on fingerprint evidence with regard to 
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fingerprint evidence" (Petitioner's Exhibit 65 Pangburn Depo. Tr. p. 27) ¥lhen asked to 
describe the fingerprint evidence issues, Pangburn failed to even mention freshness of 
prints as a concern. (Pangburn Depo. Tr. p. 27-32) Whereas the Defense fingerprint 
expert recognized this issue as critical to the point he requested Pangburn recall him to 
testify specifically on the issue of freshness. (Petitioner's Exhibit 55; Kerchusky Depo. 
Tr. pp. 54-55) 
NEWL Y DISCOVERED FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE 
The State responds to Petitioner's claim of entitlement to a new trial based on 
newly discovered fingerprint evidence, by arguing the evidence is immaterial and not 
likely to produce an acquittal. 
EVIDENCE IS MATERIAL 
Material Evidence is defined as evidence which has an effective influence or 
bearing on the question in issue. (Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition) Discovering 
that Christopher Kevin Hill, who lacks an alibi, is the person who left fresh fingerprints 
on the tools of murder, is clearly material and not merely cumulative evidence. The State 
criticizes Petitioner's argument as founded on innuendo and lacking evidentiary support. 
First, it should be noted, the State could have learned it was Hill who had left these prints 
during its investigation, if indeed the investigation had been complete. Hill could and 
should have been interviewed, and elimination prints gathered. The Defense could not 
have accomplished this routine investigative task. Once Hill's identity was discovered in 
early 2009 he was interviewed. Hill told police his prints must be on the murder weapon 
because he had taken it to the shooting range and attempted to sight it sometime in 2000 
or 2001. This story was never investigated or confirmed in any way by police. This 
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statement is in conflict with that of Speegle; indicating Hill had merely assisted him in 
moving things into the apartment in 2002, and apparently knew nothing of Hill allegedly 
taking and shooting Speegle's rifle. (Petitioner'S Exhibits 32,50 & 51) 
Fingerprint expert Kerchusky would testify that any latent prints left more than 
one year would either have dissipated or become etched prints, yet the prints in question 
were fresh, not etched into the soft metal. A complete recitation of the related facts and 
circumstances are listed in Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Disposition pp. 5-9, and need not be repeated here. Clearly, there is 
evidentiary support for the argument had Hill's identity been known to the jury; that 
information placed in context of other known facts, including, the inconsistent statements 
by both Speegle and Hill regarding handling of the weapon and ammunition, the lack of 
alibi and incomplete investigation by police, the financial condition of Hill, and the 
expert opinion testimony on the age or freshness of prints; all would have influence and 
bearing on the question at issue and raise reasonable doubt that Petitioner murdered her 
parents. 
The analysis of prejudice is the same for both the ineffective assistance of counsel 
issue, and the newly discovered evidence issue. Therefore, argument relating to these 
issues will be presented together. 
PREJUDICE 
The State concludes Petitioner has failed to show prejudice as result of trial 
counsel's deficient performance, "but instead relies on bare assertions and mere 
speculation." (Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal p. 8) Stated in plain language, the second prong of the analysis for an 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether the results would likely be different but 
for counsel's errors. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 139 P.3d 741, 747-48. The State 
argues there is no evidence the trial would likely come out differently. This argument 
ignores common sense, and the deposition testimony of Bob Kerchusky. 
The relevant facts known at the time of trial, but not necessarily presented to the 
jury, were as follows: the murder weapon was last handled by Mel Speegle within weeks 
of the crimes (Trial Tr. p. 2704); the scope was on the rifle when Speegle looked at it 
several within weeks before the crime (Trial Tr. p. 2706); the murder weapon and 
ammunition would have last been touched approximately one year before when he, or 
possibly others helped him move things into the garage apartment (Trial Tr. p. 2707-
2721); the ammunition was packaged up in a box left in the closet of the garage 
apartment, as it had been since being moved in (Trial Tr. p. 2710); Speegle had never 
removed the scope and it was on when he handled the gun prior to labor Day Weekend 
(Trial Tr. p. 2706); after the murder, the scope was found on the bed in the garage 
apartment removed from the murder weapon (Plaintiffs Exhibit 38, crime scene photo of 
scope on bed); latent unidentified prints were found on the scope, the ammunition and 
ammunition packaging, have now been linked to Christopher Kevin Hill (Exhibits 43, 44, 
45, 46 & 47); Mel Speegle's fingerprints are not found on the murder weapon 
(Petitioner'sExhibit 31); latent prints found on scope and .264 shell were not "etched" 
prints, but fresh prints (Petitioner's Exhibit 55); the police did not interview Christopher 
Kevin Hill or gather his fingerprints as "elimination prints" as part of their pre-trial 
investigation. 
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Fingerprint expert Kerchusky believes, has stated and would, if the case were 
retried, testify as follows: an accurate determination can be made whether a latent print is 
fresh; latent prints cannot generally remain on a nonporous surface for more than a year; 
the quality of a latent print quickly deteriorates over time; handling of objects can both 
leave fresh prints and wipe away older prints; the quality of the latent prints lifted from 
the tools of murder in this case were excellent; the latent prints found on the gun, the 
scope, the inserts, and the bullets were all crucial pieces of evidence and that they were 
fresh prints, left by Christopher Kevin Hill; the latent prints found on the scope were left 
when and by the person who removed the scope; the latent prints found on the scope 
would not have been left by a person sighting the rifle; the quality of the latent left by 
Hill on the murder weapon was too high to be a year or more old; Christopher Hill's 
thumbprint found on an unspent .264 brass cased round was of excellent quality, and 
would have been an etched print if it had been there more than a few months because of 
the soft metal. (See Kerchusky Deposition testimony, Petitioner's Exhibit 55) 
Counsel for the State dismisses Petitioner's argument by hypothetical questions as 
all asked and answered for the jury at trial, but fails to cite to the transcript to support this 
criticism. In fact those questions were not addressed at trial, nor of course was Hill's 
identity then known. The answers to the questions would be presented by a defense 
fingerprint expert at a new trial in a manner similar to that referenced above. It cannot be 
sincerely argued in an objective sense that this evidence and testimony would certainly 
produce an acquittal. However, if this evidence and testimony were presented toa jury, 
together with the competing circumstantial evidence case again presented against 
Petitioner, it is certainly possible an acquittal could result, and it is not unreasonable to 
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conclude, probably would result. If in fact the case were retried, by prepared and 
competent counsel, and Bruno Santos were thoroughly cross-examined; the State's 
witnesses were all confronted and interrogated in detail; all witnesses called and all 
scientific expert testimony and testing admitted; it can be stated with confidence that 
Sarah Johnson would probably not be convicted of murdering her parents. 
CONCLUSION 
No material issue of fact remains for the Court's determination, and Petitioner is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Abundant evidence has been submitted to 
support the fact that lead trial counsel was unprepared for trial and unfamiliar with the 
evidentiary details such that reasoned strategic decisions on crucial matters could not be 
made. Failing to solicit an opinion on this decisive topic from a respected expert, eager 
and ready to share his decades of experience with the jury, cannot be dismissed as an 
acceptable tactical decision. Given the totality of the circumstances and evidence before 
this court, Sarah Johnson, a sixteen year girl at the time of the crimes, should be granted a 
new, fair trial, represented by competent counsel presenting all of the evidence now 
known. 
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C RISTOPHER P. SIMMS DATED 
A TTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /1 day of March 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting 
Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile 
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, 
PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
__ /:_ US Mail 
Hand Deliver ---
___ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Hearing Type: Motion for Summary Disposition 
Date: April 30, 2010 Time: 10:00 am Courtroom: 1 
Judge: Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey Court Clerk: Shelley Bartlett 
Counsel for Petitioner: Christopher Simms 
Counsel for Respondent: Jessica Lorello 
10:00 Court called the case and asked for introductions of counsel. Court 
confirmed with counsel that all documents have been received. 
10:07 Court reviewed the claims that were dismissed by stipulation. 
10: 1 0 Mr. Simms gave argument. 
10:45 Ms. Lorello gave argument. 
11 :04 Court inquired of Ms. Lorello about the time line for the untimely matters. 
11 :07 Mr. Simms gave rebuttal argument. Mr. Simms withdrew the claim that 
Terry Sanders did not testify. 
11: 15 Ms. Lorello gave rebuttal argument. 
11 :19 Mr. Simms gave final comment. 
11 :20 Court took a brief recess. 
11 :47 Court is back in session. 
11 :48 Court gave the following findings: Ms. Lorello to prepare the order. 
- State's claim of untimeliness: Statute of limitations as to claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 
and 10 are denied. Claims 8 and 12 are taken under advisement. 
- As to Lack of Jurisdiction argument: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is 
granted. 
- As to Violation of Due Process: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is 
granted. 
- As to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Both motions are denied and 
proceed to an evidentiary hearing, but for: 
- As to Paragraph 15B: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is granted as to 
failure to object to Rod Anglert. Other claims remain for evidentiary. 
- As to Paragraph 16: All motions are denied and court will require evidentiary. 
- As to Paragraph 17: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is granted as to 
this paragraph. 
- As to Paragraph 24: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is granted as to 
this paragraph. 
- As to Paragraph 18 (vi and vii): Both motions are denied and court will 
require an evidentiary. 
- Paragraphs 22 and 23 and 26: Matters taken under advisement 
- Statute of Limitations for Pankey and new evidence issue: Under 
advisement 
12:01 Clerk will send out standard scheduling order for civil cases. The hearing 
will heard here in Twin Falls. Days to be set out past September. 
FrLED M:~'lfM ,.. 
MAY 19 2010 C<j 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~onF~~::':':'::':::::;:'::::'~~-
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Sarah M. Johnson, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. CV-200J'-000324 
ORDER FORSCHEDUUNG 
CONFERENCE AND ORDER 
RE: MOTION PRACTICE 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 16(b) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-
captioned case is scheduled for a scheduling conference to commence on July 19, 
2010 at 4:00 pm at the Theron Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, Twin 
Falls, Idaho. 
The purpose of the conference will be to enter a scheduling order regarding the 
deadlines contained in the attached schedule. Counsel must be the handling attorney, 
or be fully familiar with the case, and have authority to bind his/her client and law firm on 
all matters set forth in I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 16(b). 
In lieu of this scheduling conference, all parties may stipulate to deadlines and 
other information required in the enclosed Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. 
This stipulation must be completed as written and not modified in any way. It must be 
signed by all parties, and filed with the court at least three (3) days before the 
scheduling conference. The hearing will not be vacated until: 1) the attached 
stipulation is received by the court; and 2) counsel contact the court's clerk at the 
number set forth below. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following shall apply to motions filed in this 
case. 
1. SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and 
motion calendar every other Monday (or Tuesday following holidays) at 9:00 a.m. 
Absent an order shortening time, all motion practice other than motions for summary 
judgment will be governed by I.R.C.P. 7 (effective July 1, 2004). As a matter of 
courtesy, counsel are expected to contact the Court's Deputy Clerk in Twin Falls, Sharie 
Cooper (phone 208-736-4162) to schedule hearings, and to confirm the availability of 
opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates. As an accommodation to out-of-town 
counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion (except pre-trial conferences, 
motions for summary judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered) may be 
conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(4). Counsel 
requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for arranging for placement 
of the call, and the cost thereof. Arrangements for telephone conference of any hearing 
must be pre-arranged by the Wednesday preceding the date of the hearing. 
2. MOTIONS GENERALLY (applies to every motion). 
a. One additional copy marked or stamped If Judge's Copy" of the 
motion and of all moving or opposing papers (including affidavits, 
and briefs) must be submitted to the judge's chambers when such 
documents are filed or lodged with the clerk of the court. If a party 
relies upon any case decided by an appellate court outside of Idaho, a 
copy of such case must be attached to the copy of the brief submitted to 
the judge's chambers. 
b. The amount of time each side will be allotted for oral argument on a 
motion will be set by the court. 
c. If a notice of hearing is not filed within fourteen (14) days after the 
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motion is filed, the motion will be deemed withdrawn. 
3. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
a. NO HEARING ON ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT WILL BE 
PERMITTED IN THE 60-DA Y PERIOD PRIOR TO TRIAL, 
REGARDLESS OF WHEN THE MOTION IS FILED. 
b. The party moving for summary judgment shall prepare as separate 
documents: (1) motion, (2) legal memorandum containing a written 
statement of reasons in support of the motion, and (3) a concise statement 
of the material facts. (4) a notice of hearing with date and time blank to be 
set by the Court. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the 
particular place in the record which supports that fact. The legal 
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the 
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion. 
c. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare as 
separate documents: (a) legal memorandum containing a written 
statement of reasons in opposition to the motion, and (b) a concise 
statement of the facts which are genuine issues of material fact and/or 
which are material facts omitted from the moving party's statement of 
facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the particular 
place in the record which supports that fact. The legal memorandum shall 
include a statement, supported by authority, of the elements of any claim 
or defense relevant to the motion. 
d. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(c) is hereby MODIFIED as follows: 
i. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at 
least thirty-five (35) days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
ii. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the 
party must do so at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of 
the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an answering brief 
at least 21 days prior to the date of the hearing. 
iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less 
than 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
e. OBJECTIONS/MOTIONS TO STRIKE: Any party objecting to an 
opposing party's affidavits MUST file a written objection and motion to 
strike and have the matter noticed for hearing, in order to preserve the 
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objection and to give the court and the parties sufficient notice regarding 
the same. Oral objections regarding any affidavit WILL NOT be 
considered, and the right referenced in Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992) to 
make oral objections at summary judgment is hereby specifically 
PROHIBITED. I,R.C.P. (16)(b); Gem State Insurance Co. v. Hutchison, 
__ Idaho ,2007 Slip. Op. 130. 
f. The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the 
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and statement 
of facts along with Judge's copies of said documents. The hearing date 
can then be obtained from the judge's court clerk. This pertains to all 
motions for summary judgment, and motions for partial summary 
judgment. 
f. Each party will be allotted thirty (30) minutes for oral argument. 
4. JUDICIAL NOTICE: If either party requests the Court to take judicial 
notice of any documents not in the file at issue, Counsel shall provide, under separate 
cover, all such documents for the Court's review. 
o this I'J- day of JI, 
G. Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned certifies that on the ~ q day of May, 2010, she caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDE'RFOtscHEDULING CONFERENCE AND 
ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
Deputy Clerk for Blai e Co ty 
Petitioner's Counsel: 
Christopher Simms 
Attorney At Law 
191 Sun Valley Rd, Ste 209 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Mailed / Courthouse Mailbox __ 
Respondent's Counsel: 
Jessica Lorello 
Idaho Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Mailed ~ Courthouse Mailbox. __ 
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Faxed __ 
Faxed --
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Sarah M. Johnson, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
) 
) Case No. CV-2009-000324 
) 
) STIPULATION FOR 




The above parties hereby stipulate to the following scheduling deadlines: 
A. EXPERT WITNESSES 
(Plaintiff's experts) 
1. days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff 
intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the 
witness is expected to testify. 
2. days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose all information required by 
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses. 
3. days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of the 
plaintiff's initial expert witnesses. 
(Defendant's experts) 
4. days before trial, defendant shall disclose each person defendant 
intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the 
witness is expected to testify. 
5. days before trial, defendant shall disclose all information required 
by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses. 
6. days before trial, plaintiff shall complete any depositions of the 
defendant's expert witnesses. 
(Plaintiff's rebuttal experts) 
7. days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff 
intends to call as an expert witness at trial to rebut new information or issues disclosed 
or raised by the defendant. 
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8. days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose all information required 
by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the rebuttal expert 
witnesses. 
9. days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of 
the plaintiff's rebuttal expert witnesses. 
B. LAY WITNESSES 
1. days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff 
intends to call as a lay witness at trial (excluding impeachment witnesses). 
2. days before trial, defendant shall disclose each person 
defendant intends to call as a lay witness at trial (excluding impeachment witnesses). 
3. days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each lay witness 
(excluding impeachment witnesses) plaintiff intends to call at trial to rebut new 
information or issues disclosed or raised by the defendant. 
4. ____ days before trial, all parties shall complete any depositions of lay 
witnesses. 
C. DEADLINES FOR INITIATING DISCOVERY 
1. days before trial is the last day for serving interrogatories, 
requests for production, requests to permit entry upon land or other property, and 
requests for admission. 
2. ____ days before trial is the last day for filing motions for a physical or 
mental examination. 
D. DEADLINE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY 
1. days before trial, all parties must serve any supplemental 
response to discovery required by Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
E. STIPULATION TO ALTER DISCOVERY DEADLINES 
1. The parties may alter any discovery deadline by written agreement without the 
necessity of obtaining a court order. 
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F. PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
1. _____ days before trial is the last day to file motions to add additional 
parties to the lawsuit. 
2. days before trial is the last day to file a motion to amend the 
claims between existing parties to the lawsuit, including to add a claim for punitive 
damages. 
3. All other non-dispositive pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions 
in limine) must be filed and scheduled for hearing not less than fourteen (14) days 
before trial. Exceptions will be granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires. 
G. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. All motions for summary judgment must be filed at least ninety-six (9S) days 
before trial. 
2. No hearing on any summary judgment will be permitted in the sixty (SO) day 
period prior to trial. 
H. TRIAL SETTING 
1. This case can be set for a trial to commence on or after ------
__ . Note that, absent extremely compelling circumstances, no case will be 
set for trial more than 510 days from the date of filing the complaint. 
2. It is estimated that the trial will take ____ days. 
3. This case is to be tried as a: 
: court trial 
: jury trial 
4. Parties preference for trial dates: (Please confer and complete. Do not 
attach "unavailable dates"). 
(a) Week of Tuesday, __________ , 20_. 
(b) Week of Tuesday, , 20_. 
(c) Week of Tuesday, , 20_. 
5. The parties will submit a pretrial conference memorandum pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 1S(d), which shall be filed with the Clerk no later than seven (7) days 
before the pre-trial conference. The Memorandum may be filed as a joint 
submission or separately. 
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I. MEDIATION 
1. The parties agree to mediation:Yes_ No 
2. If yes: 
a. The parties agree to submit to mediation with a mediator mutually 
agreed upon. 
b. Mediation shall begin _____ days prior to trial. 
c. Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, the cost of 
mediation shall be equally divided between the parties. 
The parties reserve the right to amend this stipulation by agreement of all 
parties, subject to Court approval; each party reserves the right to seek 
amendment hereof by Court order, and to request further status conferences for 
such purpose, in accordance with I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 16(b). 
Appearances: 
Counsel for Petitioner: 
Date: _____ _ 
Counsel for Respondent: 
________________________________ Date: ______ _ 
Counsel for Other Parties: 
Date: ______ _ 
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Jolynn Drage, Cieri< District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON, ) 
) Case No. CV 2006-0324 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER REGARDING 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CLAIMS TAKEN UNDER 
) ADVISEMENT 
Defendants. 
THIS MATTER is before the court based upon cross motions for summary 
disposition filed by both parties herein. The court heard oral argument on the motions 
on April 30, 2010, ruling from the bench on the majority of the issues presented. The 
court took several issues under advisement at the time of the argument. Having 
carefully reviewed the record, considered oral arguments, and otherwise being fully 
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advised, the court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order GRANTING 
IN PART and DENYING IN PART the state of Idaho's motion for summary dismissal. 
The petitioner's motion for summary disposition is DENIED. 
ANALYSIS 
An application for post-conviction relief under the UPCP A initiates a proceeding 
which is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001). Like 
the plaintiff in any other civil proceeding, an applicant must substantiate, by a 
preponderance of evidence, the allegations upon which his or her request for post-
conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 
794, 797 (2000). Unlike a complaint in a civil action, however, an application for post-
conviction relief must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the 
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.e.P. 8(a)(1). Martinez v. State, 126 
Idaho 813, 816,892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). Rather, an application for post-
conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of 
the applicant. I.e. § 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other 
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not 
included. Id. Further, the post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations 
showing each essential element of the claim, and admissible evidence must be proffered 
to support those factual allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
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Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application 
for post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.e. § 19-
4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.e.P. 56. Judd v. State, 
_ Idaho --' --' 218 P.3d 1,3 (Ct. App. 2009). I.e. § 19-4906(c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of 
the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with 
any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the 
trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Cooper 
v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the 
application are insufficient to support relief when they: (1) are clearly disproved by the 
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law. Id. 
I/[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a 
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the 
conflict between those inferences." Ridgley v. State, __ Idaho ---' ---' 227 P.3d 925, 
929 (2010) (quoting Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519,650 P.2d 657, 661 
(1982». "When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not 
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be 
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drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Id. (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 
Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)). 
A. The Steven Pankey Claims. 
a. Ms. Johnson's Claims Regarding Mr. Pankey's Allegations are Time-Barred. 
The limitations period for post-conviction actions in non-capital cases is one year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal in the criminal case or from the determination 
of the appeal, whichever is later. I.e. § 19-4902. Leer v. State, __ Idaho --' --' 218 
P.3d 1173, 1175 (Ct. App. 2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that there is no 
"discovery exception" in section 19-4902. See Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 
P.3d 967,969 (2001). The courts have crafted very limited exceptions to this rule in 
recent years, e.g., Judd v. State, __ Idaho --' ---I 218 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2009) 
("[T]he failure to discover facts ... may in some circumstances delay commencement of 
a limitation period."); Kriebel v. State, ---I Idaho ---I ---I 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction 
relief petition has been recognized in very limited situations. The limits are generally 
incumbent upon when the petitioner knows or should know the relevant facts). See 
Judd, 218 P.3d at 5, quoting Allen v. State, 118 Wash.2d 753, 826 P.2d 200, 203 (1992), 
noting that "[t]he key consideration under the discovery rule is the factual, not the legat 
basis for the cause of action. The action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should 
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know the relevant facts, whether or not the plaintiff also knows that these facts are 
enough to establish a legal cause of action." 
Judgment was entered in this case, on June 30, 2005 and Johnson originally failed 
to timely appeaL Judge Wood granted post conviction relief to her, allowing Johnson to 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Based upon the relief granted by Judge Wood1, 
this court concludes that the statute of limitations pursuant to section 19-4902 would 
accrue one year after the issuance of the remittitur on Johnson's appeal. The remittitur 
was issued on July 18, 2008. 
Johnson thereafter filed her First Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief on 
March 16, 2009, well-within the one-year limitation; however, the Second Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was not filed2 until January 12,2010, long after the 
one-year time limit. In the Second Amended Petition, Johnson asserted, for the first 
time, claims regarding ineffective assistance of her counsel regarding allegations made 
by Steven Pankey, Deputy Coroner for Blaine County. She further claimed that 
Pankey's information constituted "newly discovered evidence" warranting post-
conviction relief. 
1 Based upon the relief granted, this court will not base the limitations period on the original date of judgment. 
Johnson should not be penalized in this case where counsel failed to timely appeal originally. 
2 The court granted Johnson leave to file her Second Amended Petition after a contested hearing; however, the court 
did not consider the limitations defense raised by the state at that juncture. This court will not consider the 
sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is more 
properly determined at the summary judgment stage. See Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,528,96 PJd 
623,629 (2004) (citing Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 557, 567 (2002)). 
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If a party subsequently amends the petition to assert a claim arising II out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." LR.C.P. 
15(c). "If, however, the amended pleading sets forth a new cause of action unrelated to 
the original transaction or occurrence pled, the amendment does not relate back to the 
date of the original pleading." Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 
266,281,824 P.2d 841, 856 (1991) (citing Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First 
Nat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991); Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 
1172 (1984)). 
This court concludes that the claims regarding information from Mr. Pankey 
avow a "new cause of action unrelated to the original transaction or occurrence pled ... 
. " Idaho First National Bank, supra. These claims therefore do not relate back to the date 
of the original pleading. Moreover, these facts were, or should have been known to 
Johnson or her counsel in advance of the running of the statute of limitations on July 18, 
2009. Petitioner's Exhibit 34 is a letter to Judge Wood from Mr. Pankey written July 5, 
2009. Pankey signed an affidavit (Exhibit 33) drafted by Johnson's counsel in this case 
on July 27,2009. These documents support this court's conclusion that this information 
was known or should have been known to allow filing in a timely manner. Absent the 
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second amended petition being filed by July 18, 2009, these allegations are untimely and 
therefore DISMISSED. 
b. Ms. Johnson's Claims Regarding Mr. Pankey's Allegations do not Support a 
Post-Conviction Claim in any Event. 
However, even if these claims were determined to be timely, this court would 
dismiss them as Johnson has failed to state a prima facie case that Mr. Pangburn or other 
defense counsel was ineffective in relation to Mr. Pankey's allegations. 
i. Standard of review for ineffective assistance claims. 
In order to survive summary dismissal of a claim alleging ineffective assistance 
of counsel, Johnson "must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether 
counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether 
the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case." Schoger v. State ----f Idaho --' --' 
226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88, 104 S.Ct. 
2052,2064-65 (1984). To establish deficient assistance, the claimant has the burden of 
showing that her attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 362,367 (2008). This objective standard 
embraces a strong presumption that the claimant's counsel was competent and diligent. 
Id. More simply put, "the standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 
306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999). Additionally, to establish prejudice, the claimant must 
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show a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 
P.3d at 367. 
zz. The claims regarding Mr. Pankey's information do not establish 
deficient performance or prejudice. 
In support of this claim, Johnson has submitted Mr. Pankey's affidavit (Exhibit 
33). Mr. Pankey avers that he was called to the home of Alan and Diane Johnson in his 
capacity as Deputy Coroner and Apprentice Mortician in Blaine County. See id. ~~1, 2. 
Mr. Pankey claims that he "overheard a conversation between Jim Thomas, prosecuting 
attorney for Blaine County, and Walt Femling, Sheriff of Blaine County," in which 
Pankey heard "Walt Femling state, 'Well, I guess I've got to move evidence to make a 
case."' Id. ~~ 3,4. Mr. Pankey further avers that he contacted "Sarah Johnson's trial 
attorney, by telephone, and informed him that [Pankey] had important information 
about the case." Id. ~5. 
The affidavit is silent regarding what, if any efforts Mr. Pankey made to re-
contact anyone from the defense regarding the case. Id. Moreover, Mr. Pankey does 
not indicate that he ever told anyone on Johnson's trial team the nature of his 
"important information." Moreover, Pankey did not take any steps to notify anyone 
about these issues until July 2009, four years after the verdict, when Pankey wrote a 
letter directly to Judge Wood claiming that civil suits had been filed against Mr. Pankey 
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in Blaine County" as a means of coercion against [Pankey] saying anything about 
Femling's tampering with evidence in the Sarah Johnson case." (Exhibit 34, ~4). 
Other than this brash statement and conclusion, there is nothing in Mr. Pankey's 
affidavit to support the claim that the Blaine County Sheriff actually tampered with 
evidence at any time. The statement about moving" evidence" leads to nothing more 
than conjecture that something shameful was afoot. This court is left to speculate, even 
if the statement was made by Sheriff Femling: 1) is the statement innocuous? 2) did Mr. 
Pangburn or anyone else on Johnson's trial team know the factual details, or were they 
merely told about generic "important information" as referenced in Pankey's affidavit? 
3) if Johnson's lawyers did know about the allegation, was the statement relevant, or 
admissible? and 4) would this statement, if admitted to the jury, show a reasonable 
probability that, but for Johnson's attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different? 
This court concludes that it is not in a position to guess as to these facts or 
conclusions. The petitioner is required to establish facts showing each essential element 
of her claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual 
allegations. Roman v. State, supra. Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that 
the failure to re-contact Mr. Pankey was objectively unreasonable. Johnson has 
therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was ineffective in 
relation to Mr. Pankey. 
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Moreover, Johnson has likewise failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that she was prejudiced by the alleged lack of communication between counsel and Mr. 
Pankey. Johnson's allegation of prejudice is: "If Trial Counsel had investigated and 
followed up on said phone call he would have learned that it was alleged that the Sheriff 
and the Prosecuting Attorney had tampered with evidence and would have produced 
testimony of Mr. Pankey at trial, thereby creating reasonable doubt." (Petition, p.20, ~22 
(emphasis added)). Thus, the allegation is not that further investigation would have 
revealed any actual evidence that Sheriff Femling tampered with any evidence, but 
counsel would have only discovered Mr. Pankey's allegations that Sheriff Femling had 
done so and would have "produced testimony of Mr. Pankey at triaL" 
This court cannot conclude that: 1) had Pangburn called Pankey back, Pangburn 
would have chosen to put Pankey on the stand to elicit testimony about this one 
statement; and 2) the jury's verdict would have been different if the jury had been made 
aware of such statement. This sort of bare assertion and speculation is insufficient to 
show prejudice. The actual testimony that Mr. Pankey would have provided according 
to his affidavit was that Sheriff Femling stated, "Well, I guess I've got to move evidence 
to make a case." Such testimony would not have produced an acquittal because it can 
be viewed as a perfectly innocuous statement; there are no facts to support the claims 
that evidence tampering actually occurred. 
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c. These Claims do not Amount to Newly Discovered Evidence. 
Johnson also asserts she is entitled to a new trial based upon the discovery of Mr. 
Pankey's allegation that he heard Sheriff Femling say, "Well, I guess I've got to move 
evidence to make a case." (Petition, p.25, ~30.) 
Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if the petitioner 
demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant 
at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; 
(3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not 
due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 
144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 
(1976». 
The court concludes that Johnson has failed to establish any of these four factors 
supporting her newly discovered evidence claim as to Mr. Pankey's allegations. First, 
there is no allegation that Mr. Pankey'S assertions are newly discovered and were 
unknown to the defense at trial. On the contrary, Mr. Pankey's affidavit states that he 
called one of Johnson'S attorneys to reveal his allegations during or before the triaL (Ex. 
33, p.2, ~ 5.) 
Second, the evidence is not material because there is no evidence that anyone 
associated with the investigation actually altered any evidence. Moreover, the 
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statement that the Sheriff would have to "move" evidence can be viewed as non-
exculpatory and even innocuous. 
Third, as the court has already held, the evidence would not likely produce an 
acquittal because the Sheriff's alleged statement does not actually tend to exonerate 
Johnson. The assertions being made by Mr. Pankey four years after the trial concluded 
do not merit the inferential consideration necessary to establish this required element of 
proof for a new trial. 
Finally, the evidence was made known to the defense and therefore discoverable 
through reasonable diligence. Since Mr. Pankey's affidavit establishes that the defense 
was aware of this information, Johnson cannot now claim that she was unaware of such 
information until after trial. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 P.3d at 
224 (in order to be newly discovered evidence, the evidence itself, not just importance 
or materiality of that evidence, must be unknown and unavailable prior to trial); State v. 
Weise, 75 Idaho 404,410,273 P.2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which defendant was aware 
of prior to trial but chose not to present is not newly discovered); State v. Morrison, 52 
Idaho 99, 11 P.2d 619,622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial is not newly 
discovered) . 
As such, Johnson's claim that the Pankey information is newly discovered is 
without merit, and is therefore DISMISSED. 
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B. Failure to Utilize Readily Available Psychological Evidence. 
Johnson asserts that her defense attorneys performed below the accepted 
standard, and that she was prejudiced thereby, due to their failure to attempt to 
introduce expert psychiatric opinion testimony to inform the jury that a double 
patricide-matricide is an incredibly rare phenomenon and even "rarer still with a girl of 
tender years, such as the Petitioner, who has not been physically and/or sexually 
abused, is not schizophrenic and/or intoxicated .... " (Second Amended Petition, pp.20-
Mr. Pangburn has previously testified about these claims as follows: 
Q. Do you recall talking about, with anybody, the fact that young girls don't kill 
their parents very often? 
A. I discussed that with everybody from Mark Rader to my wife to Nancy Grace 
onCNN. 
Q. And in what context were you thinking about that? 
A. Well, I never verified this, but my understanding was that there may have 
never been an instance like this in this country since the allegations related to 
Lizzie Borden of killing her parents, and she was aquitted. So it was a big 
deal. 
* * * 
Q. What, if anything, did you consider doing about the fact that [parricide is] 
rare? 
A. Busted our ass defending her in court is one thing, and deal with the many 
items of unfair evidence that the state got in and tried to get in 
misrepresenting the life of a 16-year-old girl and her inclination or ability to 
kill her parents. 
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Q. Did you ever consider pursuing the rarity of young girls murdering their 
parents as a component of your defense? 
A. I'm sure that we talked about how that element of a defense could be 
included in the case, and also that the difficulties that we would undoubtedly 
face with the presiding trial judge in trying to go that direction. But right 
now I can't recall actually presenting anything along those lines. 
Q. Do you ever remember having information from someone by the name of Dr. 
Worst in that - on that issue? 
A. Oh, well, Dr. Worst, if I am recalling correctly, was - examined Sarah after 
she was convicted. 
Q. Was that in anticipation of sentencing? 
A. It was. 
Let me back up. I said I don't recall. I argued that issue based on the 
evidence that did come in that Sarah would not -loved her parents and 
wouldn't kill them, and there was no evidence despite what they may have 
seen to show that she would have. But presenting expert testimony along the 
lines of, wel- bringing an expert in who would say that young gals, teenage 
girls, just don't kill their parents, I'm sure that we did not do that. 
Q. Do you think it takes an expert to know that's true? 
A. No, I don't. That's why I argued it based on the evidence that we did have 
come in. 
Deposition of Robert Pangburn, p. 45:1- p. 47:14. 
The same two-prong standard set forth above regarding ineffective assistance 
claims applies to this claim. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of 
showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Cooke v. State 2010 WL 610467, 11-12 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Aragon 
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v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)); Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 
139 P.3d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 2006). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Suits, 143 
Idaho at 162, 139 P.3d at 764. Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific 
facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The decision of what witnesses to callI/is an area where [the court] will not 
second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548,563, 199 P.3d 123, 138 (2008) (quoting State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 234,628 
P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). See also Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34,38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. 
App. 2005) (JIlt is generally agreed that the decision of what evidence should be 
introduced at trial is considered strategic or tactical.") (citing American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2). 
Here, Johnson has provided no evidence which suggests that the failure to call 
Dr. Worst resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance or other shortcomings. 
Indeed, Dr. Worst's affidavit does not establish that the issue was even discussed with 
defense counsel before or during the guilt phase. Thus, this court concludes that such 
evidence was not "readily available" to the defense team. Moreover, Pangburn's 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
testimony as set forth above establishes that he talked about the rarity of a young girl 
killing both her parents with numerous individuals, including Nancy Grace on CNN. 
Pangburn's failure to call an expert to establish that fact was purely tactical, as he noted: 
A. . .. bringing an expert in who would say that young gals, teenage girls, just 
don't kill their parents, I'm sure that we did not do that. 
Q. Do you think it takes an expert to know that's true? 
A. No, I don't. That's why I argued it based on the evidence that we did have 
corne in. 
Therefore, the presumption that counsel's performance fell within the acceptable range 
of professional assistance leads the court to conclude that failing to introduce expert 
testimony did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Beyond that, I/[i]n determining whether an attorney's failure to pursue a [course 
of action] in the underlying criminal action constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this [c]ourt may consider whether the [course of action] would have been successful." 
Cooke v. State, 2010 WL 610467,11-12 supra, (citing Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,713, 
905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995); Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634,637 
(Ct. App. 1993). If this court determines that the offer of Dr. Worst's testimony, if 
pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, then generally counsel will not 
be found deficient for failing to pursue it and the petitioner could not have been 
prejudiced by the lack of pursuit. Cook v. State (citing Sanchez, 127 Idaho at 713,905 P.2d 
at 646; Huck, 124 Idaho at 158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38). 
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This court concludes that testimony as proffered in Dr. Worst's affidavit would 
not have been admitted in any event. This court determines that such evidence would 
not have been admissible because statistical evidence relating to typical perpetrators of 
parricide is not relevant to whether Johnson, in particular, murdered her parents. See 
State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 33, 909 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting evidence of 
II expert testimony regarding whether a defendant fits an alleged' sexual offender 
profile' has been almost universally rejected in other jurisdictions."). 
Therefore, the claim that Pangburn was ineffective for failure to introduce expert 
testimony regarding the very rare incidence of parricide is DISMISSED. 
C. Appellate Counsel's Failure to Raise and Challenge Sufficiency of 
Evidence to Support Aiding and Abetting Instruction. 
a. Legal Standards Applicable to Appellate Counsel Claims. 
A defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on a 
direct appeal as a matter of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.s. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985). 
Johnson's claims that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
appointed counsel should have raised additional issues on appeal are subject to the 
standards set forth in Strickland. Therefore, Johnson must show that appellate counsel's 
performance was deficient and caused prejudice in the outcome of the appeal. Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.s. 685, 697-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1851-52 (2002); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 
297,92 P.3d 542,547 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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An indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed 
appellate counsel to press all nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to 
pursue. Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 660, 168 P.3d 40, 44 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Jones 
v. Barnes, 463 U.s. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983). Rather, the process of winnowing 
out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from 
being the evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. Id. 
(citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.s. 527, 536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667 (1986)). "Notwithstanding 
Barnes, it is still possible to bring a Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to raise a 
particular claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent." Smith 
v. Robbins, 528 U.s. 259, 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 765 (2000). "[O]nly when ignored issues are 
clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of 
counsel be overcome." Id. (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644,646 (7th Cir.1986)). 
b. The Evidence is Sufficient to Create an Issue of Fact on this Claim. 
The court has reviewed the record in this case and determines that it will wait 
until trial to pass upon the merits of this claim. The court recognizes that claims against 
appellate counsel are difficult to establish; however, the question of whether there were 
sufficient facts in the record to support the aiding and abetting instruction is incumbent 
upon the review of the factual record and this court's consideration of the intent/review 
by appellate counsel. Such matters are fact-driven and require a trial to judge matters 
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of credibility and weight. As such, the court DENIES summary disposition on this 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the state of Idaho's motion for summary 
dismissal is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Johnson's motion for summary 
disposition is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this c?/i1.ay of May, 
District Judge 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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Case No. CV 06-324 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Scheduling Conference Hearing 
2:07 Christopher Simms for petitioner, Jessica Lorello for the State of Idaho. Court 
reviews case with Counsel. 
2:09 Court addresses Counsel in regards to order that was emailed to the law clerk some 
time ago. Counsels discuss some issues that need clarification. 
2:19 Court wants to schedule case for trial. Ms. Lorello is available October 12,2010; 
Mr. Simms is not available on that day. Trial will be November 30, 2010 at 9:00 am, for 
4 days, Civil Pretrial November 8, 2010 at 10:30 am. Counsel to be present however if 
Mr. Simms is not available Court will reset to another date. Court will send out 
scheduling order, if Counsel has issues with the scheduling deadlines they may schedule 
it up for a hearing or stipulate to the changes. Ms. Lorello has no other issues for today, 
neither does Mr. Simms. 
2:26 Court in recess. 
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Case No. CV-06-3 Jo/ynn Drag., Olerk DIBtriot 
Oourt Sllln, Ooun ,Idaho 
ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
The Court, having considered the Petitioner's and Respondent's cross 
motions for summary disposition, and after conducting a hearing on said motions, 
hereby enters the following order: 
In Petitioner's Memorandum Response to Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief ("Response"), the Petitioner conceded the state is entitled to summary 
dismissal of the following claims: (1) "Violation of Petitioner's Right to Due 
Process of Law Relating to Judicial Bias" and the. "related claim of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Move for Disqualification for Cause" 
(Response, pp.3, 27) as alleged in paragraph 12 of Petitioner's Second 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Petition"); (2) "Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Adequately Cross Examine Matt Johnson" 
(Response, pp.3, 17, 27) as ,alleged in paragraph 16.a.iv of the Petition; and (3) 
"All allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Dealing with Fingerprint 
Evidence" (Response, Ipp.3-4, 20, 27) as alleged in paragraph 18 of the Petition 
except for the allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to "elicit from the 
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Defense Fingerprint Expert his opinion that latent prints found on the tools of 
murder were fresh prints" (Response, p.4). Based on Petitioner's concessions, 
the state's motion for summary dismissal of the foregoing claims is GRANTED. 
In Petitioner's Memorandum Reply to Respondent's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Dismissal ("Reply"), she also 
conceded the state is entitled to summary dismissal of her claims that (1) trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to lay a proper foundation for psychological 
opinion evidence (Petition, p.17, 1f 19); (2) trial counsel were ineffective in 
"dealing with the aiding and abetting theory of guilt" (Petition, pp.18-20, 1f 1f 20-
21); and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the district 
court's denial of her motion to suppress (Petition, p.22, 1f 25). (Reply, p.2.) 
Based on Petitioner's concessions, the state's motion for summary dismissal of 
the foregoing claims is GRANTED. 
At argument, Petitioner also conceded the state is entitled to summary 
dismissal of her allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Terri 
Sanders as a witness as alleged in paragraph 17.a of the Petition because, 
although not called by the defense, Ms. Sanders was called as a witness at trial 
and was cross-examined by the defense. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2650-2659.) The 
state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to call Ms. Sanders as a witness is, therefore, GRANTED. 
The state's motion for summary dismissal is likewise GRANTED as to 
Petitioner's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Stephanie 
Hoffman, Rick Olsen, or Linda O'Connor's thirteen-year-old son as witnesses as 
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alleged in paragraphs 17b-d of the Petition because Petitioner has failed to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was deficient for failing to call any of 
these witnesses or that she was prejudiced as a result thereof. 
With respect to the state's assertion that certain claims should be 
dismissed as untimely, the Court DENIES the state's motion as to Claims One 
("Petitioner is Innocent" (Petition, p.3, ,-r 10)), Two ("Trial Court Lacked 
Jurisdiction" (Petition, pp.3-4, ,-r 11 )), Three ("Violation of Petitioner's Right to Due 
Process of Law" (Petition, ppA-6, ,-r,-r 12-13), Six ("Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel in Failing to Lay a Proper Foundation for Psycological [sic] Opinion 
Evidence" (Petition, p.17, ,-r 19», Nine ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in 
Failure to Utilize Readily Available Psychiatric Evidence" (Petition, pp.20-21, ,-r 
23)), and Ten ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Due to Violation of Rules 
of Professional Conduct" (Petition, p.21, ,-r 24)), but the Court will take under 
advisement whether Claim Eight ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in 
Investigating the Allegation of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey" (Petition, p.20, ~ 
22)), and that portion of Claim Twelve asserting a newly discovered evidence 
claim based upon the allegations of Mr. Pankey (Petition, pp.24-25, ,-r 30), should 
be dismissed based upon the statute of limitation. 
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim of actual 
innocence as alleged in paragraph 10 of the Petition, to the extent it is intended 
as an independent claim rather than argument, is GRANTED. An assertion of 
actual innocence does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 
the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. 
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The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that the 
"Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Try, Convict and Sentence Petitioner" as 
alleged in paragraph 11 of the Petition is GRANTED. The crime with which 
Petitioner was charged resulted in an automatic waiver to adult court. As such, 
contrary to Petitioner's assertion, no waiver hearing was required in order to 
confer jurisdiction on the district court that presided over Petitioner's criminal 
case. I.C. § 20-505(5); I.C. § 20-509(1)(a); I.C. § 20-508(1)(b); In re Doe, 147 
Idaho 243,248,207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,978 
P.2d 214 (1999); State v. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454, 458, 700 P.2d 76, 80 (Ct. 
App.1985). 
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that her due 
process and confrontation rights were violated as a result of the district court's 
limitation on the cross-examination of Bruno Santos (Petition, p.6, ,-r 13) is 
GRANTED because this claim could have been raised on direct appeal and, as 
such, it is barred from consideration in post-conviction pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4901 (b). The Court rejects Petitioner's assertion that the Idaho Supreme Court's 
opinions in Beam v. State, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), and Hoffman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 188, 868 P.2d 516 (1994), compel a contrary conclusion and 
the Court specifically finds that both Beam and Hoffman support dismissal of this 
claim based on I.C. § 19-4901 (b). 
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the re-enactment proffered by 
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state's witness Rod Englert as alleged in paragraph 15.b of the Petition is 
GRANTED. 
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that 
counsel was ineffective due to alleged violations of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct "by communicating with the media in a self promotional 
manner" (Petition, p.21, ~ 21), is GRANTED. 
The Court will take under advisement whether summary disposition of 
Petitioner's Claim Eight ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Investigating 
the Allegation of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey" (Petition, p.20, ~ 22)), Claim 
Nine ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Failure to Utilize Readily 
Available Psychiatric Evidence" (Petition, pp.20-21, ~ 23)), and Claim Eleven 
("Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel" for failing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aiding and abetting instruction (Petition, 
p.22, ~ 26)), is appropriate. 
Both the Petitioner's and the Respondent's motions for summary 
disposition of the following claims are DENIED, and the Court intends to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing on those claims: 
(1) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a continuance 
after learning the comforter had not been collected as evidence as 
alleged in paragraph 15.a of the Petition; 
(2) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately 
investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment as 
alleged in paragraph 15.c of the Petition; 
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(3) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present expert 
testimony regarding the comforters as alleged in paragraph 15.d of 
the Petition; 
(4) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately cross-
examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry 
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo 
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, 
Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson 
as alleged in paragraph 16 of the Petition. 
(5) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether 
certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh" as alleged in 
paragraph 18 of the Petition. 
(6) Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of 
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously unidentified 
latent prints as alleged in paragraph 29 of the Petition. 
DATED this f1 day O~01 0, 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the 19th day of July, 2010, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Cross Motions for Summary 
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Christopher Simms 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1861 
Hailey, 10 83333 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney Genera! 
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{ } Court Folder 
-JA~~ . Deputy Clerk i 
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) Case No. CV -06-324 
) 
) 
) SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE 
) OF TRIAL SETTING AND PRE-
) TRIAL ORDER 
) 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. TRIAL: This case is set for a COURT TRIAL to begin at 9:00 a.m., 
November 30, 2010, in Courtroom No.1, Theron Ward Judicial Building, 427 
Shoshone Street North, Twin Fal/s, Idaho. A total of ~ days have been reserved. On 
the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief 
final pre-trial conference. Unless otherwise ordered, other than the first and last day of 
trial, proceedings will convene at 9:00 a.m. each morning, and adjourn at approximately 
2:30 p.m. each afternoon. Two brief recesses will be taken at approximately 10:30 a.m. 
and 12:30 p.m. 
2. ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge 
assigned to this case intends to utilize the provisions of I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1 )(G). Notice is 
also given that if there are multiple parties, any disqualification pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(1)(A) is subject to a prior determination under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(C). The panel of 
alternate judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been 
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disqualified in this action: Judges Butler, Brody, Crabtree, Higer, Hurlbutt, Meehl, 
Stoker, St. Clair, Wildman and Wood. 
3. PRETRIAL CONFERENCES: A Status/ADR conference will be 
conducted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 at 9:00 a.m., Monday, . The final pre-trial conference 
will be conducted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 at 10:30 a.m., Monday, November 8,2010 at 
10:30 am. TRIAL COUNSEL MUST ATTEND THE FINAL PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE IN PERSON; TELEPHONE CONFERENCES ARE NOT ALLOWED 
FOR ANY PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. Counsel for each party is to complete a "Pre-
trial Memorandum" pursuant to Rule 16(d) for the final pre-trial conference. The 
memorandum shall be filed with the Clerk no later than seven (7) days before the pre-
trial conference. 
4. PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All motions to join parties or amend the pleadings 
(except motions pertaining to punitive damages under I.C. §6-1604) must be filed and 
heard so as not to require the continuance or vacation of the trial date, and in no event 
less than ninety (90) days before trial. All motions for summary judgment and motions 
to add claims for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. §6-1604 must be filed and served 
so as to be heard not later than sixty (60) days before trial. All other non-dispositive 
pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine) must be filed and 
scheduled for hearing not less than fourteen (14) days before trial. Exceptions will be 
granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires. 
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5. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
a. The party moving for summary judgment shall prepare as separate 
documents: (a) motion, (b) legal memorandum containing a written 
statement of reasons in support of the motion, and (c) a concise 
statement of the material facts. Each statement of a fact shall include 
a reference to the particular place in the record which supports that 
fact. The legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by 
authority, of the elements of any claim or defense relevant to the 
motion. 
b. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare as 
separate documents: (a) legal memorandum containing a written 
statement of reasons in opposition to the motion, and (b) a concise 
statement of the facts which are genuine issues of material fact and/or 
which are material facts omitted from the moving party's statement of 
facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the 
particular place in the record which supports that fact. The legal 
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the 
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion. 
c. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56 (c) is hereby MODIFIED as follows: 
i. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at 
least thirty-five (35) days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
ii. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the 
party must do so at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date 
of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an answering 
brief at least 21 days prior to the date of the hearing. 
iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less 
than 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
d. The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the 
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and 
statement of facts. The hearing date can then be obtained from the 
judge's court clerk. This pertains to all motions for summary judgment, 
and motions for partial summary judgment. 
e. Each party will be allotted thirty (30) minutes for oral argument. 
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6. SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and 
motion calendar each Monday (or Wednesday following holidays) at 9:00 a.m. Absent 
an order shortening time, all motions must be filed and served at least fourteen (14) 
days prior to hearing. As a matter of courtesy, counsel are expected to contact the 
Court's Deputy Clerk, Sharie Cooper (phone 208-736-4162) to schedule hearings, and 
to confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates. As an 
accommodation to out-of-town counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion 
(except motions for summary judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered) 
may be conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I,R.C.P. 7(b)(4). Counsel 
requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for arranging for placement 
of the call, and the cost thereof. Arrangements for telephone conference of any status 
conference must be pre-arranged by the Wednesday preceding the date of the status 
conference. 
7. LEGAL BRIEFING AND MEMORANDUM: A "judge's copy" of any 
memoranda or affidavits will be provided for use by the court. All such documents shall 
be clearly marked as "JUDGE'S COPY," 
8. DISCOVERY AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES: The Court will not entertain 
any discovery motion unless accompanied by a written certification signed by counsel, 
which confirms that a reasonable effort has been made to voluntarily resolve the dispute 
with opposing counsel. A party's obligation to fully and timely respond to discovery 
requests is distinct from any obligation imposed by this order, and no party may rely 
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upon the Order or any deadline it imposes as justification for failing to timely respond to 
discovery requests or to supplement prior responses. 
9. DISCOVERY CUT ·OFFS: Absent a stipulation to the contrary, all 
discovery shall be propounded and served such that responses are due no later than 
thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplemental responses a party is required to make 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e) or the terms of an earlier discovery request shall also be 
served at least thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplementation of discovery required 
by the rule shall be made in a timely manner. 
10. WITNESS DISCLOSURES: Each party shall disclose the existence and 
identity of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses to the extent required by 
interrogatories or other discovery requests propounded by another party. There is no 
independent duty to disclose expert or lay witnesses except as required to adequately 
respond to discovery requests or supplement prior responses. If discovery requests 
seeking disclosure of expert witnesses are propounded, a plaintiff upon whom such 
requests are served shall, in good faith, disclose the existence and identity of potential 
or intended expert witnesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than one 
hundred-twenty (120) days before trial. A defendant upon whom such requests are 
served shall, in good faith, identify any potential or intended expert witnesses at the 
earliest opportunity, and in no event later than seventy-five (75) days before trial. 
Any party upon whom discovery is served who intends or reserves the right to 
call any expert witness in rebuttal or surrebuttal shall, in good faith, identify such experts 
at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial. 
SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND 
PRETRIAL ORDER - 5 
Any party upon whom discovery requests are served seeking disclosure of lay 
witnesses shall, in good faith, disclose the identity of all such witnesses at the earliest 
opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial. Absent a 
showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to any other party, any witness 
who has not been timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify at trial. 
11. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: When and to the extent required to 
respond to interrogatories, requests for production or other discovery requests 
propounded by another party, a party must identify and disclose any documentary, 
tangible or other exhibits that party intends or reserves the right to offer at trial. Absent 
a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties, any exhibit 
which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded. Without regard to whether 
discovery concerning a party's exhibits has been propounded, not less than seven (7) 
days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in 
the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one complete, duplicate 
marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during trial; and (8) 
deliver to counsel for each other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and duplicate 
copy of that party's marked exhibits. The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not 
include exhibits which will be offered solely for the purpose of impeachment. Unless 
otherwise ordered, the plaintiff shall identify exhibits beginning with number "1," and the 
defendant shall utilize exhibits beginning with number "1000." 
12. WITNESS LIST. Without regard to whether discovery concerning a party's 
witnesses has been propounded, not less than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party 
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shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed witness list together with a copy for the 
Judge's use during trial; and (B) deliver to Counsel for each other party a copy of the 
completed witness list. 
13. AUDIO-VISUAL AND OTHER EQUIPMENT. Counsel are expected to 
notify the Court no later than the pretrial conference of any need for audio-visual or 
other special equipment. The Court provides a portable television and VHS-format 
VCR, a small x-ray viewer, easel and podium. Counsel may furnish and utilize any 
additional equipment but must make all such equipment available for use by opposing 
counsel. Counsel who furnishes their own equipment should make appropriate 
arrangements to set it up in advance so that prolonged delays are not required. 
14. JURY SELECTION AND VOIR DIRE: Unless otherwise ordered, the 
struck jury selection method will be utilized. Absent an order to the contrary, in cases 
expected to last less than five (5) trial days, one additional/alternate juror will be chosen. 
A list of the names and selected information concerning prospective jurors can be 
obtained from Jerry Woolley, Twin Falls County Jury Commissioner, P.O. Box 126, Twin 
Falls, Idaho 83303 (phone: 208-736-4136) approximately one week before trial. In 
accordance with I.R.C.P. 47(i)(1), counsel for each party may make a brief (one- to two-
minute) non-argumentative statement to the entire jury panel before voir dire 
examination begins in which counsel introduce themselves and their clients, and briefly 
describe the nature of the case. The Court will conduct brief initial voir dire examination 
designed to confirm that all summoned jurors are qualified to serve, and cannot be 
disqualified for obvious bias. Thereafter, plaintiff will voir dire the entire jury panel, 
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followed by defendant. In cases involving multiple parties, co-plaintiffs and co-
defendants are encouraged to consolidate and coordinate their voir dire examination. 
Challenges for cause may be made at any time while examining a prospective juror, but 
in no event later than the conclusion of questioning of the challenged juror. Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 47U) each party shall have four peremptory challenges, plus one additional 
preemptory challenge for each additional/alternate juror to be selected provided that 
multiple co-plaintiffs or co-defendants may be required to share a given number of 
peremptory challenges as determined at the pre-trial conference. Absent extraordinary 
circumstances, the parties will be limited to 75 minutes per side for voir dire, provided, 
however, that the Court may, in its discretion, limit or terminate voir dire which. is 
excessive, repetitious, unreasonable, or argumentative. 
15. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions and verdict forms requested by 
a party shall be prepared in conformity with I.R.C.P. 51 (a), and shall be filed with the 
Clerk (with copies to Chambers) at least seven (7) days before trial. Counsel shall also 
include a floppy computer disc containing the instructions for use by the court. 
Requested instructions not timely submitted may not be included in the court's 
preliminary or final charge. Parties may submit additional or supplemental instructions 
to address unforeseen issues or disputes arising during trial. To the extent possible, 
proposed instructions and verdict forms shall be printed in 11-point, "Times New 
Roman" typeface like that contained in this order. The Court has prepared "stock" 
instructions, copies of which can be obtained upon request. The parties may, but are 
not required to submit additional stock instructions. 
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16. JUROR QUESTIONS: In accordance with I.R.C.P. 47(q), it is the Court's 
usual practice to permit jurors to submit written questions to be posed to trial witnesses 
in accordance with the Rule. Counsel are permitted to review §ll questions before they 
are posed to a witness, and register any objection or comment on the record in the 
absence of the jury before any juror questions are posed. After a witness has 
responded to any juror questions, counsel are permitted (beginning with the party who 
called the witness) to pose follow-up questions provoked by juror questions or witness 
responses. 
17. TRIAL BRIEFS: The Court encourages (but does not require) the 
submission of trial briefs which address important substantive or evidentiary issues 
each party expects to arise during trial. Any trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged 
between the parties, and lodged with the Clerk (with copies to Chambers) at least ten 
(10) days prior to trial. 
18. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court 
without a jury, each party shall, within fourteen (14) days before trial, file with the Clerk 
(with copies to Chambers) and serve upon all other parties Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law which support that party's position concerning the appropriate 
resolution of the case. The parties may submit supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law after the case is completed. 
19. REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: In setting cases for trial, the 
Court has taken into account the needs of the parties and the case, availability and 
convenience of counsel, as well as its own personnel, facilities and the interests of 
SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND 
PRETRIAL ORDER - 9 
counsel and parties in other pending cases. A request to vacate or continue an existing 
trial setting works inconveniences and hardships on the Court, its staff and other 
litigants, and impairs the Court's ability to efficiently manage its docket and calendar. 
For these reasons, requests (including stipulations) to vacate or continue a trial will be 
granted only in the face of unusual and unforeseen circumstances, and when the 
interests of substantial justice to the litigants so require. Any party requesting or 
stipulating to vacate a trial setting must submit a specific written statement concerning 
the reasons for the request, and must certify, in writing, that the request or stipulation 
has been discussed with the parties represented by counsel, and such parties have no 
objection to the request or stipulation. An order granting a request to vacate or continue 
a trial setting may be conditioned upon terms (including orders that the requesting party 
or attorney reimburse other parties or their attorneys for attorneys fees incurred for 
preparation which must be repeated or expenses advanced in anticipation of the trial 
setting which cannot be avoided or recovered). An order vacating or continuing a trial 
setting shall not serve to alter the deadlines set forth in this order, and unless otherwise 
stipulated or ordered, the specific calendar dates associated with any deadlines shall be 
adjusted in reference to the new or amended trial date. 
20. JUDICIAL NOTICE: If either party requests the Court to take judicial 
notice of any documents not in the post-conviction file, Counsel shall provide, under 
separate cover, all such documents for the Court's review. 
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21. SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: A failure to comply with this 
order or the deadlines it imposes in a timely manner subject a non-compliant party 
and/or counsel to an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i) and/or other 
applicable rules, statutes or case precedent. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 2010. 
~~~-- ~ ",/ .' /' "2'"  '«:..,;....~-.... 
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SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE 
OF TRIAL SETTING AND PRE-
TRIAL ORDER 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. TRIAL: This case is set for a COURT TRIAL to begin at 9:00 a.m., 
December 7, 2010, in Courtroom No.1, Theron Ward Judicial Building, 427 
Shoshone Street North, Twin Falls, Idaho. A total of ~ days have been reserved. On 
the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief 
final pre-trial conference. Unless otherwise ordered, other than the first and last day of 
trial, proceedings will convene at 9:00 a.m. each morning, and adjourn at approximately 
2:30 p.m. each afternoon. Two brief recesses will be taken at approximately 10:30 a.m. 
and 12:30 p.m. 
2. ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge 
assigned to this case intends to utilize the provisions of I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1 )(G). Notice is 
also given that if there are multiple parties, any disqualification pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(1 )(A) is subject to a prior determination under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1 )(C). The panel of 
alternate judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been 
~y\kJ. 
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disqualified in this action: Judges Butler, Brody, Crabtree, Higer, Hurlbutt, Meehl, 
Stoker, St. Clair, Wildman and Wood. 
3. PRETRIAL CONFERENCES: The pre-trial conference will be conducted 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 at 10:30 a.m., Monday, November 8,2010 at 10:30 am. TRIAL 
COUNSEL MUST ATTEND THE FINAL PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE IN PERSON; 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCES ARE NOT ALLOWED FOR ANY PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE. Counsel for each party is to complete a "Pre-trial Memorandum" 
pursuant to Rule 16(d) for the final pre-trial conference. The memorandum shall be filed 
with the Clerk no later than seven (7) days before the pre-trial conference. 
4. PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All motions to join parties or amend the pleadings 
(except motions pertaining to punitive damages under I.C. §6-1604) must be filed and 
heard so as not to require the continuance or vacation of the trial date, and in no event 
less than ninety (90) days before trial. All motions for summary judgment and motions 
to add claims for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. §6-1604 must be filed and served 
so as to be heard not later than sixty (60) days before trial. All other non-dispositive 
pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine) must be filed and 
scheduled for hearing not less than fourteen (14) days before trial. Exceptions will be 
granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires. 
ArolV\M 
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5. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
a. The party moving for summary judgment shall prepare as separate 
documents: (a) motion, (b) legal memorandum containing a written 
statement of reasons in support of the motion, and (c) a concise 
statement of the material facts. Each statement of a fact shall include 
a reference to the particular place in the record which supports that 
fact. The legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by 
authority, of the elements of any claim or defense relevant to the 
motion. 
b. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare as 
separate documents: (a) legal memorandum containing a written 
statement of reasons in opposition to the motion, and (b) a concise 
statement of the facts which are genuine issues of material fact and/or 
which are material facts omitted from the moving party's statement of 
facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the 
particular place in the record which supports that fact. The legal 
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the 
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion. 
c. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(c) is hereby MODIFIED as follows: 
i. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at 
least thirty-five (35) days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
ii. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the 
party must do so at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date 
of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an answering 
brief at least 21 days prior to the date of the hearing. 
iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less 
than 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
d. The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the 
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and 
statement of facts. The hearing date can then be obtained from the 
judge's court clerk. This pertains to all motions for summary judgment, 
and motions for partial summary judgment. 
e. Each party will be allotted thirty (30) minutes for oral argument. 
s~g~G OROER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND 
PRETRIAL ORDER - 3 
6. SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and 
motion calendar each Monday (or Wednesday following holidays) at 9:00 a.m. Absent 
an order shortening time, all motions must be filed and served at least fourteen (14) 
days prior to hearing. As a matter of courtesy, counsel are expected to contact the 
Court's Deputy Clerk, Sharie Cooper (phone 208-736-4162) to schedule hearings, and 
to confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates. As an 
accommodation to out-of-town counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion 
(except motions for summary judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered) 
may be conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(4). Counsel 
requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for arranging for placement 
of the call, and the cost thereof. Arrangements for telephone conference of any status 
conference must be pre-arranged by the Wednesday preceding the date of the status 
conference. 
7. LEGAL BRIEFING AND MEMORANDUM: A "judge's copy" of any 
memoranda or affidavits will be provided for use by the court. All such documents shall 
be clearly marked as "JUDGE'S COPY." 
8. DISCOVERY AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES: The Court will not entertain 
any discovery motion unless accompanied by a written certification signed by counsel, 
which confirms that a reasonable effort has been made to voluntarily resolve the dispute 
with opposing counsel. A party's obligation to fully and timely respond to discovery 
requests is distinct from any obligation imposed by this order, and no party may rely 
.lJ-
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upon the Order or any deadline it imposes as justification for failing to timely respond to 
discovery requests or to supplement prior responses. 
9. DISCOVERY CUT -OFFS: Absent a stipulation to the contrary, all 
discovery shall be propounded and served such that responses are due no later than 
thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplemental responses a party is required to make 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e) or the terms of an earlier discovery request shall also be 
served at least thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplementation of discovery required 
by the rule shall be made in a timely manner. 
10. WITNESS DISCLOSURES: Each party shall disclose the existence and 
identity of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses to the extent required by 
interrogatories or other discovery requests propounded by another party. There is no 
independent duty to disclose expert or lay witnesses except as required to adequately 
respond to discovery requests or supplement prior responses. If discovery requests 
seeking disclosure of expert witnesses are propounded, a plaintiff upon whom such 
requests are served shall, in good faith, disclose the existence and identity of potential 
or intended expert witnesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than one 
hundred-twenty (120) days before trial. A defendant upon whom such requests are 
served shall, in good faith, identify any potential or intended expert witnesses at the 
earliest opportunity, and in no event later than seventy-five (75) days before trial. 
Any party upon whom discovery is served who intends or reserves the right to 
call any expert witness in rebuttal or surrebuttal shall, in good faith, identify such experts 
at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial. 
~~ 
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Any party upon whom discovery requests are served seeking disclosure of lay 
witnesses shall, in good faith, disclose the identity of all such witnesses at the earliest 
opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial. Absent a 
showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to any other party, any witness 
who has not been timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify at trial. 
11. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: When and to the extent required to 
respond to interrogatories, requests for production or other discovery requests 
propounded by another party, a party must identify and disclose any documentary, 
tangible or other exhibits that party intends or reserves the right to offer at trial. Absent 
a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties, any exhibit 
which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded. Without regard to whether 
discovery concerning a party's exhibits has been propounded, not less than seven (7) 
days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in 
the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one complete, duplicate 
marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during trial; and (8) 
deliver to counsel for each other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and duplicate 
copy of that party's marked exhibits. The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not 
include exhibits which will be offered solely for the purpose of impeachment. Unless 
otherwise ordered, the plaintiff shall identify exhibits beginning with number "1," and the 
defendant shall utilize exhibits beginning with number "1000." 
12. WITNESS LIST. Without regard to whether discovery concerning a party's 
witnesses has been propounded, not less than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party 
~LJ-. 
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shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed witness list together with a copy for the 
Judge's use during trial; and (8) deliver to Counsel for each other party a copy of the 
completed witness list. 
13. AUDIO-VISUAL AND OTHER EQUIPMENT. Counsel are expected to 
notify the Court no later than the pretrial conference of any need for audio-visual or 
other special equipment. The Court provides a portable television and VHS-format 
VCR, a small x-ray viewer, easel and podium. Counsel may furnish and utilize any 
additional equipment but must make all such equipment available for use by opposing 
counsel. Counsel who furnishes their own equipment should make appropriate 
arrangements to set it up in advance so that prolonged delays are not required. 
14. TRIAL BRIEFS: The Court encourages (but does not require) the 
submission of trial briefs which address important substantive or evidentiary issues 
each party expects to arise during trial. Any trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged 
between the parties, and lodged with the Clerk (with copies to Chambers) at least ten 
(10) days prior to trial. 
15. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court 
without a jury, each party shall, within fourteen (14) days before trial, file with the Clerk 
(with copies to Chambers) and serve upon all other parties Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law which support that party's position concerning the appropriate 
resolution of the case. The parties may submit supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law after the case is completed. 
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16. REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: In setting cases for trial, the 
Court has taken into account the needs of the parties and the case, availability and 
convenience of counsel, as well as its own personnel, facilities and the interests of 
counsel and parties in other pending cases. A request to vacate or continue an existing 
trial setting works inconveniences and hardships on the Court, its staff and other 
litigants, and impairs the Court's ability to efficiently manage its docket and calendar. 
For these reasons, requests (including stipulations) to vacate or continue a trial will be 
granted only in the face of unusual and unforeseen circumstances, and when the 
interests of substantial justice to the litigants so require. Any party requesting or 
stipulating to vacate a trial setting must submit a specific written statement concerning 
the reasons for the request, and must certify, in writing, that the request or stipulation 
has been discussed with the parties represented by counsel, and such parties have no 
objection to the request or stipulation. An order granting a request to vacate or continue 
a trial setting may be conditioned upon terms (including orders that the requesting party 
or attorney reimburse other parties or their attorneys for attorneys fees incurred for 
preparation which must be repeated or expenses advanced in anticipation of the trial 
setting which cannot be avoided or recovered). An order vacating or continuing a trial 
setting shall not serve to alter the deadlines set forth in this order, and unless otherwise 
stipulated or ordered, the specific calendar dates associated with any deadlines shall be 
adjusted in reference to the new or amended trial date. 
~~ 
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17. JUDICIAL NOTICE: If either party requests the Court to take judicial 
notice of any documents not in the post-conviction file, Counsel shall provide, under 
separate cover, all such documents for the Court's review. 
18. SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: A failure to comply with this 
order or the deadlines it imposes in a timely manner subject a non-compliant party 
and/or counsel to an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i) and/or other 
applicable rules, statutes or case precedent. 
DATED this 8th day of Septemb 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned certifies that on the~th day of September, 2010 she caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL 
SETTING AND INITIAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER to be served upon the following persons in 
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Petitioner's Counsel: 
Christopher Simms 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1861 
Hailey, ID 83333 
~c 
Sharie Cooper ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
Mailed Courthouse Mailbox __ Faxed __ 
Respondent's Counsel: 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Mailed--£- Courthouse Mailbox. __ 
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I lSEP~~ I Jo/ynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV -06-324 
) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) TO RECONSIDER 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attomey for Blaine County, and hereby submits this brief in support of the 
state's motion to reconsider. 
I. 
Background 
On February 8, 2010, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal and a 
memorandum in support seeking dismissal of all claims in the Petitioner's (Ii Johnson") 
Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Johnson filed a cross motion for 
summary disposition that same day. On April 30, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on 
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the parties' motions at which it granted, in part, and denied, in part, the state's motion for 
summary dismissal, and took the remaining claims under advisement. The Court entered 
a Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement 
("Memorandum Decision") on May 21, 2010, and memorialized its oral ruling from the 
summary disposition hearing in "Its Order on Cross Motions for Summary Disposition 
("Order), filed July 19, 2010. For the reasons set forth below, the state now seeks 
reconsideration of that portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision in which the Court 
concluded the Petitioner ("Johnson") is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her claim that 
counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine a number of witnesses as 
alleged in paragraph 16 of her second amended petitlon (Order, p.6, 114), and that portion 
of the Court's Order in which the Court concluded Johnson is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on her ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim (Memorandum Decision, 
pp.17-18). 
U. 
This Court Should Reconsider Its Prior Ruling Denying The State's Motion For 
Summary Dismissal Of Johnson's Claims That Trial Counsel Were Ineffective In Cross-
Examining WItnesses And Her Claim That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective And 
Dismiss Those Claims Without An Evidentiary Hearing 
A. General Legal Standards Applicable To Motions For Reconsideration 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permit the filing of "raj motion for 
reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court . . . at any time before the 
entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final 
judgment." I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B), 1'l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(8) provides a dfstrict court with 
authority to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not 
been entered." Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 785, 69 P.3d 1035 
(2003). The trial court is permitted to consider new or additional facts presented with 
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the motion. Noreen v. Price Development Co. !..imited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816,820, 
25 P.3d 129 (Ct. App. 2001). The district court has considerable discretion in 
determining whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. Jordan v. Beels, 135 
Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908 (Ct. App. 2001). "Generally, post-conviction applications 
are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Prooedure." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 
57,106 P.3d 376 (2004). 
B. The Court Should Reconsider Its Order Denying The State's Motion For 
Summary Dismissal Of Johnson's Claim That Counsel Were Ineffective In Failing 
To Adeguately Cross-Examine A Number Of Witnesses And Conclude That 
Johnson Has Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That Would 
Entitle Her To An Evidentiary Hearing On This Claim 
In her second amended petition, Johnson alleges counsel failed to adequately 
cross-examine a number of witnesses, "inolud[ing] but ... not limited to Matt Johnson, 
Alan & Julia Dupuis, EMT Sohel! Elf/son, Sherrif [sic] Walt Femling, Detective Steve 
Harkin, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez (aka Juan 
Gonzales)[,] Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez and Carlos Ayala, and also include officers Raul 
Ornelas, and Stu Robinson."1 (Second Amended Petition r Petition") , p.9, 1f 16.) As 
noted in the state's original brief in support of summary dismissal, Johnson falls to 
allege any specifiC deficiencies or prejudice in relation to Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, 
Schell Eliison, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Beoky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala. (See 
generally Petition, pp.9-13.) With respect to the remaining witnesses Johnson believes 
were inadequately cross-examined - Detective Harkin, Officer Ornelas, Sheriff FemJing, 
Consuelo Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Bruno Santos, Officer Robinson, and Officer Kirtley -
1 Johnson has since conceded she is not entitled to relief on her claim that counsel was 
ineffective in relation to the cross--€lxamination of Matt Johnson and the Court has 
dismissed this claim. (Order, pp.1-2.) 
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while Johnson has highlighted deficiencies she perceives in the cross-examination that 
was conducted of each of these witnesses, the allegations in this regard are bare and 
conclusory with respect to Johnson's burden of establishing a material issue of fact as 
to both deficient performance and prejudice. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, _,226 
P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); 
Baldwin v. state, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 363, 367 (2008»). Bare and conclusory 
allegations are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 
Idaho 156, 159. 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826, 
702 P.2d 860,864 (Ct. App. 1985). 
More importantly, Johnson has failed to offer any evidence as to what any of the 
witnesses she complains were not properly cross-examined would have said if the 
witnesses had been questioned differently. 'To justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-
conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent on the applicant to tender written 
statements from potential witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to 
facts within their knowledge." Selfv. State, 145 Idaho 578, 581,181 P.3d 504,507 (Ct. 
App. 2007). Johnson has failed to do so. 
To the extent Johnson is claiming counsel were ineffective based upon an 
accumulation of the alleged deficiencies in their cross-examination, such an assertion is 
insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. At a minimum, Johnson must first 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that she suffered some prejudice as a 
result of counsels' cross-examination (or lack of cross-examination). See Boman v. 
State, 129 Idaho 520, 927 P.2d 910 (1996) ("While this Court has recognized the 
doctrine of cumulative error, a necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a 
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finding of error in the first instance.") (Citations omitted.) Johnson has failed to do so if 
for no other reason than because she has failed to provide any evidence of how the 
testimony of the witnesses would have been different. Nor have counsel, through their 
respective depositions, provided any basis for concluding there is a genuine issue of 
material fact relating to their cross-examination strategy that needs to be litigated at an 
evidentiary hearing. While one of Johnson's trial attorneys, Mark Rader, certainly 
appears ready and willing to concede his own deficiencies, as well as the deficiencies 
he perceives vis-ii-vis the entire "defense team" (Deposition of Mark Rader taken June 
5, 2009, p.25, L.12 - p.28, L,18), neither Mr. Rader nor Johnson's other trial attorney, 
Bob Pangburn, have Identified any specific cross-examination they believe should have 
been conducted, or any additional information they could have elicited through cross-
examination (see generally Deposition of Mark Rader and DeposItions of Bob Pangburn 
taken June 5, 2009, and July 24, 2009). 
Because Johnson has failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that 
counsel were deficient in their cross-examination strate91 or that she was prejudiced 
as a result, cumulatively or otherwise, she is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
her claims that counsel were ineffective in this regard and the state respectfully 
requests this Court reconsider its decision denying the state's motion to summarily 
dismiss Johnson's claims that trial counsel were ineffective in cross-examination and 
dismiss this claim without an evidentiary hearing. 
2 ''Trial counsel's decision of which witnesses to call is encompassed in that aspect of 
trial counsel's role denominated 'trial tactics' or 'strategic choices.'" Campbell v. State, 
130 idaho 546,548,944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997) (Citation omitted); 
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C. The Court Should Reconsider Its Order Denying The State's Motion For 
Summary Dismissal Of Johnson's Claim That Appellate Counsel Were Ineffective 
For Failing To "Argue Insufficient Evidence To Support An Aiding And Abetting 
JUry Instruction" And Conclude That Johnson Has Failed To Raise A Genuine 
Issue Of Material Fact That Would Entitle Her To An Evidentiary Hearing On This 
Claim 
In Claim Eleven of her Petition, Johnson alleged appellate counsel were 
ineffectiVe for failing to "argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting 
jury instruction. n3 . (Petition, p.22, 1126.) The entirety of Johnson's allegatIons regarding 
this claim reads: 
Direct Appeal Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution in failing to argue insufficient 
evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction. (See Supreme 
Court Opinion State v. Johnson, 188 P.3d 912, footnote NO.2) But for 
Appellate Counsel's failure to raise this allegation of error it is more likely 
than not the Supreme Court would have reversed the District Court error 
and remand the matter for [sic] new trial. 
(Petition, p.22, 1126 (punctuation and capitalization origina!).) 
The state previously moved for summary dismissal of this claim on the grounds 
that it is bare and conclusory. In denying the state's motion, the Court concluded: 
The court has reviewed the record in this case and determines that 
it will wait until trial to pass upon the merits of this claim. The court 
recognizes that claims against appellate counsel are difficult to establish; 
however, the question of whether there were sufficient facts in the record 
to support the aiding and abetting instruction is incumbent upon the review 
of the factual record and this court's consideration of the Intent/review by 
appellate counsel. Such matters are fact-driven and require a trial to 
judge matters of credibility and weight. 
3 Johnson also asserted appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise "an 
allegation of error by the trial court in denying the Motion to Suppress Statement 
Against Interest made subsequent to retainer of counsel, Doug Nelson, and Nelson's 
issuance of a 'oease and desisf questioning letter" (Petition, p.22, 11 25), but she has 
since conceded the state was entitled to summary dismissal of that claim, and the Court 
dismissed the claim accordingly (Order, p.2). 
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(Memorandum Decision. pp.18-19.) 
Since the Court issued its Memorandum Decision denying the state's motion to 
summarily dismiss Johnson's remaining ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim, Johnson has since provided the state with an affidavit from one of her appellate 
attorneys, Jason Pintler, in which Mr. Pintler indicated he would not be available to 
testify at the evidentiary hearing originally scheduled to begin November 30, 2010,4 and 
averred, in relevant part: 
5. Had we believed that we could have raised a meritorious argument 
on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction, we would 
have done so in addition to raising the variance and constructive 
amendment arguments; 
6. I reviewed the entirety of the trial transcripts including the portions 
containing ML Pangburn's objection to the court giving the aid and abet 
instruction, and the district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning of 
why the instruction would be given; 
7. [Co-counsel. Sara] Thomas and I discussed both whether to raise 
the specific objection raised by Mr. Pangburn, i.e., that there was 
insufficient evidence to support giving the instruction, and we also 
discussed whether to raise an argument that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a ju!)' finding of guilt under an aid and abet theo!)' -
an argument that can be raised for the first time on appeal; 
8. Although I cannot recall any specific cases that I reviewed, I was 
aware of the fact that jury instructions and jury verdicts can be supported 
based entirely upon circumstantial evidence, and I was further aware of 
the standards that are applied to appellate review of a district court's 
decision to give a requested jury instructions [sic] and for appellate review 
of whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a jury finding of 
guilt; 
9. In order to establish a claim that there was insufficient evidence to 
support giving the aid and abet instruction, we would have had to convince 
the appellate court that no reasonable view of the evidence would have 
supported giving the instruction; 
4 The evidentiary hearing has since been rescheduled to begin December 7, 2010. 
(Amended Scheduling Order. Notice of Trial Setting and Pre-Trial Order dated 
September 8~ 2010.) 
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10. In order to establish a claim that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a jury finding that Sarah Johnson was guilty under and [sicl aid 
and abet theory, we would have had to convince the appellate court that 
no reasonable view of the evidence presented would support a jury finding 
of guilt under an aid and abet theory, in spite of the fact that there is an 
appellate presumption that all reasonable inferences would weigh in favor 
of sustaining the jury's verdict; 
11. After discussing the applicable standards in light of Judge Wood's 
oral statement of why the court felt there was sufficient evidence to 
support the instruction, both Ms. Thomas and I, individually and 
collectively, agreed that raising such issues would have no merit; 
12. Judge Wood found that a reasonable view of the evidence showed 
that Sarah Johnson had access to the apartment where the rifle and 
ammunition was kept and knowledge of its presence; 
13. Although there was contradictory eVidence as to whether the 
apartment was locked, the evidence showed that the apartment was not 
entered into by force suggesting that, If It was locked, it had to be 
accessed by a key and Sarah Johnson had access to a key to the 
apartment; 
14. Judge Wood also noted that evidence was presented that 
suggested that one of the three oddly placed knives was previously 
located in an unobViOUs area that Sarah Johnson, as a resident of the 
house, would have known about; 
15. Judge Wood noted that the gloves found with the robe belonged to 
Diane Johnson and that she normally kept them in the glove box of her 
vehicle, again Sarah Johnson having knowledge of their location; 
16. Judge Wood also noted that the robe that both the State and the 
defense acknowledged was in the environment of the shooting, was found 
in a garbage can along the route Sarah Johnson took when she ran to the 
neighbor's residence; 
17. Additionally, Judge Wood found that there was other potentially 
incriminating evidence in Sarah Johnson's bedroom and that she was 
admittedly on the same floor of the house as her parents when the 
murders occurred, although I frankly found this evidence less compelling 
than the court did; 
18. In sum, the decision not to raise any sufficiency of the evidence 
claim was based upon our determination that such claims were meritless 
in light of the district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning for giving 
the aid and abet instruction, in light of the appellate record and transcripts 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 8 
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supporting the court's conclusions, and in light of the applicable law and 
applicable appellate standards. 
(Affidavit of Jason Pintler, Direct Appeal Co-Counsel, pp.2-4 (Appendix A).) 
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Although credibility cannot be assessed via affidavit. the pleadings submitted by 
Johnson herself, including Mr. PlntJer's affidavit, demonstrate there is no genuine issue 
of material fact necessitating an evidentiary hearing on Johnson's claim that appellate 
counsel were ineffective for failing to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim as to the 
aid and abet instruction. 
In order to establish a prima facie case that appellate counsel was ineffective, 
Johnson must allege a genuine issue of material fact that appellate counsel were 
deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S, 387 (1985); 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Even if a defendant 
requests that certain issues be raised on appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional 
obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 746, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v, State, 114 Idaho 758, 766, 760 P.2d 
1174,1181 (1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). Moreover, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on appeal cannot be predicated upon counsel's failure to raise 
meritless issues. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,809 n.2, 839 P.2d 1215, 1223 n.2 
(1992); Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1985). As 
explained by the Supreme Court, "Experienced advocates since time beyond memory 
have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and 
focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones at 752. 
To the extent Johnson's remaining claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel can be construed as alleging counsels' decision as to what issue to pursue on 
appeal was not based upon strategy, but was instead based upon inadequate 
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preparation, Ignorance of the law, or some other objective basis for evaluating counsels' 
perfonnance, Mr. Pint1er's affidavit dispels any material factual issue that could be 
advanced by such an allegation. See Remington vo State, 127 Idaho 443, 447, 901 
P.2d 1344, 1348 (Ct. App. 1995) (summary dismissal not appropriate where affidavit 
filed by trial counsel did not disprove petitioner's claims or dispel all material factual 
issues). Mr. Pintler's affidavit demonstrates that both he and co-counsel on appeal 
researched the relevant legal standards and thoroughly reviewed the record and 
ultimately concluded that the sufficiency of the evidence claim Johnson contends they 
should have pursued was without merit. A review of the record and the law supports 
appellate counsel's assessment as well as the trial judge's conclusion that the 
instruction was appropriate based upon the evidence presented. and nothing in 
Johnson's Petition establishes otherwise. 
In light of the bare and conclusory allegations in Johnson's Petition, Mr. Pintler's 
affidavit explaining that counsel made a sound and informed judgment not to pursue a 
claim that lacked merit, and in light of the evidence that supported the trial court's 
decision to give an aid and abet instruction, which evidence is outlined in Mr. Pintler's 
affidavit, the state respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision denying 
the state's motion for summary dismissal of this claim, and dismiss this claim without an 
evidentiary hearing as authorized by I.C. § 19-19-4906(c). (liThe court may grant a 
motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it appears from 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements 
of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material 
faet and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its prior decisions denying 
the state's motion for summary dismissal of Johnson's claims that trial counsel were 
ineffective in cross-examination and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aid and abet instruotion and 
dismiss those claims without an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 2010, 
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Respondent's Motion to Reconsider by the method indicated below: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
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Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
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Attorney at Law 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JASON 
PINTLER, DIRECT APPEAL 
CO~COUNSEL . 
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COMES NOW, Jason C. Pintler, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, and 
swears and affirms under oath and upon his personal knowledge the following: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, currently 
employed by the Office of State Appellate Public Defender, I represented Sarah 
Johnson, as co-counsel with Sara Thomas, during Ms. Johnson's direct appeal: 
2. It is my understanding that this matter is set for evidentiary hearing commencing 
on November 3D, 2010. I am unavailable to testify during the scheduled 
evidentiary hearing and provide the testimony offered herein under oath, in lieu of 
live testimony; 
3. My understanding of Petitioners allegation of Ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel is that it essentially involves two parts: 1) that we chose to raise 
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unwinnable issues, Le., the variance and constructive amendment arguments; 
and. 2) that we did so in lieu of raising a claim that there was Insufficient 
evidence to support the court's decision to give the aid and abet instruction; 
4. The decision to raise the variance and constructive amendment arguments was 
entirely independent from the decision not to raise any claims regarding the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's decision to give the aid and abet 
Instruction; 
5_ Had we believed that we could have· raised a meritorious argument on the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction, we would have done so In 
addition to raising the variance and constructive amendment arguments; 
6. I reviewed the entirety of the trial transcripts Including the portions containing 
Mr. Pangburn's objection to the court gMng the aid and abet instruction, and the 
district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning of why the instruction would 
be given; 
7. Ms. Thomas and I discussed both whether to raise the specific objection raised 
by Mr. Pangburn, Le., that there was insufficient evidence to support giving the 
instruction, and we also discussed whether to raise an argument that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a jury finding of guilt under an aid and abet theory 
- an argument that can be raised for the first time on appeal; 
8. Although I cannot recall any specific cases that I reviewed, I was aware of the 
fact that jury instructions and jury verdicts can be supported based entirely upon 
circumstantial evidence. and I was further aware of the standards that are 
applied to appellate review of a district court's decision to give a requested jury 
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instructions and for appellate review of whether sufficient evidence was 
presented to support a jury flnding of guilt; 
9. In order to establish a claim that there was Insufficient evidence to support giving 
the aid and abet instruction, we would have had to convince the appellate court 
that no reasonable view of the evidence would have supported giving the 
instruction; 
10. In order to establish a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury 
finding that Sarah Johnson was guilty under and aid and abet theory, we would 
have had to convince the appellate court that no reasonable view of the evidence 
presented would support a jury finding of guilt under an aid and abet theory, in 
spite of the fact that there is an appellate presumption that all reasonable 
inferences would weigh in favor of sustaining the jury's verdict; 
11. After discussing the applicable standards in fight of Judge Wood's oral statement 
of why the court felt there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction, both 
Ms. Thomas and I, individually and collectively, agreed that raising such issues 
would have no merit; 
12. Judge Wood found that a reasonable view of the evidence showed that Sarah 
Johnson had access to the apartment where the rifle and ammunition was kept 
and knowledge of its presence; 
13. Although there was contradictory evidence as to whether the apartment was 
locked, the evidence showed that the apartment was not entered into by force 
suggesting that, if it was locked, it had to be accessed by a key and Sarah 
Johnson had access to a key to the apartment; 
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14. Judge Wood also noted that evidence was presented that suggested that one of 
the three oddly placed knives was previously located in an unobvious area that 
Sarah Johnson, as a resident of the house, would have known about; 
15. Judge Wood noted that the gloves found with the robe belonged to Diane 
Johnson and that she normally kept them in the glove box of her vehicle, again 
Sarah Johnson having knowledge of their location; 
16. Judge Wood also noted that the robe that both the State and the defense 
acknowledged- was in the environment of the shooting, was found in a garbage 
can along the route Sarah Johnson took when she ran to the neighbor's 
residence; 
17. Additionally. Judge Wood found that there was other potentially incriminating 
evidence found in Sarah Johnson's bedroom and that she was admittedly on the 
same floor of the house as her parents when the murders occurred, although I 
frankly found this evidence less compelling than the court did; 
18. In sum, the decision not to raise any sufficiency of the evidence claims was 
based upon our determination that such claims were meritless in light of the 
district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning for giving the aid and abet 
instruction, in light of the appellate record and transcripts supporting the court's 
conclusions, and in light of the applicable law and applicable appellate standards; 
and 
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19. Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this 18th day of August, 2010. 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Diputy State Appellate Public Defender 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
SuaSCRI8ED AND SWORN to before m~ on this 18th day of August. 2010. 
c:::=~~ NOTARY PUBLlCFORfoAHO 
Residing in Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires 2/1212016 
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EVAN A. SMITH ----
Administrative Assistant 
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COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby moves, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
11 (a)(2)(B), for partial reconsideration of the Court's Order on Cross Motions for 
Summary Disposition ("Order"), entered July 19, 2010. The state specifically requests 
reconsideration of that portion of the Order concluding Johnson is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on her claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately 
cross-examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Fleming, 
Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Lis Ramirez, 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 1 
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Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez., Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart 
Robinson, as alleged In paragraph 16 of Johnson's second amended petition. (Order, 
p.6, 1f 4.) 
The state also seeks partial reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement ("Memorandum 
Decision"), entered May 21 j 2010. Specifically, the state requests reconsideration of 
the Court's determination that Johnson is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her claim 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as an issue on appeal the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aiding and abetting instruction. (Memorandum 
Decision, pp.17-18.) The basis of the state's motion is contained in the Memorandum in 
Support of Respondent's Motion to Reconsider filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 2010, 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of September, 2010, I caused to be 
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Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, 10 83303 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attomey at Law 
191 Sun Valley Rd. 
Ketchum, 10 83340 
Fax (208) 788-2300 
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Case No: CV -06-324 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
I.R.C.P. 16 (d) 
COMES NOW Petitioner, through counsel and pursuant to order of this Court in 
compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16( d) files this Pre-Trial Memorandum, 
and therefore states; 
1. Pending before this COUli is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief from a Judgment of Conviction Upon Jury Verdict of Guilt on two 
counts Murder First Degree with Firearm Enhancement for which Petitioner was 
sentenced to determinate Life in the Penitentiary, plus fifteen, two terms. 
2. On or about September 9, 2010, this Honorable Court entered an Amended Pre-
Trial Order, setting the matter for trial beginning on December 7, 20 10, setting a pre-trial 
conference on November 8, 2010, and ordering the parties to submit a Pre-Trial 
Memorandum no later November 1,2010. This memorandum is intended to comply with 
the Court's order and I.R.C.P. Rule 16 Cd). 
, 
PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
3. The issues to be tried have been narrowed and are clearly presented by the Court's 
Order On Cross Motions for Summary Disposition entered on July 19, 2010 and 
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement, dated 
May 20, 2010. Those claims to be decided by this court at trial, and for which relief is 
requested, are as follows: 
a. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a continuance or 
adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after learning the 
comforter had not been collected as evidence as alleged in paragraph 15.a 
of the Petition; 
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate the 
scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on crucial blood 
splatter opinion evidence, as alleged in paragraph 15. c of the Petition; 
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present expert testimony, 
and failing to adequately investigate the scientific basis for a gun shot / 
sheet experiment, bearing on crucial blood splatter opinion evidence, as 
alleged in paragraph 15.d of the Petition; 
d. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately cross-examine 
Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling, 
Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, 
Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul 
Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson as alleged in paragraph 16 of the 
Petition. 
PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 2 
e. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present evidence of an 
audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross Kirtley, which 
recording clearly proved the theory that police focused on Petitioner Sarah 
Johnson, to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, 
because she was the easiest target. 
f. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether certain 
previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh" as alleged in paragraph 
18 of the Petition. 
g. Ineffective assistance of counsel' stemming from an overall lack of 
diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic 
tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all of 
which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, a manifestly unfair 
trial and unjust verdict. 
h. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise and argue 
insufficient evidence to support submission of an aiding and abetting jury 
instruction. 
1. Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of 
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously unidentified latent 
prints as alleged in paragraph 29 of the Petition. 
4. Each of the aforementioned claims presents an issue of fact, except that relating to 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which presents a mixed issue. No pure issues 
oflaw are presented for the Court's determination. 
PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 3 
5. Defendant has in its posseSSlOn all documents, tangible things and exhibits 
intended to be introduced at the trial of this cause. (Exhibit List attached and made a part 
hereof) Counsel has initiated consultation with opposing counsel regarding stipulated 
admission of documents and things calculated to avoid unnecessary proof as to 
authentication. ) 
6. A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which Petitioner intends to call 
to testify at trial is attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
7. Issues to be addressed at Pre-Trial Conference include the transport of Petitioner 
from the Pocetello Women's Correctional Center to Twin Falls for purposes of 
appearance at trial; possible amendment to the time schedule for trial to suit the 
convenience of witnesses and counsel, all of whom will be traveling from outside of 
Twin Falls County; and admission of evidence to avoid unnecessary proof as to 
authentication. 
,ATTO /c EY AT LAW 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
1/ I () 
DATED 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _(_ day of __ OV_o_I/ _____ 2010, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special 
Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO 
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, 
Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, 
Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail ----
Hand Deliver ----
~a facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
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/J 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
FI LED ~.~. ~.~~ I 
[NOV Oi 2010 "] "" 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
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Case No: CV -006-324 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL 
EXHIBIT LIST 
________ ~R~e=s~p=o=nd=e=n~t ____________ ) 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Trial Exhibit List, and therefore recites 
as follows; 
Exhibit Number & Description 
1. Transcript from Grand Jury Proceedings 
2. Transcript of Trial Proceedings 
3. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn, Investigator for Defense 
4. Patrick Dunn, Deposition Transcript 
5. Affidavit of Mark Rader 
6. Mark Rader Deposition Transcript 
7. Suspended Status of Attorney Bobby Eugene Pangburn (Idaho Bar Association) 
8. Disciplinary Order Idaho Supreme Court Bobby E. Pangburn 
9. Bobby E. Pangburn, Deposition Transcript 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 1 
10. CNN Transcripts of Nancy Grace Television Programs with Bobby Pangburn 
11. Resume of Robert J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert 
12. Robeli Kerchusky, Deposition Transcript 
13. Latent Fingerprint Cards (w/o Bates Stamp) 
14. Transcript ofInterview with Mel Speegle 10/9/2003 
15. Transcript ofInterview with Consuelo Cedeno & Jane Lopez 9112/2003 
16. Blaine County Sheriff's Report of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/2/2003 
17. Transcript of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/3/2003 
18. Supreme Court ofIdaho Opinion: State vs. Johnson, 188 P.3d 912 
19. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes 11125/03 
20. External and Internal Chain of Custody form last date 11/25/03 
21. ISP Forensic Services Rpt- Bates Nos. 0022-PCt thru 0028PC 
22. Blaine County Sheriff's Report 2/3/2009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher 
Kevin Hill Bates Nos. 0003PC thru 0020PC 
23. Photograph of Diagram of Glen Aspen Drive 
24. Photograph of Murder Weapon at Scene 
25. Photograph of Trash Can Johnson Residence 
26. Photograph of Removed Rifle Scope on Guest Bed Johnson Residence 
27. Photograph of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges 
28. Supplemental Report Blaine County Sheriff's Office Interview with Dell Speegle 
9/3/2003 
29. ISP Report Fingerprints Bates Nos. 0025PC-0028PC 
30. ISP Repoli Bates Nos.00108PC - 00114PC 
31. ISP Report Bates Nos.OO 115PC-00122PC 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 2 
32. ISP Report Bates Nos.00133PC-00139PC 
33. Blaine County Sheriff's Supplemental Report 1112/2009 Regarding Christopher Kevin 
Hill Missing Statement 
34. ISP Forensic Services Notes Regarding Hill Investigation Bates Nos. 0064-65PC (?) 
35. AudiolVideo Recording oflnterview with Mel Speegle 2110/2009 
36. Audio/Video Recording of Interview with Christopher Kevin Hill 2112/2009 
37. Blaine County Sheriff's Supplemental Report 4/28/2009 regardingMajor Case Prints for 
Christopher Kevin Hill Bates Nos. 0094PC-0096PC 
38. Blaine County Sheriff's Supplemental Report 10117/2009 Regarding Hill Fingerprinting 
Bates Nos. -124PC-00125PC 
39. ISP Report dated 10115/09 Bates Nos. 00126PC-00132PC 
40. National Academy of Science Journal Article Badly Fragmented Forensic Science 
Systems Needs Overhaul: Evidence To Support Reliability Of Many Techniques Is Lacking 
41. Laboratory Report Forensic Identification Orchard Cellmark Company 5/13/2004 
42. Cellmark Chain of Custody Bates No.1 0078 
43. Cellmark Lab Report Bates Nos. 10170-10174 
44. Blaine County PA letter dated October 12,2004 to Bob Pangburn 
45. Report of Ed Fuller dated December 7, 2004 Bates Nos. 9969-9972 
46. Defense Request to Inspect Evidence Bates Nos. 9977-9978 
47. RepOIi of Cindy Hall dated 12-08-04 Bates Nos. 9999-10000 
48. ISP Report dated 12-30-04 Bates Nos. 10032-33 
49. Bruno Santos Interview Transcript September 3,2003 
50. Police Report of Carlos Ayala Interview 
51. Bruno Santos - Nikki Settle Transcript of Taped Telephone Call 
52. Rod Englert Consultation Rpt May 12,2004 Bates Nos. 6749-6763 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 3 
In addition to those exhibits specifically referenced herein, Petitioner reserves the right to 
offer exhibits previously submitted to this court in support of her First and Second Amended 
Petition, Motion for Summary Disposition and Memorandum Response to Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, and 
all documents produced by the State pursuant to Discovery Order of this Court. 
Y AT LAW 
/! . /() 
RISTOPHER P. SIMMS DATED 
A TTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _1_ day of jl/tJ(J[, I'np[.. ~ 2010, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST was delivered to 
the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; 
Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue 
South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard 
Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail ---
Hand Deliver 
~ facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 5 
,,) 
FILED ~.~. ~ SF' j 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
~ p-
NOV 0'" 2D10 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
-!..~n t::Jrage, Clerk District 
vvurt BlaJrie County, Idaho 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 









________ ~R==es~p=o=nd=e=n~t ____________ ) 




COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Trial Witness List, and states the 
following persons may be called to testify during trial on behalf of Petitioner: 
1. Bobby Pangburn, Trial Counsel 
3042 S. Whitepost Way 
Eagle, ID 83646 
208861 1886 
2. Mark Rader, Trial Co-Counsel 
381 W. Idaho Avenue 
Ontario, OR 97914 
541 8892351 
3. Patrick Dunn, Defense Investigator 
4695 AITowhead Way 
Boise, ID 83709 
2083622727 
4. Jason Pintler, Appellate Counsel 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
2083342712 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
5. Sarah Thomas, Appellate Counsel 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
2083342712 
6. Robel1 Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert 
1235 N. Echohawk Way 
Eagle, ID 83616 
2089394914 
7. Officer Ross Kirtley 
700 W. Jefferson St. #228 
Boise, ID 83720 
208 854 3013 
8. Det. Steve Harkins 
480 East Avenue N. 
PO Box 2315 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
ISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
RNEY AT LAW 
//.//;J .. 
DATED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'T 
I ~ tJ(JJ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of ________ 2010, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, 
Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile 
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail ---
Hand Deliver ---
__ /v_Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
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REQUEST TO OBTAIN APPROVAL 
TO VIDEO RECORD. BROADCAST 
OR PHOTOGRAPH A COURT 
PROCEEDING 
--------------------------~): 
I hereby request approval to: 







I have read the Rule 45 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules regarding cameras in the courtroom, 
and will comply in all respects with the provisions of that rule. and will also make certain that all other 
persons from my organization participating in video or audio recording or broadcasting or 
photographing of the court proceedings have read Rule 45 of the Idaho Court Administra.tive R1,lles and 
will comply in all respects with the provisions: of that rule. 





News OrganiZation Represented 
rc>/k,,11tI2 
Date 
t<.BQUESi TO OSTAI'N APPROVAL TO VIDEO RECORD. BROADCAST 




D I STR ICT TCA 
.. _ .: llj/29/2616 as: 27 KMVT 
FAX 736 4002 p, 02/02 
PAGE 62 
nIE COURT, ha.ving c.otlsidered the above Request for Approval under Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules, hereby orders that pcrmisliion to "ideo record the above hearing Is: 
[ ~NTED under the following restrictions in addition to those $et forth in Rule 4S of the tdaho 
CoW't A.dministrative Rules: 
[ ] DENIED. 
, , 
••• _ •• ~~ •• ~~' •• ".' •• " ••• ~P~.w»j., •••• ", •••• ~ ••••• , ••••• 1._ ..• ' ... w •••••••••••• "~ ••• , ••••••• ~~ ••••••• , ••• •••••••••••••••• 
THE COURT. havini considered the above Request for Approval under RuLe 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Ruies, hereby orders that pf!nnission to broadcast the above hearing is: 
[ ] GRANTED under the following restriotions i.n addition to those set forth in Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Adtninistrativ~ Rules! 
[ ] DENIED, 
.¥., •• " •• '.f ••••••••• , •••••• t ••••••••• _w~ ....... tC •••• , •• ' •••••• t ••••••••••• , •••• lt'~ •• ,~ •• ~ •••••••••• , •• , • •••• t •••• • ••••• 
THE COURT, havjl'lg considered the above Request for Approval under Rule 4S of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules, hereby orders tbat permission to pbotograph tho above: heM'mg ls: 
r ] GRANTED. under the following restrictions in addition to those set forth in Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative R.ules. . 
[ ] DENIED. 
;:<." I (J 
~-t--=--~ _____ J.. .~ 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Idaho Attorney General 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISS #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074 
NO. 523 P. 1 
Jotynn Drage, Clerk District 
COurlBlaine Coun , J..~_ho_ .... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-06-324 
) 
VS. ) RESPONDENT'S PRE-TRIAL 
) MEMORANDUM 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits this pre-trial memorandum 
pursuant to I.RC.P. 16(d) and this Court's Amended Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial 
Setting and Pre-Trial Order. 
Following proceedings on the parties' cross-motions for summary dismissal, the 
remaining claims in Petitioner's ("Johnson") Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief ("Petition"), which are currently set for an evidentiary hearing are: 
RESPONDENT'S P RE-TRlAL MEMORANDUM - 1 
NOV, i. 2010 12:55PM 1D ATTNY GEN CRIMDIV NO, 523 p, 2 
Claim 4(a) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a 
continuance after discovering the comforter on the bed where Diane Johnson was 
murdered was not collected as evidence. (Petition, pp.7-8, 11' 15.a.) 
Claim 4(0) -Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate 
the scientific basis for the proffered coconut experiment. (Petition, p.8, 11' 15.0.) 
Claim 4(d) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to provide expert 
testimony as to comforters." (Petition, p.9, 11 15.d,) 
Claim 4(e) - Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the cross-
examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkin, 
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane lopez, Becky 
Lopez, Car/os Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, 1116.) 
Claim 4(f) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present evidence of an 
audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police ufocused" on Johnson "to the 
exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] Was the 
easiest target." (Petition, p.13, 11 16.c.) 
Claim 11 - Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for "failing to argue 
insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction." (Petition, p.2Z, 
1126.) 
Claim 12 - Newly discovered evidence based upon the identification of 
fingerprints belonging to Christopher Hill. (Petition, pp.22-24, mr 27-29.) 
The state responds to the requirements of Rule 16(d) as follows: 
Rule 16(d)(1); On September 30,2010, the state filed a motion to reconsider the 
Court's decision denying the state's motion for summary dismissal of Claim 4(e) and 
Claim 11. The state's motion for reconsideration is pending and is set for hearing on 
RESPONDEAT'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2 
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November 8,2010, in conjunction with the pre-trial conference. Aside from this Court's 
resolution of the cross-motions for summary disposition and the pending ruling on the 
state's motion for reconsideration, the state does not believe there is potential for further 
simplification of the issues. 
Rule 16{d)(2): There is no necessity or desirability to amend the pleadings at this 
time. 
Rule 16(d)(3): The parties are currently discussing the possibility of stipulating to 
certain exhibits in order to avoid unnecessary proof. 
Rule 16(d)(4): The state does not intend to call any expert witnesses per sa. To 
the extent the state calls witnesses, those witnesses will be limited to trial counsel. 
appellate counsel, and individuals who testified at the underlying criminal tria/. 
Bule 16(d)(5): Because this case will not be tried to a jury, there is no need for a 
preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings. 
Rule 16(d)(6): With the exception for the state's motion for reconsideration, the 
state is unaware of any matters that may aid in the disposition of this action. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2010. 
JES leA M. LORELLO 
e uty Attomey General 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
RESPONDENT'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of 
Respondent's Pre-Trial Memorandum by the method indicated below: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax (208) 788-5527 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
Fax (208) 736-4155 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
191 Sun Valley Rd. 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax (208) 788-2300 
L.Facsimile 
L. Facsimile 
_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile 
{ilk!!:: 
RESPONDENT'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 4 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 7882300 
FILED ~:~.--+-\;­
NOV 03 201 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 













________ ~R~es~p~o~nd~e~n=t ____________ ) 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Addendum to Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 
List, and therefore recites as follows; 
l. In addition to those exhibits listed specifically and generally in Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 
List Petitioner intends to offer portions of an audio tape recorded at the scene of the crime on the 
day of the event by Officer Ross Kirtley. Specific reference to this exhibit was inadvertently 
omitted from Petitioner's Trial Exhibit List, but has been discussed with counsel for the State. 
1/ 2.. Ii) 
CHRISTOPHERP. SIMMS DATED 
A TTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 day of __ IVo_V ______ 2010, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 
was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: 
Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; 
The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 
Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable 




/via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
---
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 2 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
FILED ~.::: 2:( l 
NOV 05 2010 
J9fynn OraBel Cierk District 
COurt Blains Count}\ Idaho 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 .... _·'_r_ 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, ) Case No: CV-2006-0324 
) 
Petitioner, ) MOTION FOR ORDER 
) TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER 
vs. ) TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) I.C. 19-4907 (a) 
) 
ResI1ondent~ ) ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED 
COMES NOW Petitioner by and through her attorney, CHRISTOPHER P. 
SIMMS, and files this, her MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL and in support thereof states as follows: 
1. Petitioner is in the custody of the Pocatello Women's Correctional Center, located 
in Pocatello, Idaho, serving life sentences, upon conviction of Murder, First Degree, with 
Fireann Enhancement, The Fifth District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Blaine, 
Case No. CR-2003-1820. 
2. Pending before this Court is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, set for evidentiary hearing commencing December 7, 2010. 
3. The evidentiary hearing is scheduled for four (4) days, to be conducted in the 
Theron Ward Judicial Building, located in Twin Falls, Idaho. 
4. Petitioner's presence is required for the evidentiary hearing. 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL 1 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court enter an Order to Transport 
Petitioner to the Twin Falls County Jail before the commencement of the evidentiary 
hearing on November 30,2010, at 9:00 a.m. 
ristopher P. Simms 
Attorney for Petitioner 
TORNEY AT LAW 
Dated 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN 
FALLS COUNTY JAIL was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special 
Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box 
83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 and The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney Facsimile number 208.788.5554, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, 
Idaho 83333: 
US Mail ---
___ Hand Delivery 
/ 
Via facsimile 208.854.8074 & 208.788.5554 ---
MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL 3 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
FILED ~t:::~:: 
~ 1'Yc... 
NOV 05 2010 
.l9iYnn Drage, Clerk District 
COurt Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 









Case No: CV -006-324 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
__________ =R=es~p=o=n=de=n=t ____________ ) 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Memorandum Response to 
Motion to Reconsider, and in support thereof states as follows; 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. On or about October 4, 2010 counsel for Petitioner received Respondent's Motion 
to Reconsider, and Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Reconsider 
addressed to this Court's orders disposing of the parties' motions for summary 
disposition. 
2. This Court on or about September 9,2010 entered an Amended Scheduling Order, 
Notice 0.( Trial Setting and Pre- Trial Order, which order required motions for summary 
judgment to be field and served so as to be heard not later than sixty (60) days before 
trial. 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERA TION 
3. Counsel for Petitioner has not received Notice of Hearing, as contemplated by the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel first received notice that Respondent intended to 
address the Motion jar Reconsideration at the time set for Pre-Trial Conference during a 
telephone conversation with opposing counsel on Friday October 29, 2010, at which time 
Attorney for Petitioner informed opposing counsel that Notice of Hearing had never been 
served. 
4. By the tenns of this Court's Pre-Trial Order, Respondent's Motion to Reconsider 
was filed too late to be considered, and further a response is not due because the motion 
has not been properly noticed. 
SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE 
INADEQUA TE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 
5. The first issue raised by Respondent's Motion to Reconsider, that no genuine 
issue of material fact is raised by Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
due to inadequate cross-examination of witnesses, is mere re-recitation of the losing 
arguments made in support of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. This Court, 
based on the evidence submitted in support of the allegations, and the argument made by 
counsel, declined to grant summary disposition, because an issue of credibility of 
witnesses was presented. A determination of the merits of these claims must await the 
Court's judgment as to the credibility of trial counsel after live testimony. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPEALLA TE COUNSEL 
6. The Affidavit of Jason Pintler, Appellate Counsel for Petitioner, is now before the 
Court. In summary, Mr. Pintler swears he, together with co-counsel, made a strategic 
decision not to argue insuffIciency of the evidence to support the proffered aiding and 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERA TION 
2 
abetting jury instruction. The veracity of Mr. Pintler's testimony is not in question. At 
issue is the nature and quality of the legal research conducted prior to Mr. Pintler making 
the decision not to pursue this issue on appeal. In other words, whether Mr. Pintler 
properly apprised himself of the law, as applied to the facts of his case, before he 
determined the strongest issues to present on appeal. 
In paragraph 8 of Mr. Pintler affidavit, he states he cannot recall any specific 
cases reviewed. Mr. Pintler thereafter makes a general sweeping statement of law, upon 
which he based his conclusion, "I was further aware of the standards that are applied to 
appellate review of a district court's decision to give a requested jury instructions 
(sic) ... " Without citation Mr. Pintler states, "In order to establish a claim that there was 
insufficient evidence to support giving the aid and abet instruction, we would have had to 
convince the appellate court that no reasonable view of the evidence would have 
supported giving the instruction;" This statement is not an accurate reflection of the law 
in the State ofIdaho. 
In State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 920 P.2d 391 the Supreme Court of Idaho 
reversed the trial court and remanded the case finding insufficient evidence to support a 
jury instruction of necessity. The Howley Court cited State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 
831 P.2d 555 (1992), for the proper standard in determining whether sufficient evidence 
is present to support a jury instruction. The Court" ... adopted a four paIi aI1alysis to 
determine whether a requested jury instruction was properly denied: (1) identify the 
specific elements necessary for the requested instruction; (2) define the statutory 
elements, or as in this case, the common law elements of the requested instruction; (3) 
consider the evidence presented to determine whether such evidence supports the 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
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requested instruction; and (4) if the requested instruction is not supported by the 
evidence, the court must reject the requested instruction. Eastman, 122 Idaho at 89-90, 
831 P.2d at 557-58." The Court in State v. Mitchell, 195 P.3d 737, 742 (ID 2008), 
stated, 
In order to be convicted under I.C. § 18-204 for aiding and abetting the 
commission of a crime, a person must act in such a way as to facilitate, 
promote, encourage, solicit, or incite the actions of the crime. Aragon, 107 
Idaho at 364, 690 P.2d at 299; State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 132, 594 
P.2d 639, 642 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Humphreys, 
134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000); Howard v. Felton, 85 Idaho 286, 297, 
379 P.2d 414, 421 (1963); Horejs, 143 Idaho at 263, 141 P.3d at 1132. 
However, mere knowledge of a crime or assent or acquiescence in its 
commission does not create accomplice liability through aiding and 
abetting. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 
(1990), overruled on other grounds by Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 
652. Aiding and abetting contemplates a sharing by the aider and abettor 
of the criminal intent of the perpetrator. Howard, 85 Idaho at 297, 379 
P.2d at 421; State v. Hickman, 119 Idaho 366, 367,806 P.2d 959,960 (Ct. 
App. 1991). Thus, the aider and abettor must have the requisite intent and 
have acted in some manner to bring about the intended result. State v. 
Gonzalez, 134 Idaho 907, 909,12 P.3d 382,384 (CL App. 2000). 
Under the four pari test, the elements of aiding and abetting are known and include a 
requirement that the person charged facilitate, promote, encourage, solicit or incite the 
actions of the crime. Furthermore, mere knowledge of the crime or assent or 
acquiescence is not enough. In the present case, at most, the evidence at trial may lead to 
a reasonable inference that Petitioner had some knowledge of the crime. However, there 
is simply no evidence in the record of facilitation, promotion, encouragement, solicitation 
or incitement by Petitioner. Not one scintilla. Therefore, Appellate Counsel's conduct 
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. If the issue of sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the aiding and abetting instruction were argued on appeal, there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
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The Court in State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (Idaho 1990), made 
clear the need for affirmative evidence of aiding and abetting, "However, 'aiding and 
abetting' requires some proof that the accused either participated in or assisted, 
encouraged, solicited,< or counseled the crime. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 
1152 (Idaho 1990), citing "United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1938); Johnson 
v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.1952); State v. Gladstone, 78 Wash.2d 306, 474 
P.2d 274, 42 A.L.R.3d 1061 (1970). Mere knowledge of a crime and assent to or 
acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability. State v. Brooks, 
103 Idaho 892,655 P.2d 99 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Sensenig, 95 Idaho 218, 506 P.2d 
115 (1973); State v. Schrag, 21 Or.App. 655, 536 P.2d 461 (1975); Monison v. State, 518 
P.2d 1279 (Okl.Cr.1974). Failure to disclose the occunence of a crime to authorities is 
not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 23 
S.Ct. 42,47 L.Ed. 100 (1902); State v. Grant, 26 Idaho 189, 140 P. 959 (1914)." 
The State of Washington has reached the same result, based on the same 
reasoning. In State v. Gladstone, 78 Wn.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 (Wash. 1970) a jury 
found defendant guilty of aiding and abetting in the unlawful sale of marijuana. 
Defendant appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under 
an aiding and abetting theory of guilt. The Court agreed, citing lack of affirmative 
evidence of directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing 
or otherwise procuring another to commit a crime. Id at 307. 
In Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1952), the question for 
determination was whether there was substantial evidence to supp0l1 a jury verdict of 
aiding and abetting in the crime charged. Johnson, at 675. The court stated "Generally 
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speaking, to find one guilty as a principal on the ground that he was an aider and abetter, 
it must be proven that he shared in the criminal intent of the principal and there must be a 
community of unlawful purpose at the time the act is committed. As the term 'aiding and 
abetting' implies, it assumes some participation in the criminal act in furtherance of the 
common design, either before or at the time the criminal act is committed. It implies 
some conduct of an affirmative nature and mere negative acquiescence is not sufficient." 
Id, citing, Morei v. United States, 6 Cir., 127 F.2d 827; United States v. Dellaro, 2 Cir., 
99 F.2d 781. The essence of the Court's holding is that circumstantial evidence is not 
enough to support conviction. 
The Johnson v. United States Court concluded, "The defendant was, of course, 
presumed to be innocent and the evidence from which it could possibly be gathered that 
he was an aider and abetter in the commission of the crime is entirely circumstantial." 
"Proof of circumstances which, while consistent with guilt, are not inconsistent with 
innocence, will not support a conviction'. (also citing: Wesson v. United States, 8 Cir., 
172 F.2d 931; Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 8 Cir., 178 F.2d 363; Read v. United 
States, 8 Cir., 42 F.2d 636. In Wesson v. United States, the COUl1 reversed a conviction 
based upon circumstantial evidence and stated, "Inferences must be based upon proven 
facts or facts of which judicial notice must be taken and one inference cannot be 
based upon another inference. To sustain a finding of fact the circumstances proven 
must lead to the conclusion with reasonable certainty and must be of such probative 
force as to create the basis for a legal inference and not mere suspicion. 
Circumstantial evidence, even in a civil case, is not sufficient to establish a 
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conclusion where the circumstances are merely consistent with such conclusion or 
where they give equal support to inconsistent conclusions." Johnson at 676. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, Mr. Pintler had not apprised himself of the above cited cases, nor the 
general statement of law recited therein. The facts and evidence summarized by Judge 
Wood, and repeated by Mr. Pintler, are but circumstantial, equally supporting a 
conclusion inconsistent with guilt. Therefore, as a matter of law, Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be granted. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
/1. 5,/0 
DATED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of November 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was delivered to the Office of Attorney 
General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 
208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine 
County Prosecuting Attomey; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue 
South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. 
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Case No. CV 06-324 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
------------------------------) 
Pretrial Conference and Motion for Reconsideration 
10:32 Christopher Simms for petitioner, Jessica Lorello for the State of Idaho. Court 
reviews case with Counsel. Mr. Simms informs the Court never received the notice of 
hearing for the motion for reconsideration. Court will hear the motion to reconsider at 
this time; however Counsel will have post motion time for briefing. 
10:36 Ms. Lorello gives argument on motion to reconsider. 
10:41 Mr. Simms gives argument, ineffective assistance of Counsel. 
10:44 Court takes this issue under advisement as of Wednesday the 17th of November 
and Mr. Simms has until Monday the 15 th to file a response to this Court house and to 
Blaine County as well. As to the issue of cross examination of witnesses, Court stands by 
its prior ruling. Ms. Lorello to prepare an order. 
10:45 Pretrial conference, Mr. Simms gives the Court an update, has an audio/visual 
recording, see Administration for equipment to play audio/visual. Order to Transport has 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
been signed by the Court. The Court has one issue to clear up in regards to Security for 
the defendant or if we have to have Blaine County send Security here. Schedule for the 
trial is set to begin each day at 9:00 am. The Court will change the time to 10:00 am start 
time each day with recess between 4:30 and 5:00 pm every day. Mr. Simms has trial 
transcript and will offer it again during this trial. The Court will accept the CDs for the 
transcript, no objection from the State. Any evidence which can be offered digitally is 
welcomed. Findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, briefs etc. are accepted electronically 
for the Judges copies. 
10:57 Ms. Lorello comments in regards to pretrial issues. The trial exhibit list, there are 
some the State will not stipulate to. The Court would like a motion in limine filed 
previous to trial. Conflicts in regards to the two pretrial memorandums filed. Mr. Simms 
gives comments in regards to the cumulative argument. The Court will consider in 
regards to the cumulative argument. Scheduling order, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, Court would like findings of fact for a better understanding of the issues. Counsel 
will be given time post trial for briefing if they desire. Court treats post convictions just 
as though they were a trial. Mr. Simms moves the Court to exclude witnesses. Court 
grants motion. 
11:03 COUli in recess in this matter. 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
NOV-08-2010 MON 12:08 PM r.~url Services 
NCV~n~-2010 MON 09:22 lNE COUNTY JUDICIAL 
FAX 
FAX NO, 
n8 736 4155 
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Case No! CV .. 2006~0324 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
. PBITIONER TO TWIN FALLS 
COUNTY JAIL 
The Court, having considered Petitioner~s MOTION TO ORDER 
PEmONER TRANSPORTED TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL, filed herein and 
good cause a.ppearing therefore, HEREBY ORDERS Petitioner Transported to'Twin ' 
Falls County Jail, from the Pocatello Women~s' Correctional Filcility, pri~r to 
December 7, 2010. 
Oll. O. Riohard Bevan, District Judge 
"-
~ ~ Ab. \S OJtcc..tL- <?~l1~D1Z1, 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
7J 
Currently pending is the Respondent's motion to reconsider the partial denial of its 
motion for summary dismissal. This memorandum is in support of that motion, 
FACTS AND PROCSDURAL HISTORY 
During the underlying trial, trial counsel for Johnson objected to the giving of an 
aiding and abetting instruction, in part claiming that the evidence was insufficient to justify 
such an instruction. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6029, L. 18 - p. 6031 f L. 20 (a copy of the portion 
of the trial transcript cited in this memorandum is attached as an appendix to this 
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memorandum).) The district court overruled this objection, ''finding [that] the evidence 
here clearly supports an aiding and abetting instruction." (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6034, L. 25-
p. 6035, L. 1.) The court noted that, although the state had focused on Johnson as the 
shooter, the defense had inte~ected evidence and the theory that there was a different 
shooter. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6035, L 6 - p. 6037, L. 12.) The evidence that another 
shooter could not have acoomplished the murders without Johnson's help and assistance 
included, as found by the trial court: 
1. Both Mel Speegle's residence on the Johnson property and the presence of 
the rifle used as the murder weapon therein were not common knowledge. that both had 
been accessed without forced entry, and Sarah Johnson was one of the few people with 
both knowledge and access to both. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6037, L. 13 - p. 6038, L 11.) 
2. Knives placed at the murder scene had come from two different places in 
the house, including one that was not obvious, indicating complete familiarity with where 
the knives were in the house. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6038, Ls. 12-22.) 
3. One of the gloves used by the killer, the leather one, had come from inside 
Diane Johnson's suburban, whiie the matching one was found in Sarah Johnson's 
bedroom. (Trial Tr., p. 6038, L. 23 - p. 6039, L. 8.) 
4. Two cartridges matching those used in the murders were also found in 
Sarah Johnson's bedroom, and the presence of Diane Johnson's brain matter on them 
indicated they were there before the murders took place. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6039, Ls. 9-
13.) 
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5. Diane Johnson's brain matter found in Sarah Johnson's bedroom also 
indicated that both her bedroom door and the bedroom door of the victims had been open 
at the time of the murders. (Tria! Tr., vol. IX, p. 6039. Ls. 9-16.) 
6. Sarah Johnson admitted being in her bedroom or just outside the victims' 
bedroom at the time of the murders but the physical evidence indicated that both doors to 
the bedrooms were open at the time of the murders. and she had blood on the sales of her 
socks, alt of which put her at least in close proximity to the murders. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 
6039, Ls. 17-23.) 
7. The bathrobe that all the evidence and experts indicated was present during 
the murders, worn by someone, was Sarah Johnson's. had been In her bathroom adjacent 
to her bedroom prior to the murders, and was found in a trash can on the path that 
Johnson had taken immediately after the murders, Indicating that either Johnson placed 
the robe in the trash or that she was with or would have seen the person who did so. (Trial 
Tr., vol. IX, p. 6039, L. 23 - p. 6041, L. 5.) 
The trial judge concluded: 
So I would have to find that all of that evidence clearly supports a fair 
inference or ftnding by this jury. because this case is circumstantial, that if 
Sarah Johnson didn't do it, she certainly assisted or facilitated by knowledge 
of where these various items were In the house and so forth. So I think it's 
clearly supported by the evidence. 
(Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6041, Ls. 6-12.) 
On appeal, counsel for Johnson challenged the giving of the aiding and abetting 
instruction on the grounds that the instruction created a variance with the charging 
document and that giving it violated her right to due process. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 
970, 972-77, 188 P.3d 912, 914-19 (2008). Counsel did not, however, raise as an issue 
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on appeal the question of whether the district court erred in concluding the evidence 
justified the giving of the aiding and abetting instruction. Id. 
Johnson claims in post conviction that her appellate counsel was ineffective for 
"failing to argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting instruction." 
(Second Amended Petition, p. 22. 11 26.) The state moved for summary dismissal of this 
claim because it is unsupported by any evidence. This Court denied this part of the state's 
motion. 
Thereafter Johnson filed the "Affidavit of Jason Pintler, Direct Appeal Co-Counsel" 
(hereinafter "Affidavit"). In the Affidavit Pintler stated that he had reviewed the relevant 
part of the appellate record (Affidavit. p. 2, 1f 6), considered raising the issue of 
insufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction (Affidavit, p. 2, 1f 7), concluded that 
the law allows the giving of such instructions where the evidence of aiding and abetting is 
circumstantial (Affidavit, p. 2-3, 1f 8), and concluded that the issue was insuffioiently 
meritorious to have a reasonable chance of success on appeal (Affidavit, pp. 34, mr 9-18 
(setting forth Judge Wood's bases for the ruling that were not subject to reasonable 
challenge on appeal)). Pending Is the state's motion for reconsideration of whether this 
claim should be summarily dismissed in light of the Affidavit. 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss a post-
conviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears there is "no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary 
disposition is appropriate when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of 
material fact which. jf resolved in the appllcanfs favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
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requested relief. Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 
1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct App. 1995). If a 
petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which he bears 
the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 592, 
861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). 
It is well-settled that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
petitioner must provide admissible evidence that his counsel's perfonnance was deficient 
and that the alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88 (1984); Richman v. State, 138 Idaho 190, 192, 59 P.3d 995, 997 (Ct. App. 
2002) ("To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel.claim, the defendant must show 
that the attorney's performance was defiCient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by 
the deficiency." (citations omitted»). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must 
demonstrate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283,286 (1986» and overcome the "strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance," Davis v. State. 116 Idaho 401, 406. 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. 
App. 1989). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, 
but for trial counsel's deficient performance) the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v, State, 114 Idaho 758, 761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger 
v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The foregoing standards apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276,971 
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P.2d 727, 730 (1998). The relevant inquiry on the prejudice prong is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, Johnson would have prevailed on 
appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 
Here the only evidence presented disproves Johnson's claim of the ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel on both prongs of the test. First, the Affidavit establishes 
that appellate counsel knew and reasonably applied existing law after a review of the 
appellate record, and therefore that their performance was not objectively deficient. 
Second, the Affidavit establishes that if the issue of whether the aiding and abetting 
ins1ruction had been raised. Johnson would not have prevailed on appeal because the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by giving it. 
A district court may properly refuse a requested instruction on a legal theory that is 
not supported by the evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881,736 P.2d 1327, 1335 
(1987); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660,669-70,726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(self-defense instruction not supported by evidence). Whether a reasonable view of the 
evidence supports an instruction is a matter within the trial court's discretion. State v. 
Bush, 131 Idaho 22,32, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997); State v. Howle'l, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920 
P.2d 391, 395 (1996). Here, as articulated above, the trial judge found the aiding and 
abetting instruction very well supported by the evidence. The Affidavit establishes that 
appellate counsel property reviewed the record and rejected the issue of whether the court 
abused its discretion in giving the instruction based on the applicable legal standard. 
(Affid avit. ) 
Summary dismissal of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is warranted 
because the evidence before this Court shows that appellate counsel could not have 
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shown an abuse of discretion in giving the instruction. Thus, it was not deficient 
performance to elect not to raise the issue and there is no prejudice because Johnson 
would not have prevailed had it been raised. 
Johnson claims that appellate counsel's objective shortcoming was ignorance of 
the law. (Petitioner's Memorandum Response to Respondent's Motion to Reconsider, p. 3 
(hereinafter "Memorandum.") SpecIfically. Johnson claims that appellate counsel's 
conclusion that "'we would have had to convince the appellate court that no reasonable 
view of the evidence would have supported giving the instruction'" misapprehended the 
applicable legal standard. (Memorandum, p. 3 (as in Memorandum) (purportedly quoting 
Affidavit').) Review of the applicable law shows no misapprehension. 
Idaho law is well-established: I'A proposed instruction is not correct and pertinent If 
it is: an erroneous statement of the law, adequately covered by other instructions, or not 
supported by a reasonable view of the trial evidence." State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 957, 
231 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 
546,552,21 P.3d 483,489 (2001»). "Whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports 
an instruction to the jury is a question committed to the discretion of the trial court, and 
such a determination is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Eby, 
136 Idaho 534, 539-40, 37 P.3d 625, 630-31 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Bowers, 131 
Idaho 639, 640, 962 P.2d 1023, 1024 (1998»). On its face the standard articulated by 
appellate counsel is a correct statement of the law. 
Johnson argues that there is no evidence of her "facilitation, promotion, 
encouragement, solicitation or incitement" of the murders, "[n]ot one scintilla." 
(Memorandum, p. 4.) Johnson does not mention, however, the evidence relied upon by 
1 Johnson misquoted the Affidavit (Comoare AffidaVit, p. 3.1110.) 
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the trial judge. Instead, Johnson, relying on federal cases decided in 1952 or earlier, 
apparently contends that because the evidence was circumstantial it was automatically 
inadequate to support an aiding and abetting theory as a matter of law. (Memorandum, 
pp.6-7.) Johnson apparently argues that appellate counsel should have argued that the 
trial court erred because there was not a "scintilla" of direct evidence of her aiding and 
abetting, and that circumstantial evidence is, as a matter of law, insufficient to prove her 
guilt on that theory. This argument, however, is without basis in the law. 
The law Johnson relies on - that circumstantial evidence is insufficient if an 
inference of innocence is possible - has been rejected by both the Idaho Supreme Court 
and the Supreme Court of the United States. Holland v. United States. 348 U.S. 121, 138-
40 (1954) (rejecting standard by which circumstantial evidence would have to exclude 
every theory consistent with evidence before jury could convict); State v. Humphern, 134 
Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000) (rejecting continuing legal viability of Holder 
instruction that circumstantial evidence was entitled to less weight than direct evidence). 
Johnson's reliance on cases implicitly overruled by Hal/and, and a legal standard rejected 
in Humpherys, is misplaced and does not show either an objective shortcoming by 
appellate counselor that she would have prevailed on this issue had it been raised on 
appeal. 
The Affidavit establishes that appellate counsel considered whether to raise the 
issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in finding the aiding and abetting 
instruction supported by the evidence. In post-convictlon Johnson apparently contends 
that appellate counsel's performance was deficient for not raising an argument based on 
federal case law overruled over 50 years ago and a legal standard specifically rejected by 
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the Idaho Supreme Court. This contention fails to show either deficient performance or 
that she would have prevailed on appeal. The record does more than establish that 
Johnson has failed to present evidence to support this claim; the only evidence in the 
record shows that this claim is without merit. Accordingly, the state requests that Court to 
reconsider its order denying the state's motion for summary dismissal and dismiss 
Johnson's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of November, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration to: 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, 10 83340 
Fax (208) 788-2300 
Hon. Richard G. Bevan 
Fax (208) 736-4155 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax (208) 788·5527 
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u,. last we'lI just take out . .:;entence. So 
I'll have my clerk modify that and provide it to you, 
3 all right? I' .. !! MR. PANGBURN: Okay. 
II g Tl-fE COURT: Okay, so that - let me 
6 cheek my little list here. I think, then. of the ones , I \ . ~ ~:~ ~:~;:~:;:~~~ :~:~:t~~~:~:Ck 
9 in. I can't find my sheet, so when I find it, we" I 10 get back to it. 
All right. state's position on the 
instructions, then, as I have offered. And the 
verdict form. I want to make sure that we talk abOut 
11 
I ~~ 
14 the verdict fonn, as well. 
1
'5 MR. WHATCOli: Your Honor, looking through 
16 the instructions that you have in thls packet that you 
17 gave us this moming, taking out that last sentence on 
, 18 Number 29, we have no objection to the form and the 
1$ substance ottl'lese instructions. 
20 The only thing that we were planning on 
21 objecting to was the defense's offered instruction. I 
22 know that that isn't in here. If the court wants to 
23 hear us on that issue, we'll be prepared to argue 
24- that 
2.G THE COURT: We'll get to that in a 
6028 
1 minute. Okay, I want to be absolutely dear in the 
2 record that it is 'the state that is requesting the 
3 accessory, aiding and abetting instruction. 
4 MR. WHATCOTT: That's correct, Your Honor. 
S THE COURT: And you want that? 
6 MR. WHATCOTT: That's correct 
7 TJiE COURT: Okay. And that you 
8 indicated yesterday that while not requested, you had 
9 no objection in our informal meeting ~ 
10 I just want to place this on the record to 
11 make sure that j'm not mishearing something. 
12 The state did not object to the - or was 
13 inclined to want the second degree murder as a lesser 
14 included offense. 
16 MR. WHA TCOn: We don't object to those 
16 instructions. 
17 THE COURT: Defense. 
18 '~'NGBURN: First of all, Your Honor. 
19 :we do object to Instruction, proposed instruction 
~o ''Ntiinber 30_ 
t1 THE COURT: Let me get to it Okay. 
t2 MR. PANGBURN: And the basis for that 
3 objection is that -
4 THE COURT: Just a minute. That's ICJI 
5 311. 
6029 
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1 MR. Correct. 
2 THE COURT: Just so ifs in the record, 
3 all right 
4 MR. PANGBURN: Yes. The basis of out 
5 objection there, Your Honor, is based Oil the evidence 
6 presented in this case. There is -
7 fhere has been no indication, Whatsoever, 
8 none that I have seen, that any evidence was offered" 
9 regarding an allegation that Miss Johnson assisted, 
10 facilitated, promoted, encouraged, counseled, 
11 solicited, invited, helped or hired another. 
12 There'S absolutely no evidence on any of 
13 those points. Not just not on all of them, but not 011 
14 any of them. This is a case where, you know, 
15 there's - in my mind, there's kind of two - two 
16 types of defenses you can boil things down to. 
11 And' ()f course, there's more than those. 
18 You go through the tracfdional dog analysis, "My dog 
19 doesn't bite, I don't have a dog," that sort of thing. 
~o But I'd like to focus on two, 
21 In thiS case, it's really there's no 
22 dispute that k~lings occurred. So It's not like a 
23 case of theft, for example, where "not only am I not 
24 guilty, nothing occurred. I had an absolute right to 
25 those things." That is not that kind of ease. 
6030 
1 This Is a case where killings occurred. 
2 Our defense has always been that Miss Johnson did not 
3 do it. The logical and only inference, in that two 
4 people are dead, is that If she did not do it, someone 
S else did. And I contend that that is not enough -
& I mean tttat's really all we have. If she 
7 did not do it. someone else had to. Or someone - or 
8 some other people had to. But there's been no 
9 connection be1.\veen Miss Johnson and th~ other people 
10 that we contended - person or persons who committed 
11 this crime. 
12 And that's what this instruction requires. 
13 Not only anticipates, but requires a connection 
14 between Miss Johnson and those other people. 
1$ And our argument - or I would contend, 
16 and unless I missed something here, there's been no 
17 evidence of any kind of connection offered there. 
18 And so I would argue that to the extent 
19 that this instruction is given, it is certainly more 
20 confuSing than it is helpful to the jury. 
21 MR. WHATCOIT: Your Honor, we obviously 
22 filed a pretty extensive brief on this, and so I think 
23 that the law is quite clear that this is something 
24 that is provided for in·these types of cases. 
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2 fa:ts of this ease do not support and 
3 ~etting instruetion. 
4 Certainly, under our theory of the case, 
5 we have alleged that the defendant was the shooter, 
6 was the sole actor In this crime; and that is what we 
7 are proceeding on. Thelr defense, obviouslY, has been 
8 that someone else is the shooter. 
9 The question, when you're providing an 
10 instruction such as !his on aiding and abetting, is 
11 whether a reasonable View of the eVidence would 
12 support that. 
13 It's our position that even under their 
14 theory that someone else was the shooter, a reasonable 
15 view of the evidence would support that the defendant 
16 aided and abetted that unknown shooter. And we 
17 believe that is baSed upon the circumstantial evidence 
18 that has been presented here In the trial. 
19 I have cited $ nUmber of different 
20 examples in our brief; but I think that when you look 
21 at the aeee$S, the knowledge and the opportunity 
22 regarding the evidence in this case, and the 
123 instruments of the crime, a reasonable view of the 
24. evidence under the defense theQry would be that the 
25 defendant did aid and abet. 
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1 r think the case law Is quite clear that 
2 in this circumstance. such an Instruction is 
3 warranted. 
4 MR. PANGBURN: Your Honor. in essence, 
S what the state is arguing for is <it third position. 
6 They have their case. We have ours. And maybe 
7 there's a third position here, 
8 Certa;nly~~~t one that they have 
9 supported, because,t!:Ieir,contention throughout this 
10 case has been that Miss Johnson was the shooter:. Ours 
11 has"heen that she was not There's no connectiOn, 
12 there's no evidence of any kind of connection. 
13 There's no evidence at all of -
14 Because it states here, nlntentionally 
15 aids, assists, facilitates, promotes," There's no 
16 connection with a separate person. 
17 It's almost like one hand clapping, 
18 standing in the room and assisting - standing, being 
19 alone in a room, and assisting someone else. You 
20 cannot do it without a second person, and the 
21 connection between those. 
22 Thafs our concern, is that there has been 
23 no evidence, whatsoever, making a connection between 
24 Miss Johnson and someone else. 




















































contrary to he state has repeatedly , 
asserted that was no other person, 
THE COURT: First. the cases like State 
wrsus Butcher in Idaho. I think It's 137 Idaho; the 
Wheeler case that we previously talked about; Ayers, 
A-y-e-r-s, r think It's In 70 Idaho; is the law that 
this court relies on. Plus we have done some research 
and found, I think, nine or ten federal cases, 
including Some ninth circuit matters. 
I agree that the Information - or the 
indictment does not charge this in the aJtemative. 
Although, it's our - my research concludes that it's 
not a variance; and the defendanfs had notice of this 
at least since January 20, when the state filed its 
jury instructions, that the state was seeking an 
aiding and abetting instruction. So there is notice. 
'But going to, then, the question of 
whether Or not the law supports this instruction - or 
the evidence supports this instruction, I want to be 
real clear that there's a difference between, you 
know, my personal opinion and whether or not I think 
it's a good idea to have this in here from the state's 
perspective versus whether or not, because they 
requested it, the evidence supports It 
And my finding Is the evidence here 
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clearly supports an aiding and abetting instruction. 
And since you have objected to It, J'II tell you some 
of the reasons why, wHhout even trying to be - make 
any sort of an exhaustive list My understanding of 
the-
And It really (:ames into play when the 
defense put on its defense, is What really cast the 
light to me on this aiding and abetting matter. 
Because frankly, When I first got it from the state, I 
was wondering, you know, what's going to support this. 
Well. the evidence in tI'Iis case Is there's 
one neighbor, and I did not write down the names, but 
heard the speeding car that morning. 
Then you have the neighbor that put up the 
placard that shows she lives across the street, heard 
the car idle, another car come down. so forth. 
Then you have Rocky Mink and company. 
their theory, their third hypothesis that it was 
someone other - Well, the first hypothesis was 
murder/suicide. Second hypothesis was Sarah Johnson 
was the shooter. The third hypothesis was It was 
somebody other than Sarah Johnson and Alan Johnson who 
was the shooter, right? O~ay, 
So we have this evidence thafs been 
injected in here that clearly there's the opportunity 
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2 commission of the offenses. 
3 The third hypothesis proposed by the 
I 4 defense, that It's someone other than Sarah or Alan -
I 6 Well, let me back up a minute. 
s The second hypothesis that it could not be 
I 7 Sarah. this no blood, no gUilt, has always been 
I 8 curious to me, because the theory of that Is that we 
9 have this head and we have the gun. Then we have the 
10 shooter, and one analysis is there's the pink robe. 
11 Well. I have had the - gone back and 
12 Jooked at the notes, and my understanding of the I 13 gunshot residue person is there's gunshot residue on 
14 both gloves; the leather glove and the rubber glove 
I 
15 found wrapped in the pink bathrobe that was located in 
16 the trash can. There's no blood on them. 
17 There's no blood on - of Diane Johnson's 
18 on the gun. as i rec:aR. Everybody agrees that this 
19 .264 was used in the murders. So someone has got it I 
20 wrong here. 
I 21 22 I mean somebody's hypothesis isn't carrying water here, because everybody agrees this 
robe was in the environment. Everybody agrees this 
gun was used. Two and two isn't adding up here to me, 







The third hypothesiS. though, the one that 
really we're talking about with this aiding and 
3 abetting, my understanding was Bruno Santos' DNA was 
4 found on the bottom sheet in Sarah's bedroom, correct? 
5 MR. THOMAS: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Okay, so a fair inference 
7 from that is Bruno Santos at some point was in that 
8 house. My understanding of the defendant's position 
9 with respect to the third hypothesis, though, is 
10 really not pointing the finger at Bruno Santos. It's 
11 pointing the finger at somebody other than Bruno 
12 Santos, one of his gang member friends. 
13 Well, when you stop and look at this 
14 exhibit, Exhibit 5 that has the layout of the property 
15 and so forth, there is on the second floor, located in 
16 Mel Speegle's apartment, essentially for a/l practical 
17 purposes hidden - but if hidden is too strong of a 
18 word, certainly covered, obscured - is this 264 
1~ rifte and the shells. 
20 Access to the guest house is limited; and 
21 It was locked, and fuere's no eVidence of forced 
22 entry. 
23 Sarah Johnson, by the testimony provided, 
24 including through Jim Vavold, as I recall, was that 
ZS she was over there in that house at least Sunday 
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1 preceding ...Iers; and if I recall, maybe' Monday . 
2 But without revieWing the notes, I won't state that 
3 But I recall definitely on Sunday. 
4 So there's access over Ulere. She also 
S cleaned the apartment for Mel Speegle and. a jury 
6 could infer, had knowledge of what was there. 
7 And it's undisputed in this case, as I 
8 understand it, that that is where the gun that was 
9 used, the rifle in the commi~ion of the murders came 
10 from. And it's where the ammunition came from. Okay, 
11 so thafs one piece of evidence. 
12 I believe it was Matt Johnson testified 
13 with respect to the three knives, the two I&ft at the 
14 foot of the master bedroom and one left on the guest 
15 bedroom, one of those knives, as' recall, came 
16 from - two were in a kitchen block or butcher blook 
17 in the kitchen visible to anybody. 
18 The third knife was, In essence, concealed 
1.9 by or hidden by, I think it was, a bread box or 
20 microwave or something. The fair inference being 
21 somebody had to know where that knife was to get it. 
22. Totally different location from where the gun was. 
23 The two leather gloves, the matched set, 
24 were ordinarily kept in Diane Johnson's Suburban. 
25 They're not shooting gloves. That someone here 
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1 testified that Diane Johnson always wore a Ben Allen, 
2 I think it is, shooting glove of a particular 
3 construction; and that these leather gloves are not 
4 the ones she shot with. 
5 The leather glove found out in the trash 
6 can has gunshot residue on it. The match to it. 
7 presumably the match, is found in Sarah Johnson's 
8 room. 
9 LIkewise, two live .264 cartridges are 
10 found in Sarah johnson's room with some of the 
11 mother's tissue on them, meaning, the fair inference, 
12 they had to be there before the shots W&re fired - or 
13 the shot was tired that killed the mother. 
14 All of the experts, all of the witnesses 
is we heard here testified that both doors had to be 
16 open. 
17 Sarah Johnson admits being present in the 
18 house. We're not talking about different floors. 
19 We're talking the same f,I00f, both doors open. The 
20 jury saw this house. We saw the house. I mean it's 
21 not very far. The close proximity. 
22 Sarah Johnson has blood 011 the soles of 
23 her socks. And then, of course, the trash -- the robe 
24 and the gloves are found in the trash can immediately 
25 after the event, and the robe has - that's assigned 
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1~~~~ 1 
2 Obviously, we Who's wearing it, 2 
, barrel was extensively . 
blood and there was a determination 
3 but her robe, which the witnesses all described 3 that it was not there. 
1 
4 hanging In the guest bedroom. very near her - or 4 The other thing is I think the evidence is 
5 guest bathroom and her bathroom, very near to her 5 at least contradictory as to whether or not the guest 
6 bedroom, That's where its ordinary place of keeping 6 house was looked. And assuming that the evidenoe is 
1 was, and irs found to have the residue on it - or ., contradictory -
8 the blood stain on it of both parents. 8 I think someone said, 'Well, it's locked;" 1 
9 And all people say, that testified with 9 but then it really came out that there was stuff maybe 
110 knowledge of that kind of scienoo, testified that that 10 stacked in front of the door. 
11 pink robe had to be In the shooting environment ofthe 11 If the guest house is not locked, our 
J 
12 death of both parents, which oocurred in two different 12 contention is that you can boil this case down even -
13 roome. 13 even to a more - (would think an easier analogy 
14 And then lastly, for these purposes at 14 here, or an analogy. 
1
15 least, you knOw, we don't know - I don't know Who was 15 A can of beans in the grocery store Is 
1$ wearing the pink robe. Obviously, I wasn't there. 16 missing. Miss Johnson has access to that grocery 
17 But Sarah Johnson's traced tlerway out of 17 store. Someone else has access to that grocery store. 
18 the house, down the driveway where the trash can was 18 And purportedly, you can carry this analogy to any of 
19 parked to go over to the Richards', which is where the 19 the Items that you discussed, whether it was the robe 
20 robe was found. 20 or the gloves Or whatever. 
21 $0 you know, if she wasn't wearing it and 
22 somebody else was, then presumably they both went down 
23 the same path and placed the robe there. 
24 I don't know. I'm just- It's the way 
25 the evidence seems to me. If the robe was present 
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1 with both shootings and ends up 'in the trash can along 
2 the same path she took, either she put it there, is 
3 one inference: or somebody else that was in the house 
4 put it there, and it's along the same path that she 
5 took. That's all I'm saying about that 
G So I would have to find that all of that 
7 eVidence clearly supports a fair inference or finding 
8 by this jury I because this case is circumstantial, 
9 that if Sarah Johnson didn't do it, she certainly 
10 3$$isted or facilitated by knowledge of where these 
11 various items were in the house and so forth. So I 
12 think it's olearty supported by the evidence. 
13 MF{. PANGBURN: Your Honor. tf I may, 
14 there's one thing_ You had indicated that there was 
is no blood foul'\d of Mom's on the gun. That's not a true 
16 statement. Or that there was no blood - I think 
17 what you said is that there was no blood on that gun. 
18 I think a more accurate description is 
19 that there was no blood found, particularly because 
20 apparently no one looked; certainly didn't conduct the 
21 type of investigation, exactly in light of the state's 
Z2 last rebuttal witness that would indicate that it was 
23 nkely very small, potentially even toward 
24 microscopic. 
25 So to that extent, there was no evidence, 
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21 If the doors were unlocked In the house, 
22 whioh everybody has contended they were, it's really 
23 like merely because someone else had access to those 
24 things, as did she, does not - you know, my 
25 contention is that there's not the necessary nexus. 
6042 
1 THE COURT: Well, I understand your 
2 contention. And with all due respect, 1'!lIet you 
3 argue that to the jury. I'll let you explain to the 
4 jury how Sarah Johnson represents that she was in her 
5 bed asleep, or in her room, and someone came in and 
6 put the bullets, the extra .264 bullets In there, and 
7 the extra glove In there and so forth. 
8 That's fair argument You can argue that 
9 all you want to the jury. 
10 The question Is whether or not - and the 
11 sale question is whether or not there's evidence to 
12 support this requested instrUction. And I will make 
13 the finding that, based on what I have represented. 
14 that there's evidence to support that 
is Whether ifs iii good idea to give it from 
16 the state's perspective may be a different question. 
17 That's not my deal here, okay. I want to be real 
18 clear about that State's requested it, 1'/1 give it. 
19 It is supported by the evidence. 
20 Okay, next 
21 MF{. PANGBURN: Okay, our second objection. 
22 second of really three, relates to a number of 
23 different instructions. 33, 36 .-
24 THE COURT: Just a minute, just a 
25 minute. 337 
6043 
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3et is its evidentiary value is .:IV 411~1~ I~hy liS IIU ~up Jl eVioence 
indicating that where someu ling is destroyed in bad 
faith, you can assume it was adverse to that party. 
Your Honor, we still believe this is the 
same analysis as on Friday. We believe the court was 
correct in its ruling on Friday. We'd ask that you do 
not change that ruUng. 
MR. PANGBURN: Your Honor. obviously, it 
was intentional. Thafs never been an issue. The 
real issue is whether or not it was done with bad 
faith. We would ask the court to look: at the - the 
evidence of this case, look at the actions of the 
parties; particular1y that the destruction of the 
evidence occurred after a thorough evaluation of 
Miss Johnson, and the destruction was done by 
investigator.; who have held themselves out to be very 
experienced and, in fact, who were very experienced. 
I think the parties, or even the court on 
Friday - or the prosecution or the court pointed to 
Cindy Hall as one of the people who was part of that 
decision. But Miss Hall testified that her decision 
as to whether or not to throw that comforter away was 
based not on whether or not it would have exculpatory 
value for the defense; but instead. she based her 
deciSion solely On an identification use for that. 
6065 
Whether or not It would be helpful to 
identify to OIane Johnson, one of the victims in this 
case; and she said, because it was so obvious from the 
scene, that she didn't feel, for that purpose, it was 
worth collecting. However, she did not testify, nor 
do I think she was qualified to testify regarding the 
blood spatter effects. She was there to -
She was put on as - primarily as a DNA 
exPert for the state, and I don't believe she 
tesiified at all regarding blood spatter. And that 
was the reason for the collection of the comforter, 
was its blood spatter evidentiary use. 
THE COURT: Well, my ruling on Friday 
was what we have here is a failure to collect 
evidence, which evidence's evidentiary value was 
unknown at the time. So I'll adopt the same ruling I 
made last Friday. 
1 have thought about It all weekend. And 
I'll also state that after hearing this entire case, 
"m left with the strong feeling that the party that 
rea lly wishes they had that comforter is the state. 
In other words, what I'm saying is I 
cannot make a finding that there's a bad faith conduct 
on the part of the state to destroy evidence that's 




















































unknown. And I went through the factual matters on 
Friday with Cindy Hall- 1 believe that's her name -
the DNA person, after she got down there. Stu 
Robinson. And I read those portions back, and so 
1'/1 - I have considered it, I'll stay with State 
versus Dopp that I quoted on Friday and relied on on 
Friday. and \'11 again deny the request. 
Other matters. 
MR. RADER: Your Honor, as the court 
knows, I filed an objection to -
THE COURT: Let me get to one thing 
while we have our jury commissioner here. Marji 
Shepherd Is here. She has checked - She came to me 
and told me she had checked some items that some 
jurors had brought, reading material. 
I know she's got other work do this 
morning, so I want to get her to make her statement 
You can ask her any questions, and lefs get this done 
so she can get about her work. 
MS. SHEPHERD: Okay, Your Honor, the 
jurors did bring some items in to take for 
sequestration. Some of them were painting projects. 
paint brushes, bottles of paint And I would ask the 
court to please approve those so they could take 
6067 
those. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. THOMAS: No objection. 
MR. PANGBURN: No, Your Honor. 
MS. SHEPHERD: There were also some 
magazines about massage therapy. I would ask that the 
court to please approve that 
MR. PANGBURN: No objection. 
MR.. THOMAS: No objection. 
MS. SHEPHERD: I think that Is just about 
all, except for the sewing items, sewing machine and 
needle, thread, things like that; and pieces of 
fabric. 
MR. PANGBURN: No objection to that, Your 
Honor. 
MR.·THOMAS: No objection. 
MS. SHEPHERD: 
THE COURT: 
Thank you, Your HonOL 
Ihanks. 
Sorry, go ahead. 
MR. RADER: ~'Our Honor, as the court 
knows, I filed an objection to your findings regarding 
the fact - findings of fact in support of jury 
Instruction number 30, Which you said you were going 
to give last Friday. 
I'm not gOing to go into any further 
6068 
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I 1 d~lJ. aPOut It, cut r Ju$t want It Clear on ',!.-...: 2 the record that it is in. 
3 In tl'rat light. I had a chance, finally, to 
I 4 read the Idaho Statesman's article today. $ THE COURT: Let's take one thing at a 
6 time. Let's talk about this filing. I just got it 
I 7 about ten minutes ago. It's ten pages 1011g. I rushed 
8 through it as fast as I COUld. 
9 A copy was given to the state. Doesn't 
I 10 even have the court's nling stamp on it J'II 
11 Instruct the cieri< to put a filing stamp all It 
I 
12 It's captioned "Defendant's Objections to 
13 the Court's Findings of Fact In Support of Jury 
14 Instruction Number 30." Comment by the-
15 MR. WHATCOTT: Your Honor, I read through 
16 It rea! briefly. Basically, it's just argument on the 
17 factual issues, and the conclusions that the court 
I 18 drew trom it. It doesn't provide any new case law or 19 anything that I believe would provide a basis for 
20 changing the ruling On Friday. 
I 21 So as far as the factual arguments, those 
22 are issues for the jury. So, Your Honor, we don't 
I 
23 believe there's been any basis for changing that 
24 rUling. 
25 MR. RADER: They're not just issues for 
I 6069 1 the jury. They're issues that you relied on in making 
2 your finding that Instruction number 30 should be 
I given, Your Honor. 3 4 Those are the bases of our argument, that 
5 you're wrong about those decisions. I don't want to 
I 6 be so blunt about it. but that's what basically we are 7 arguing in the paper. 
I 
8 THE COURT: It wouldn't be the first 
9 time. 
10 MR. RADER: And it wouldn't be the 
l 
11 . first time I told a judge that. 
12 You know, our conclusion basically is -
13 or our argument is basically substantial parts of your I 14 conclusions do not match the evidence that was 
~ 15 ·-·provided during trial; and, therefore, are not 
16 
.. 
approprlate for inclusion in making that decision. 
17 Essentially, we're arguing that there is 
18 no evidenoe to support the conclusion that 
19 Sarah Johnson aided and abetted anybody. There has to 
[ 20 be some evidence of some action on her part. and there 
. ~1 'is none. That's the basis of the argument, 
22 Your Honor; and I don't need to go any further than 
23 that 
24 THE COURT: I tried to make it clear on 
25 Friday, and I'll try to make it clear again today. 
6070 
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~Vidence that I could find that 
support the defendant's involvement in the orime. 
For Instance. one of the things that I did 
not list Is, if the Jury chooses to believe it, is the 
statement that Malinda Gonzales testified to, in words 
or substance, that the knives were placed there to 
throw the police officers off in their investigation; 
and that was reported to have been made by the 
defendant. 
You take the position that I see in your 
writing that you take each little. individual item. 
and try to attack each indMdualltem. 
What I'm trying to suggest to you and put 
in this record is when one takes the totality of a/l 
of the circumstances, the likelihood of some outsider 
with no connection, Whatsoever, to this case, that 
could go in the amount of time involVed, and go around 
and find all of these selected pieces of evidence that 
have been admitted In this trial; and bring them all 
to one place, and use in one form or another, appeared 
to have been used in one form or another In the 
commission of this clime, you know, the zeros that 
this DNA person put up hel'$, there probably isn't 
enough room to put that many zeros up there, the 
6071 
likelihood of some just absolute total stranger being 
able to do that 
The evidence is real strong, in my view. 
that there's some involvement by the defendant here. 
The other thing. and I said It on Friday 
and I'll say it here again, Is that everybody agrees 
that both of these doors were open, the parents' 
bedroom door and her bedroom door. She was there, 
within 25 feet of where Diane Johnson was shot 
I mean it's not like being on one level of 
a house and somebody in another. And I have gone 
through the evidence found in the room, the location 
of where the evidence 'NaS. 
I don't make it as a finding of fact that 
that in fact exists. Thers the jUry's job. I want 
to be real clear about that AU 1'm making is a 
finding of what evidence supports the giving of the 
instruction. 
It is up to the jury to decide. They may 
disbelieve all of it I don't know. That's the 
proper subject of argument I'm just making those 
statements. I have noted it. I'll have it filed. 
[ want to make one other comment with 
respect to your filing, and that is I read your filing 
to be in two parts. 
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1 Vrll:' ~ CI C1li::111~  )V'U~I1C1;1 trlCiL 1 check the d iimply movea Items out aT me way, 
2 supports giving the Instruction. • lie other is a 2 put them up e door so that he could get his car 
3 misappncation of the law, that It's improper - ""If' 3 in the garage. There is no testimony that tnat door 
meaning Instruction number 30, the accessory 4 was locked. 
instruction - because it wasn't pled. 5 There wa5 testimony, however, that the 
And ~ think that State versus Butcher that 6 guest house was often locked or regularty locked; but 
I previously relied on, and those other cases, Butcher 7 there's no testimony supporting the tact that it was 
in particular makes it absolutely olear that it ~, locked that night 
9 doesn't have to be pled to be giVen. 9 THE COURT: WeU, then, J'" correct it 
10;' In fact, my recollection of Butcher. if 10 to say the guest house was ordinarily locked, and 
t1 it's the right case, the state once charged it and 11 Sarah Johnson had keys to the guest house. 
then withdrew It; and the defense argued that they 12 But that doesn't change anything. The 
were totally misled, because It had been abandoned by 13 idea here is how would somebody off the street know 
the state. So ( have noted it, and - 14 that Mel Speegle had this gun hidden in his bedroom. 
MR. RADER: Your Honor, I would pOint 15 covered with clothes, that there's ammunition there. 
out, for the record, in the last few years we have 16. How would somebody know that Mrs. Johnson 
seen several laws that have been overturned by the 17 kept a pair of leather gloves in the Suburban. 
Supreme Court because of what was once good law and 18 That we have this knife hidden behind the 
now considered to be bad. 19 bread box with some part of the handle exposed. 
Evidence brought up on things such as 20 The idea of putting the shells in 
Crawford v. Washington and Blakely v. Washington, and 21 Sarah Johnson's room, presumed mate to the glove and 
Apprendi case, and the whole line of cases resulting 22 so on. You ean argue about this for a long time. 
in that It's my job as the defense attorney, and 23 But I can tell you that in my view, the 
Mr. Pangburn's Job, to put this in front of tne court 24 evidence is strong. And the instruction is clear that 
so that these matters can be reserved for the future; 25 it can't be just an Idle knowledge of it. 
6073 6075 
and we're doing that here today. 1 Instruction 30 Is approved by the Supreme 
THE COURT: Sure, I understand. 2 Court. It tells the level of involvement that has to 
MR RADER: Secondly, want to say that 3 be there. And the evidence is there, in my view, to 
I agree you have to look at the totality; but the 4 give the instruction. 
totality of the issues you have to look at should be 5 Other matteI'S. 
limited to those items that are specifically - for 6 MR. RADER: The last issue, Your Honor, 
, which there is specii'ic evidence in the transcript 1 is the article that was In the Idaho Statesman. I 
And my argument again, baSically, is some 8 finally have a copy of It I read it. I thinK this 
of the items that you have chosen to rely on as a 9 is the entire article that I read. It is not as 
totality of the evidence are not In the transcript, 10 serious as I had been led to believe, I think. 
are nqt supported by it 11 However, It may - I think it's worth the 
THE COURT: Tell me one. 12 court's - the court's time to ask the jury, maybe as 
MR. RADER: The one that comes to mind 13 a whole, if they read this paper today. If some have, 
is the one involving the locked - the fact the guest 14 then I think we need to address the issue deeper. 
house was lOCked. There's no evidence on the record is THE COURT: State. 
that this guest house was locked this night 16 MR. IHOMAS: Your Honor, this court has 
The witness by the name of Dupuis has 11 admonished the jury not to read anything. When I look 
testified that when he came out in his back yard, the 18 at what they're talking about, the court said "could 
door was open, the lights were on. 19 have assisted." Basically, it was part of your 
Officer Harkins testified that when he 20 finding; so I don't think this court ever extended an 
went out to the guest house after he got to the scene. 21 opinion Of guilt. 
he walked in, without unlocking the door. 22 And I think to do - to bring the jury in 
Mel Speegle testified he had no idea 23 and ask them would highlight it We could have done 
Whether that door was locl<ed. :u that after each day's testimony, so we'd object to 
And Matt Johnson testified that he didn't 25 bringing them in. 
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COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Amended Trial Witness List, 
and states the following persons may be called to testify during trial on behalf of 
Petitioner: 
1. Bobby Pangburn, Trial Counsel 
3042 S. Whitepost Way 
Eagle, ID 83646 
208861 1886 
2. Mark Rader, Trial Co-Counsel 
381 W. Idaho Avenue 
Ontario, OR 97914 
541 8892351 
3. Patrick Dunn, Defense Investigator 
4695 Arrowhead Way 
Boise, ID 83709 
2083622727 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 1 
4. Robert Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert 
1235 N. Echohawk Way 
Eagle, ID 83616 
208 9394914 
5. Officer Ross Kirtley 
700 W. Jefferson St. #228 
Boise, ID 83720 
208 8543013 
6. Det. Steve Harkins 
480 East Avenue N. 
PO Box 2315 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
9. Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling 
Blaine County Sheriffs Department 
1650 Aviation Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
10. Stuart M. Robinson 
Retired Idaho State Police 
(208) 420-8930 
Physical Address Unknown 
E-Mail: srinvestigations@cableone.net 
www.srinvestigations.net 
11. Officer Raul Ornelas 
Hailey Police Department 
115 Main Street South, Ste. H 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
12. Maria Eguren 
Idaho State Police Headquarters - Forensic Labratory 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
(208) 884-7000 
13. Kjell Elisson 
Fire Administration Offices 
40 East Pearl Avenue 
Jackson, Wyoming 
Phone: (307) 733-4732 
Fax: (307) 739-9856 











PO Box 1562 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Physical Address Unknown 
208.481.0104 
Jane Lopez 
PO Box 3371 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Physical Address Unknown 
208.721.0477 
Bruno Antonio Santos 
c/o Blaine County Detention Facility 
1650 Aviation Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Glenda Osuno 
Physical Address Unknown 
Luis Ramirez 
Physical Address Unknown 
Carlos Ayala 
Physical Address Unknown 
Becky Lopez 
Physical Address Unknown 
Alan Dupuis 
1166 Riverview Drive 
Bellevue, Idaho 83313 
Julia Dupuis 
1166 Riverview Drive 
Bellevue, Idaho 83313 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of November 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, 
Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile 
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail ---
Hand Deliver ---
__ /_Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
F~ED ~':';q'~'~ 
, NOV 1 5 2010 hi 
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JI -- J !ynn Drage, Clerk District 
ourt Blame County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 









__________ R==es=p=o=nd=e=n=t ____________ ) 
Case No: CV-006-324 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW PETITIONER and files this, her Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition To Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Response to Motion to 
Reconsider, and in support thereof states as follows; 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 8, 2010, the parties appeared before the Court and presented 
argument in support of, and in opposition to Respondent's Motion to Reconsider 
concerning the Court's ruling on Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, among other claims, 
asserts ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue insufficient 
evidence to support submitting an aiding and abetting a jury instruction. The Court, at 
Petitioner's request, allowed additional citation and argument, to be filed by November 
15,2010. 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner submits that in order to be convicted for aiding and abetting the 
commission of a crime, affirmative evidence must be presented that a person acted to 
facilitate, promote, encourage, solicit or incite the actions of a crime; mere knowledge of 
a crime, or assent or acquiescence is not enough. Stated in the alternative, the aider and 
abetter must have the requisite intent and have acted in some manner to bring about the 
intended result; proof of which must support a reasonable inference of guilt. Respondent, 
is mischaracterizing, or has misconstrued, Petitioner's argument. Respondent, states, 
"(t)he law Johnson relies on that circumstantial evidence is insufficient if an inference 
of innocence is possible has been rejected by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Court of the United States." (Pg 8, Respondent's Memorandum in support of 
Motion to Reconsider) 
Without a question, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 
129, 594 P.2d 639 (J 979) with its opinion in State v. Humphreys, l34 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 
652 (Idaho 2000) The ruling in Holder required, in cases of purely circumstantial 
evidence, an additional instruction advising the jury that circumstantial evidence must be 
irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of a defendant's innocence in order to support a 
finding of guilty. The Humphreys opinion eliminated the need for an additional 
instruction, and confirmed a single standard of proof in all criminal cases, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Humphreys case did not, and does not eliminate the need for 
affirmative evidence of facilitation, promotion, encouragement, incitement of the crime, 
and shared criminal intent with a principle. 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
2 
In State v. Mitchell, 195 P.3d 737, at 742, (ID 2008) the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the above statement of law. The Mitchell Court cited State v. Randles, 117 
Idaho 344, for the proposition that mere knowledge of the crime, or assent or 
acquiescence in the commission of a crime is inadequate to prove accomplice liability by 
aiding and abetting. Mitchell at 742. In Randles, the defendant was charged with and 
convicted of manufacture and possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The evidence 
showed the home, shared by Randles with another, contained a paper bag holding seven 
sandwich bags containing approximately one ounce of marijuana apiece, a finger scale 
atop a box of clear sandwich bags, six paper bags and a glass jar containing loose 
marijuana leaves, two drying trays containing marijuana, a tray containing loose 
marijuana, marijuana cigarette butts, rolling papers, a paper bag containing marijuana 
stems, a film canister filled with what appeared to be marijuana seeds on a hutch in the 
kitchen, and a baggie containing an unspecified quantity of marijuana in a purse in the 
kitchen. Twenty, well cared for, immature plants were found outside, in a greenhouse 
attached to the residence. Randles at 346. 
The State argued that both defendants should be convicted of manufacture, as 
neither resident could be ignorant of the activity they were both guilty of the offense as 
accomplices for aiding and abetting in the cultivation. The Court noted, it is true that one 
who fails to report a felony is guilty as an accessory, but not as an accomplice. Randles 
at 347. The Mitchell Court noted Randles was overturned by Humphreys, but on other 
grounds. 
In the present case, the State urges the court to consider six circumstances as the 
evidence supporting accomplice guilt. None of the circumstances can reasonably support 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
an inference that Sarah Johnson facilitated, promoted, encouraged, solicited, or incited 
the murder of her parents. Only speculation can lead to the conclusion that Sarah aided 
or abetted another in the crimes. Even Respondent's recitation of the circumstances 
seems even to concede, in conclusion mere presence or knowledge, not facilitation, was 
afoot. Such statements as, " ... all of which put her at least in close proximity to the 
murders," and " ... or that she was with or would have seen the person who did so," are 
not reasonable inferences of aiding and abetting. The Randles Court rejected this type of 
speculation on circumstances far more damning than those in the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner is entitled to relief on her claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for failing to raise and argue the issue of error in offering the jury an aiding and 
abetting instruction as unsupported by the evidence. Respondent's Motion to Reconsider 
must be denied and Petitioner granted a new direct appeal on this issue. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
RISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
. (S, /..:J 
DATED 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of November 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER was delivered 
to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica 
Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; 
The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 
208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 




___ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
FILED ~:~:---­
NOV 22 2010 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 









________ ~R=e=s=po=n=d=e=m~ __________ ) 
Case No: CV -006-324 
PETITIONER'S FILING 
MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached documents in the above-
styled matter: Subpoena for and Acceptance of Service by Robert J. Kerchusky; 
Subpoena for and Acceptance of Service by Patrick T. Dunn; Subpoena and Personal 
Return of Service for Sheriff 1. Walt Femling; and Subpoena and Personal Return of 
Service for Bruno A. Santos. 
CHRISTOPHERP. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 
I ~ ,/7J 
DATED 
1 tt5'5'1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of November 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM was 
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: 
Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile 
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail ---
Hand Deliver ---
/via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 2 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 2087882300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











The State ofIdaho to: ROBERT J. KERCHUSKY 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this 21 st day of September, 2010. 
SUBPOENA 
SUBPOENA 
hristopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State Bar No. 7374 
ourt: 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 2087882300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









________ -=R=es~p~o=nd=e=n=t, ___________ ) 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I received and accepted a subpoena, served by mail to the 
address listed below, to appear to testify at the evidentiary hearing in Johnson vs. State of Idaho, 
case number CV-2006-0324, commencing on the 7th day of December, 2010, at 9:00 a.m, which 
evidentiary hearing is to take place at the Twin Falls County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward 
Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, Twin FaUs, Idaho 83301 
Robert J. Kerchusky 
1235 N. Echohawk Way 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









__________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t=, ____________ ) 
The State of Idaho to: PATRICK T. DUNN 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; AND 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce or permit inspection and copying of the following 
documents or objects, including electronically stored information, at the place, date and 
time specified below: The audio recording of Idaho State Police Officer Ross L. Kirtley 
made on September 2,2003. 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this 21 st day of September, 2010. 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
By O~. / of an OffiCr. roe Court: 
/I~ / /'/7 / (/:ff /f~ 
thriStOPher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State Bar No. 7374 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 









Case No: CV-2006-0324 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t~, ___________ ) 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I received and accepted a subpoena, served by mail to the 
address listed below, to appear to testify at the evidentiary hearing in Johnson vs. State of Idaho, 
case number CV-2006-0324, commencing on the 7th day of December, 2010, at 9:00 a.m, which 
evidentiary hearing is to take place at the Twin Falls County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward 
Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
Patrick T. Dunn 
4695 Arrowhead Way 
Boise, Idaho 83709 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 1 
1. WALT FEMLING 
(208) 788-5563 
SARAH M JOHNSON 
-- vs _. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
1650 AVIATION DRlVE 
HAILEY, ID 83333 
PLAINTIFF(S) COURT: 
Paper ID: 201001177 
BCDC 
CASE NO: 2006·00324 
DEFENDANT(S) PAPER(S) SERVED: 
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA 
I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE 
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 9:24 O'CLOCK A.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING 
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MAnER UPON 
* * * * * FEMLlNG, J. E. "WALT" * * * * * 
PERSONALLY AT: 1650 AVIATION DRIVE HAILEY ID 
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO. 
SHERIFF'S FEES: 
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE: 
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED: 
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS 





DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 




KYLE D. GREEN 
SERVING OFFICER 







BLAINE COUNTY Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
~-~~----
~;)V i " 2010 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
Hr. Min M 
--J-:-"e-rry-=F=-e--:mling, Sheriff 
By C:vIlD~:y 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
__________ R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~ __________ ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling 
Blaine County Sheriff's Department 
1650 Aviation Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this f..- 5 day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA J ltJLe <b 




J. W AL T FEMLING 
(208) 788-5563 
BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
1650 AVIATION DRIVE 
HAILEY, ID 83333 
Paper ID: 201001176 
SARAH M JOHNSON 
•• VS·· 




CASE NO: 2006-00324 
PAPER(S) SERVED: 
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA 
I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE 
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 9:25 O'CLOCK A.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING 
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON 
* * • * • BRUNO ANTONI SANTOS·DOMINGUEZ * * * * * 
PERSONALLY AT: BLAINE COUNTY JAIL HAILEY 10 
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO. 
SHERIFF'S FEES: 
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE: 
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED: 
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS 
PO BOX 1861 




DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 




KYLE D. GREEN 
SERVING OFFICER 







~:.l 'J 1 b 2010 Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hr. __ ---=~q~· Min !5D M 
Jerry Fem~in ,Sheriff 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 By ~ lGi'III O('?Jty -r::rrd'-">' 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 2087882300 
IN THE PISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
________ ~R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~----------) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: BRUNO A. SANTOS 
c/o Blaine County Detention Facility 
1650 Aviation Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls" Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this \ (' day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA 
1 \'61'\ 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 






STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
COurt Blaine County, Idaho 
Case No. CV -06-32r-.-...----=~~,;.;;.;:;.;;;:;...... 
) ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S 




The Court, having considered the Respondent's Motion to Reconsider, 
filed September 30, 2010, and after conducting a hearing on said motion, hereby 
enters the following order. 
The Court denies the state's motion to reconsider the denial of its request 
for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing 
to adequately cross-examine a number of witnesses as alleged in paragraph 16 
of the Second Amended Petition. 
The Court takes under advisement the state's motion to reconsider the 
denial of its request for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that appellate 
counsel was ineffective as alleged in paragraph 26 of the Second Amended 
Petition. The parties shall have until November 15, 2010, to file, to the extent 
they deem appropriate, supplemental briefing on whether this claim should be 
dismissed. 
.,.~ 
DATED this /f. day of November, 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Respondent's Motion to 
Reconsider to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
Christopher Simms 
Attorney at Law 




Deputy Attorney Generals 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, 1083720-0010 
{X} U. S. Mail 
{ } Court Folder 
{X} U. S. Mail 
{ } Court Folder 
. eputy Clerk 
2 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
FI LED ~~':;P'2~ 
r- 1(.. 
NOV 22 2010 
-!2!!n
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ng{)rage, C/9rk District V<JU 1slne County, Idaho 
,.,.. . ",----. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











__________ R~es~p=o=nd=e=n=t, ____________ ) 
Case No: CV -2006-0324 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
TO TRANSPORT WITNESS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF 
TESTIMONY AT POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING 
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED 
LRC.P. 17 & 26 
COMES NOW Petitioner by and through her attorney, CHRISTOPHER P. 
SIMMS, and files this, her MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY AT POST-CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING and in 
support thereof states as follows: 
1. Pending before this Court is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, set for evidentiary hearing commencing December 7, 2010. 
2. The evidentiary hearing is scheduled for four (4) days, to be conducted in the 
Theron Ward Judicial Building, located in Twin Falls, Idaho. 
3. Petitioner's allegations, include but are not limited to, Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel relating to the cross-examination of several key witnesses during the trial for 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
TESTIMONY AT POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING 
Two Counts of First Degree Murder under cause number CR-2003-1820, for which 
Petitioner was convicted and is serving a life sentence plus fifteen years. 
4. One key witness is Bruno Antonio Santos, the then boyfriend of Petitioner, who 
is currently being held in the Blaine County Detention Facility on pending criminal 
charges. 
5. Bruno Santos has been duly served with a Subpoena compelling his attendance at 
said hearing. 
6. It is expected that the testimony of Mr. Santos will be required on December 9, 
2010. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court enter an Order to Transport Bruno 
A. Santos from the Blaine County Detention Facility to the Twin Falls County Jail before 
the commencement of the evidentiary hearing on no later than 10:00 a.m. on December 9, 
2010. 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney for Petitioner 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
TESTIMONY AT POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING 
Dated 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of November, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY AT POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
HEARING was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting 
Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box 83720, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-0010 and The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Facsimile 
number 208.788.5554,201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333: 
US Mail ---
___ Hand Delivery 
/Via facsimile 208.854.8074 & 208.788.5554 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
TESTIMONY AT POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
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Case No: ~-2006-0324 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF INTERPRETER 
LC.R. 28 
COMES NOW Petitioner Sarah M. Jonson, through Counsel Christopher P. 
Simms, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 28 move for this Court for an Order 
Appointing Interpreter and in support thereof, states as follows: 
1. The witnesses named herein have been served with subpoenas, or will be served 
with subpoenas; Bruno A. Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Becky Lopez, Jane Lopez, Luis 
Ramirez, Carlos Ayala, and Glena Osuno, all of whom are native Spanish language 
speakers, communicate primarily in the Spanish language and understand very little 
English language. 
2. This matter is set for hearing on the Court's calendar on at 10:00 a.m., on 
December 7, 2010, 2010, however the testimony of the above witnesses is expected to 
begin at 10:00 a.m. on December 9,2010. 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner hereby requests appointment of an English/Spanish 
language interpreter, for the Court to issue a subpoena for the attendance of said 
interpreter, for said interpreter to be sworn to accurately and fully interpret the testimony 
of the above witnesses given at the hearing to the best of the interpreter's ability before 
assuming the duties as an interpreter. 
Dated this 22nd day of November 2010. 
ey for Defendant 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of November, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER was 
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: 
Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-
0010 and The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Facsimile number 
208.788.5554,201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333: 
US Mail ---
___ Hand Delivery 
/Via facsimile 208.854.8074 & 208.78 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER 3 
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I) 
LAWRENCE G. WASOEN 
Idaho Attomey General 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
FI LED ~:~ . .:/ ;L6r 
[ NOV 2 3 2010 I r;-
JESSICA M. L.ORELLO ISB #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attomeys 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
COurt Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








) Case No. CVw06-324 
) 
) RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) 
) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits the Respondenfs 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to this Court's Amended 
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and PreftTrial Order dated September 8,2010. 
Following proceedings on the parties' cross-motions for summary dismissal, the 
remaining claims in Petitioners ("Johnson") Second Amended Petition for Post~ 
Conviction Relief ("Petition"), which are currently set for an evidentiary hearing are: 
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Claim 4(a) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a 
continuance after discovering the comforter on the bed where Diane Johnson was 
murdered was not collected as evidence. (Petition, pp.7-8, 11 15.s.) 
Claim 4(c) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate 
the scientific basis forthe proffered coconut experiment. (Petition, p.8, 11 15.c.) 
Claim 4(d) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to provide expert 
testimony as to comforters." (Petition, p.9, 11 15.d.) 
Claim 4(e) - Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the cross-
examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkin, 
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky 
Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, 11 16.) 
Claim 4(f) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present evidence of an 
audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on Johnson "to the 
exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] was the 
easiest target." (Petition, p.13, 11 16.c.) 
Claim 11 - Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for "failing to argue 
insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction." (Petition, p.22, 
lr 26.) 
Claim 12 - Newly discovered evidence based upon the identification of 
fingerprints belonging to Christopher Hill. (Petition, pp.22-24, 1T1J27-29.) 
The state's position on the appropriate resolution of each of these claims is that, 
for the reaSOns set forth below, Johnson will not be able to meet her burden, and is not 
entitled to relief on any of her claims. 
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A. Claim 4(a) 
In Claim 4(a), Johnson contends trial counsel were ineffective for failing to move 
for a continuance after discovering "that a comforter, that would have contained physical 
evidence, had been discarded and not gathered as physical evidence." (Petition, pp.7-
8, 11' a.) According to Johnson, she was prejudiced by counsels' failure to do so 
because it left counsel "inadequately prepared to cross-examine the State's witnesses 
about the alleged comforter" and "[s]pecifically, whether a hole on the comforter was a 
bullet hole and whether a sheet and or comforter covered the head of Diane Johnson 
thereby effecting blood spatter." (Petition, p.8, n 15.a.) Johnson cannot meet her 
burden of establishing deficient performance or prejudice to support this allegation. 
In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Johnson must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U 
.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). "Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance 
- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 
1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong 
presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgmenf' to establish that 
counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance." Claiboume v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting, 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-
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guessed or selVe as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel unless that decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective 
review." State Vo Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373.941 P2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles 
v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 
254,258,869 P.2d 571,575 (Ct.App. 1994)). 
Thus, the first element - deficient performance - "requires a showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the (counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The 
second element - prejudice - requires a showing that counsel's deficient perfonnance 
actually had an adverse effect on her defense; i.e., but for counsel's defiCient 
performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. state, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second element, Johnson has the 
burden of showing that her trial counsels' deficient conduct "so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial can"ot be relied on as having 
produced a just resutt.)' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 
P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to file 
a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the probability of 
success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity 
constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 
642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995), A petitioner must a/so overcome the presumption that trial 
counsel's decision not to file a particular motion was strategiC or tactical. See State v. 
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Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 816 P.2d 1023 (Ct App. 1991) (trial counsel's choice of 
witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his lack of objection to 
testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions). 
The evidence will show that the failure to request a continuance was objectively 
reasonable since additional time would not have changed the circumstances regarding 
the comforter or the ability to cross-examine the state's witnesses, Rather, it was 
objectively reasonable for counsel to instead emphasize and capitalize on the state's 
failure to collect the evidence. Moreover, the Court should conclude that a request for a 
continuance on this basis would not have been granted and that there is no reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if a continuance 
had been requested or granted. 
S. Claim 4( c) 
In Claim 4(c), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective because, she asserts, 
they were "inadequately prepared to present adequate support for [their] proffered 
expert testimony regarding the blood splattering evidence;" specifically, their 
"experiment using a coconut [to] re-create the alleged crime [sjc].~ (Petition, p.S, ~ 
15.c.) Johnson further asserts, as an "example," "Trial Counsel was unable to oonsult 
with any experts and property present an experiment that would have met evidentiary 
standards and would have been admissible .... " (Id.) Relief should be denied on this 
claim because the evidence will show that Johnson cannot meet her burden of 
establishing deficient performance or prejudice in relation to these allegations. 
The notion that counsel were "unable to consult with any experts" is belied by the 
recor<f. Counsel clearly had adequate time to consult with experts and, in fact, did so. 
Any request for additional time would have certainly been denied. In addition, no 
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additional foundation could have presented in order to render the coconut experiment 
admissible. For these reasons, and because there is no reasonable probability the 
result of the proceeding would have been different had a "coconut experiment" been 
presented, Johnson cannot prove prejudice. Relief on this claim should therefore be 
denied. 
C. Claim 4{d) 
In Claim 4(d), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective in "failing to provide 
expert testimony as to comforters." (Petition, p.9, 'fJ 1S.d.) More specifically, Johnson 
asserts: 
Trial Counsel requested the ability to provide evidence of a forensic 
experiment showing the effects of a contact gunshot from a high-powered 
rifle on a sheet and comforter at the proximity that the State asserted 
occurred In this case. The District Court denied Trial Counsel's request 
because Trial Counsel could not provide evidence that the comforter used 
in the experiment was the same type of comforter that the State 
destroyed. Trial Counsel was ineffectiVe in failing to present to the District 
Court evidence showing that the type of comforter used in the experiment 
would not have made a difference to the relevance of the experiment and 
thus Trial Counsel failed to get the experiment into evidence. But for Trial 
Counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner 
would not have been convicted. 
(Petition, p.9, ~ 1S.d). 
Johnson cannot meet her burden of establishing either deficient performance or 
prejudice based upon the absence of any evidence relating to the comforter. The 
efforts undertaken by counsel to "prOVide evidence that the comforter used in the 
experiment was the same type of comforter that the State destroyed [sic)" were more 
than adequate and it was not objectively unreasonable for them not to have pursued 
this avenue further since the comforter was not available, which necessarily impaired 
counsels' ability to prove that the comforter used in the experiment was '1he same type." 
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Johnson also cannot establish any prejudice resulted from failing to produce 
"expert testimony" about the comforter. In light of the evidence presented at trial, there 
Is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had counsel 
made additional efforts to "get the experiment into evidence." Relief should be denied 
on this claim. 
D. Claim 4(e) 
In Claim 4(e), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective with respect to the cross-
examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkin, 
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky 
Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, 11' 16.) The 
evidence will show that Johnson cannot meet her burden of establishing counsels' 
decisions regarding cross-examination were anything but strategic and tactical and 
objectively reasonable. Johnson also cannot meet her burden of proving a reasonable 
probability that any cross-examination she now believes should have been conducted 
would have resulted in a different outcome. The Court should deny relief on Johnson's 
claims that counsels' cross-examination was ineffective. 
E. Claim 4(1) 
In Claim 4(t), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present 
evidence of an audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on Johnson 
i'to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] was the 
easiest target." (Petition. p.13, ,-r 16.c.) Johnson cannot demonstrate counsels' 
decision not to introduce such evidence was objectively unreasonable or that 
introduction of such evidence, assuming it can even be correctly characterized as 
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Johnson has characterized it, would even remotely undermine confidence in the 
outcome of her case. The Court should deny relief on Claim 4(1). 
F. Claim 11 
In Claim 11, Johnson alleges appellate counsel were ineffective for ~ailing to 
argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction." (Petition, 
p.22, 1126.) The state's request to reconsider the Court's order denying its motion for 
summary dismissal of this claim is currently under advisement. To the extent this olaim 
proceeds to hearing, Johnson will not be able to meet her burden. 
The standards that apply to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims also 
apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, i.e., in order to establish 
ineffective assistance of appellate oounsel, a petitioner has the burden of proving that 
his counsel's representation on appeal was deficient and that the deficiency was 
prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,276, 
971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). The relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that. but for counsel's errors, Johnson would have prevailed on appeal. 
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Even if a defendant requests that certain 
issues be raised on appeal, appeUate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise 
every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 
751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988) (citing 
Jones, 463 U.s. at 751-754). Moreover, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
appeal cannot be predicated upon counsel's faIlure to raise meritless issues. Matthews 
v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 809 n.2, 839 P.2d 1215, 1223 n.2 (1992); Maxfield v. State, 
108 Idaho 493,501,700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct App. 1985). As explained by the Supreme 
Court, "Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the 
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF' FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF' LAW - 8 
NOV. 23. 2010 4:25PM AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO. 125 P. 10/13 
importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central 
issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." ~ at 752. 
The evidence will establish that appellate counsel made an informed and 
reasonable decision not to pursue a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the aiding and abetting instruction. A review of the record and the law supports 
appellate counsels' assessment as well as the trial judge's conclusion that the 
instruction was appropriate based upon the evidence presented. Johnson will not, 
therefore, meet her burden of establishing either deficient performance or prejudice in 
relation to her claim that appellate counsel was ineffective; the Court should deny relief 
on this claim. 
G. Claim 12 
In Claim 12, Johnson alleges there is newly discovered evidence warranting a 
new trial. (Petition, pp.2:2-25, 1111 27-30.) Specifically, she alleges that latent fingerprints 
on Mel Speegle's rifle scope and an insert on a box of .264 caliber ammunition were 
identified as belonging to Christopher Kevin Hill. Johnson cannot establish the 
Identification of Mr. Hill's fingerprints requires a new trial. 
In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme 
Court articulated a four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show 
that the evidence offered (1) is "newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at 
the time of trial"; (2) is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably 
produce an acquittal; and (4) could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
diligence on the part of the defendant. .!sL. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. In announcing this 
four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure 
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and speoifically noted his oomment, "after a man has had his day in court, and has been 
fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial." M:. (Citation omitted). 
Consistent with the four-part test in Drapeau and Professor Wright's comment, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence known to the defendant at the 
time of trial cannot be considered newly discovered. See,~, State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 
404,410,273 P.2d 97,100 (1954) (evidencewhioh defendant was aware of prior to trial 
but ohose not to present is not newly discovered); State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99, 11 
P.2d 819,822 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial is not newly discovered): State v. 
Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts unknown at time of trial could be 
considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho 45, 88 P. 240, 242 (1907) 
(concluding evidence that colts Were not stolen but actually belonged to rancher for 
which defendants worked was not newly discovered). 
The newly discovered evidence in this case is neither material nor likely to 
produce an acquittal. At trial, evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the 
scope, the box and elseWhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (Trial Tr., Vol. 
VII, p.5045, L.15 - p.5132, L.15; Vol. VIII, p.5S0S, L.1 - p.5843, L.4; p.5846, L16 -
p.S858, L.17; Vol. V, p.2994, L,10 - p.3077, l,25.) It was established that unidentified 
fingerprints were on the scope, gun, some of the shells, and the box containing the 
shells. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3077, Ls.1-17.) Thus, it was established at trial that Johnson 
had left no fingerprints on those items; If any of the prints on those items belonged to 
the "reaf killer," then the killer was not Johnson and was some unidentified person. 
Because evidence that people other than Johnson had at some point handled the 
scope and the ammunition box, and had left fingerprints thereon, was well established 
at trial, the only evidence that is even arguably newly discovered is the identity of one of 
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the previously unidentified persons to handle the scope and the box of ammunition. 
Knowing his name, however, is not material to this case or likely to produce an acquittal. 
Evidence at trial that someone (who was unknown at that time) other than Johnson had 
touched the scope and ammunition box did not create a reasonable doubt as to 
Johnson's guilt. The julY had no reasonable doubt that the person who had deposited 
those fingerprints was in fact the actual killer, instead of Johnson - otherwise the jury 
would have acquitted. Knowing a name to associate with those prints does not change 
that calculus in the slightest. 
In addition, both Mel Speegle (the owner of the gun) and Hill gave statements 
indicating when, how and where Hill had touched the gun. BeIng able to do so made 
the fingerprint evidence of even less value to Johnson than it was at trial when the state 
was not able to provide any information about how the unknown fingerprints could have 
gotten where they were found. 
Whether an unknown person who had left fingerprints on the scope and 
ammunition box could have been the killer was one of the issues at trial. The jury 
clearly rejected the argument that the prints created reasonable doubt as to Johnson's 
guilt. That we now know the source of at least some of those prints in no way indicates 
that a jUlY would view the presence of those prints any differently_ Because the jury 
necessarily rejected the argument that the "real killer" left the fingerprints, newly 
discovered evidence that the prints belong to a friend of the gun owner who helped him 
sight the gun in some time before the killing is not material or likely to produce an 
acquittal. 
Johnson also alleges the newly discovered fingerprint evidence somehow shows 
that "Tina Walthall's trial testimony asserting that Ms. Eguren has provided all latent 
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Al'lD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -11 
NOV. 23.2010 4:26PM AHO AiTY GENERAL-SPU NO. 125 P. 13/13 
print 11ft cards was false" and that if "this truth" had been known it is "reasonably likely" 
that she would not have been convicted. (Petition, p.23, 11' 28a.) Johnson, however, 
cannot establish Walthall's trial testimony was false and there are 0'0 reasonable 
grounds to believe that any evidence regarding what fingerprint cards Ms. Eguren was 
provided would have in any way been Important to the verdict. 
Because Johnson is not entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered 
evidence, the Court should deny relief on Claim 12 as well as all other claims that have 
not been prevIously dismissed. 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2010. 
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served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of 
Respondent's Pre-Trial Memorandum by the method indIcated below: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax (208) 788-5527 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
Fax (208) 736-4155 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attomey at Law 
191 Sun Valley Rd. 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax (208) 788-2300 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, ) 
) Case No: CV-2006-0324 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
vs. ) ,BRUNO ANTONIO SANTOS 
) FOR PRODUCTION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OF TESTIMONY FOR POST-
) CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING 
________ ~R=e~sp~o~n=de=n=L ___________ ) 
The Court, having conside~ed Petitioner's Motion for Order of 
, Transport Witness For Production of Testimony at Post-Con,.viction Relief Hearing, . 
/ and gOQd cause appearing therefore, HEREBY OJU>ERS Bruno Antonio Santos be 
transported to Theron Ward Judicial Building" Twin Falls County, from the Blaine 
I" • 
County Detention Facility, prior to the commencement of the scheduled hearing for 
Post-CoIiviction Relief no later than 10:00 am., on December 9,2010 for the purpose 
of producing testimony, before G. Richard Bevan, District Judge. 
DATED this..l!f- day of November, 2010 
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Case No: CV-006-324 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL 
BRIEF 
__________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t~ ___________ ) 
COMES NOW Petitioner and files this, her TRIAL BRIEF and in support thereof 
states as follows; 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief seeking a new trial from a conviction in Blaine County, on or about 
April 19, 2006, on two counts of Murder in the First Degree, with firearm enhancement, 
in Case No. CR-03-1820. On or about June 30, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced, and is 
serving two life terms plus fifteen (15) years, in Pocatello Women's Correctional Center. 
Petitioner's trial counsel failed to timely file notice of appeal, and therefore her direct 
appeal was initially dismissed as untimely. Relief was granted pursuant to the initial 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, timely filed with this Court on April 19, 2006, in the 
form of allowing the direct appeal to proceed. The Idaho Supreme Court, on June 26, 
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2008, affirmed Petitioner's Conviction in State v. Johnson, Case No. 33312, which 
decision can be found at 188 P.3d 912 (ID 2008). 
The unresolved issues contained in Petitioner's Post-Conviction action were 
stayed during pendency of the direct appeal. On or about November S, 2008 the parties 
stipulated and the Court Ordered Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief filed by March 16, 2009. On or about February 13, 2009 it was learned new 
evidence had been uncovered, specifically that a match had been identified wherein 
formerly unidentified latent prints found on the tools of murder had been positively 
connected to one Christopher Kevin Hill. Petitioner's First Amended Petition was timely 
filed. 
Thereafter, a previously unknown witness came forward with an allegation that 
led to a Second Amended Petition. Those allegations, together with a host of Petitioner's 
other grounds for relief, have been disposed of through Motion for Summary DismissaL 
The allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel relating to failure to raise the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction is submitted 
and under advisement as a purely legal issue. The issues now before the Court on issues 
of fact and law are those asserted in paragraphs 14, ISa., IS.c., IS.d., 16.a.i., 16.a.ii., 
16.a.iii.,16.v., 16.vi., 16.b., 16.c., 16.d., 18.vi., 18.vii., and 29 of Petitioner's Second 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The allegations contained in the 
referenced paragraphs and claims to be decided by this court at trial, and for which relief 
is requested, are summarized as follows: 
a. Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall lack of 
diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic 
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tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all 
of which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, a manifestly 
unfair trial and unjust verdict as alleged in paragraph 1 4.; 
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a continuance or 
adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after learning the 
comforter had not been collected as evidence as alleged in paragraph 
I5.a.; 
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate 
the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on crucial 
blood splatter opinion evidence, as alleged in paragraph I5.c.; 
d. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present expert 
testimony, and failing to adequately investigate the scientific basis for 
a gun shot I sheet experiment, bearing on crucial blood splatter opinion 
evidence, as alleged in paragraph I5.d.; 
e. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately cross-
examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry 
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo 
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, 
Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson as 
alleged in paragraph 16.; 
f. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present evidence of 
an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross Kirtley, 
which recording clearly proved the theory that police focused on 
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Petitioner Sarah 10hnson, to the exclusion of all other possible 
suspects and theories, because she was the easiest target as alleged in 
paragraph 16.; 
g. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether certain 
previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh" as alleged in 
paragraph 18.; 
h. Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of 
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously unidentified 
latent prints as alleged in paragraph 29. 
FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND 
(Exhibit References as used in 2nd Amended Petition) 
On the morning of September 2, 2003 Alan and Diane 10hnson were found shot to 
death in their horne, where they lived with their sixteen year old daughter, Sarah. (Trial 
Transcript pp. 1512-1514, 1593-1605) Almost immediately after the rifle blasts Sarah 
ran from the house screaming that someone had shot her parents. (Trial Transcript pp. 
1518-20) The first people at the house, initially neighbors and then police, found a 
gruesome scene of blood and tissue literally dripping from the walls and ceilings of the 
master bedroom and adjoining hallway. (Trial Transcript pp. 1593-1605, 1654-1663) 
Mrs. Johnson's body was found in the bed, with her head almost entirely blown off. 
(Trial Transcript pp. 1667-1668, 1795) Mr. Johnson's wet, naked body was found by the 
side of the bed, with the master bath shower running. (Trial Transcript pp. 1662, 1792) 
A .264 caliber rifle was on the floor in the doorway of the master bathroom. (Trial 
Transcript pp. 1600 & 1849, Exhibit 36) 
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A more complete inventory of the crime scene located a pink robe, a pair of 
surgical gloves, and five (5) .25 auto rounds in a trash can by the curb. (Trial Transcript 
pp. 1673, 1894, 1900-01, 1949-52, Exhibit 37, see also property/evidence location 
diagram Exhibit 35) A scope, which had been attached to the .264 caliber rifle, was 
found on the bed in the garage apartment. (Trial Transcript pp. 2057, Exhibit 38) 
Ammunition for the .264 was found in the closet of the garage apartment. (Trial 
Transcript pp. 2029, Exhibit 39) In Sarah's room, across the hallway from the master 
bedroom, were found a leather glove, two (2) live .264 rounds, and a 9mm magazine 
wrapped in a red bandana. (Trial Transcript pp. 2038-2040) In the garage attached to the 
main house a .22 rifle was found sitting on top of a freezer with a box of .25 auto rounds, 
and a spent .264 casing was found on the floor. (Trial Transcript pp. 1730, 2038-49, 
5705) 
Further investigation revealed that one Mel Speegle was renting the garage 
apartment, where he normally stayed from Sunday through Wednesday. The .264 murder 
weapon belonged to Mr. Speegle. Speegle moved into the apartment approximately one 
year prior to the murders. Speegle told police and testified he moved the .264 rifle into 
the apartment; and a few weeks prior to the murders, had held it and generally checked it 
out. (Exhibit 40, Exhibit 41, Exhibit 42 & Trial Transcript pp. 2694-2721) 
Sarah had been dating one Bruno Santos, an adult illegal immigrant, who had 
been threatened with statutory rape prosecution in the weeks prior to the murders. (Trial 
Transcript pp. 3358-59, 5433-34) A search of Bruno's home revealed .25 automatic 
rounds in the closet of his bedroom. (Exhibit 13) The surgical gloves held DNA from 
Sarah Johnson. (Trial Transcript pp. 3096-3110) The robe was spotted with a mixture of 
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DNA; Mr. and Mrs. Johnson's, Sarah's and an unknown male. (Trial Transcript pp. 
3436) The blood spots on the robe were from Mr. and Mrs. Johnson and the same 
unknown person. (Trial Transcript pp. 3438-3451) The .264 rifle, ammunition and 
ammunition containers, as well as the scope all had unidentified latent fingerprints which 
have now been identified as those of one Christopher Kevin Hill. (Exhibit 43, Exhibit 44, 
Exhibit 45, Exhibit 46 & Exhibit 47) 
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of Murder in the First Degree, with 
firearn1 enhancement. Petitioner is serving a life term in The Pocatello Women's 
Correctional Center and has exhausted her right to direct appeal. Petitioner was 
represented at trial by Bobby Eugene Pangburn appointed under a public defender 
contract with Blaine County. Mr. Pangburn is suspended from the practice of law in the 
State of Idaho, and in the State of Oregon. 
PROOF TO BE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL 
Enumerated below is a list of witnesses, together with a synopsis of testimony to 
be offered by Petitioner at trial. For a preview of documentary and tangible evidence to 
be offered by Petitioner at trial see the timely filed Restated Trial Exhibit List. 
P A TRICK DUNN: Petitioner intends to call Patrick Dunn, the defense investigator at 
trial, to offer testimony. Mr. Dunn is expected to testify as follows: lead trial counsel, 
Bobby Pangburn was chronically unprepared; Pangburn failed to participate in defense 
team meetings; Pangburn failed to timely distribute to the defense team discovery 
materials received from the State; Pangburn failed to diligently prepare for trial, by lack 
of review of prepared witness books containing pre-trial witness statements, lack of 
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perseverance, and out of town travel during trial; Pangburn and co-counsel Rader agreed 
Rader would handle all expert witnesses, and Pangburn would handle all lay witnesses, 
yet at trial, without warning, Pangburn assigned Rader the task of examining lay 
witnesses; Pangburn was late to trial and would frantically prepare to examine witnesses; 
trial counsel was made aware of an audio recording made by Officer Kirtley that captured 
officers' opinion that Sarah 10hnson could not have committed the murder, and Sheriff 
Femling directing concentration of the investigation against Sarah 10hnson, but failed to 
offer said recording into evidence; trial counsel were aware that Consuelo Cedeno (Bruno 
Santos mother) made pre-trial statements contrary to trial testimony that would have 
created doubt as to Bruno's alibi, yet trial counsel failed to cross-examine Consuelo 
Cedeno; Dunn will testify he investigated and timed an escape route from the crime scene 
to Bruno Santos home, and advised trial counsel of his findings regarding same. 
MARK RADER: Petitioner intends to call Mark Rader, trial co-counsel, to offer 
testimony at trial. Mr. Rader is expected to testify as follows; Rader is an attorney 
licensed to practice law in Oregon and Idaho, who has vast murder trial experience; 
Pangburn as lead attorney assigned Rader to handle expert and forensic witnesses, while 
Pangburn would handle the lay witnesses; the defense learned approximately one month 
prior to trial that the comforter from the master bedroom had not been taken into 
evidence; the defense team was very dysfunctional; Pangburn, without advance warning, 
handed Rader the responsibility to examine lay witnesses, when Rader had conducted no 
advance preparation to examine said witnesses; the defense failed to adequately cross-
examine Sheriff Walt Femling; the defense failed to adequately cross-examine Kjell 
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Elisison; the defense failed to adequately cross-examine Bruno Santos; Rader was aware 
that Officer Stu Robinson falsely testified before the grand jury that no useful latent 
fingerprints were found at the scene, but failed to cross-examine him on that point; Rader 
should have cross-examined Officer Robinson regarding indications in the records 
showing collection into evidence of the comforter and the fact the comforter was later not 
available for defense inspection; He failed to do any legal research to determine the 
proper foundation for admission of the coconut blood splatter test offered, but rejected as 
admissible evidence at trial; the defense knew the exact type of sheet that was on the bed 
in the master bedroom; the defense knew the master bedroom crime scene contained a 
king size bed, fully made, yet the recreated conditions for the ballistics experiment, 
offered into but refused admission into evidence, were not consistent with those at the 
crime scene; He was aware of prior inconsistent statements made by Consuela Cedeno, 
Bruno Santos mother, but failed to cross examine her regarding such statements. 
BOBBY E. PANGBURN: Petitioner intends to call Bobby E. Pangburn, the lead defense 
trial lawyer in the underlying criminal prosecution, to offer testimony at trial. Mr. 
Pangburn is expected to testify as follows: He is currently suspended from the practice of 
law in both the State of Oregon, and the State of Idaho; He is facing further disciplinary 
bar association proceedings; He was appointed to represent Sarah Johnson in the 
underlying criminal prosecution pursuant to the Blaine County Public Defender Contract; 
It was agreed between he and co-counsel Rader that Pangburn would handle lay 
witnesses, while Rader dealt with expert and forensic witnesses; He will disclaim 
responsibility for the defense failure to have admitted into evidence the offered blood 
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splatter and ballistic tests; He will disclaim responsibility for the defense failure to offer 
an audio recording of Sheriff Femling making statements on the morning of the crime, to 
the effect, " this is a resort community. We've got to find somebody right now."; He will 
admit to changing his mind, without notice, directing Rader to examine witnesses; He 
will disclaim responsibility to the decision not to cross-examine Bruno Santos, but state 
he disagreed with the decision by Rader; He will admit the defense had evidence that 
called into question Bruno Santos alibi, but that evidence was not offered at trial; He will 
admit Consuela Cedeno, Bruno's mother, should have been cross-examined regarding 
inconsistent statements relating to Bruno's alibi; He will admit he watched himself on 
television, and spent time during the trial discussing the case on broadcast television 
programming; He will claim to have met with Rader daily and to have visited Sarah more 
than 125 times; He will be examined as to his failure to inquire of fingerprint expert 
Kerchusky's opinion testimony regarding the freshness of latent fingerprints on the tools 
of the murder. 
OFFICER ROSS KIRTLEY: Petitioner intends to call Officer Ross Kirtley, ISP trooper 
who arrived first at the crime scene, to offer testimony at trial. Officer Kirtley is 
expected to testify as follows; he was the first law enforcement officer at the scene; He 
recorded audio of all sound within his personal space for the first several hours of the 
investigation at the scene; He recognizes Sheriff Femling's voice that appears on the 
audio recording. 
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SHERIFF JERRY "WALT" FEMLING: Petitioner intends to call Blaine County Sheriff 
Walt Femling, to offer testimony at trial. Sheriff Femling is expected to testify as 
follows; he arrived at the crime scene at approximately 7:00 a.m., at which time he made 
contact with Officer Kirtley; He will confirm his voice on the Kirtley recording and 
affirm the statements made therein; He will be questioned about his recorded statements 
and those of other officers; He will admit the community was critical of his office for 
taking so long to make an arrest; He will discuss the State's theory of the case; He will 
testify he received information from Randy Parker at ISP Fingerprint Laboratory that new 
fingerprint evidence was discovered in February of 2009, matching the known 
fingerprints of one Christopher K. Hill to the previously unknown latent prints found on 
the tools of murder; He will be cross-examined regarding the follow-up investigation into 
Hill. 
CHIEF STEVE HARKINS: Petitioner intends to call Ketchum Police Chief, Steve 
Harkins, to offer testimony at trial. Chief Harkin was a Detective with the Blaine County 
Sheriff's Department during the investigation and trial of Sarah Johnson. Chief Harkins 
will testify regarding his investigation in the case, particularly of Bruno Santos; He will 
testify regarding his post-trial investigation of the Christopher Kevin Hill and Mel 
Speegle relating to Hill's known inked fingerprints being matched to the previously 
unidentified latent prints found on the tools of murder. 
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STUART M. ROBINSON: Petitioner intends to call Retired Idaho State Police Officer, 
Stuart Robinson, to offer testimony at trial. Mr. Robinson will be cross-examined 
regarding his grand jury testimony relating to lack of fingerprints found at the scene. 
RAUL ORNELAS: Petitioner intends to call Raul Ornelas, a Hailey City Patrol Officer 
at the time of the Johnson investigation and trial to offer testimony at trial. Officer 
Ornelas will be cross-examined regarding his observations of foot print evidence. 
JULIA DUPUIS: Petitioner intends to call Julia Dupuis, a neighbor of the Johnsons at 
the time of the murders, to offer testimony at trial. Ms. Dupuis will be questioned 
regarding what she heard, observed and how she reacted on the morning in question. 
MARIA EGUREN: Petitioner intends to call Maria Eguren, a fingerprint technician for 
the Idaho State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification, to offer testimony at trial. Ms. 
Eguren will be cross-examined regarding her testimony in the underlying criminal trial 
and regarding the newly discovered fingerprint evidence. 
BRUNO SANTOS: Petitioner intends to call Bruno Santos to offer testimony at trial. 
Mr. Santos will be cross-examined regarding his relationship with Petitioner; his criminal 
history; and his whereabouts on the morning of the murders. 
CONSUELA CEDENO: Petitioner intends to call Consuela Cedeno, Bruno Santos 
mother, to offer testimony at trial. Ms. Cedeno will be cross-examined regarding pre-trial 
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statements wherein she insisted her son Bruno Santos had not driven the car the morning 
of the murders because there was dew on the windshield and that she checked the 
mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno was lying about where he had been, which 
statements were·inconsistent with her trial testimony. 
JANE LOPEZ: Petitioner intends to call Jane Lopez, Bruno Santos cousin, to offer 
testimony at trial. Ms. Lopez will be cross-examined regarding her trial testimony 
bolstering Bruno Santos alibi, which is contradicted by phone records. 
ROBERT KERCHUSKY: Petitioner intends to call Robert Kerchusky, a fingerprint 
expert who testified for the defense at the underlying criminal trial, to offer testimony at 
triaL Mr. Kerchusky is expected to testify he made Trial Counsel aware of his opinion, 
, and the basis therefore, that the latent unidentified prints found on stock of the .264 rifle, 
the scope, and the ammunition packaging were a fresh prints; His opinion was based 
upon statements and testimony the gun had not been touched, other than by Speegle, in 
approximately one (1) year; He will testify Trial Counsel had knowledge of Mel 
Speegle's testimony, and had available to him Speegle's pre-trial statements, asserting 
the .264 ammunition was obtained ten years prior to the shooting and had not been 
opened nor gone through in that length of time; that Speegle had handled the weapon 
within the few weeks prior to the murders; He will recount his comparison of the latent to 
latent prints whereby he was able to identify as a match one latent print from the scope to 
a latent print from the insert from the box of .264 magnum ammo; He will testify this 
latent to latent print identification proves the latent prints on the scope were fresh, and he 
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informed trial counsel of same, yet trial counsel failed to elicit testimony regarding the 
freshness of prints found on the tools of murder. 
Kerchusky will testify he has reviewed the ISP Forensic Services fingerprint 
results and related police reports; He is expected to provide his expert opinion regarding 
the newly discovered fingerprint evidence - previously unidentified prints found on the 
stock of the .264 rifle, the scope removed from the .264 rifle prior to the murder, and a 
plastic insert from a box of .264 ammunition were in fact the prints of a single person, 
Christopher Kevin Hill. More specifically, Kerchusky is expected to conclude with his 
opinion that Christopher Hill is the person who removed the scope from the murder 
weapon, and is in fact the last person to have touched the murder weapon, the 
ammunition and ammunition packaging. 
ANALYSIS 
The issues to be addressed at trial have been extensively briefed, first in 
association with filing of Petitioner's First and Second Amended Petitions, then as part of 
the summary disposition process. The issues have been narrowed, but the general 
standards remain the same. It is not expected that any truly "new issues" or evidence will 
be presented at trial. The Court will be presented with the above referenced witnesses, 
whose credibility, under all of the circumstances, must be judged. It appears beyond 
question the trial attorneys' performance was deficient in several respects, leaving the 
second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice, within the Court's discretion. At the risk 
of redundant reiteration the following discussion again lays out the legal criteria for 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence in the context 
of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARDS 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show 
the attorney's performance was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984) To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of 
showing the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988) To establish prejudice, 
the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 
761, 760 P.2d at 1177. 
It is often repeated that trial counsel's strategic decisions will not be second 
guessed. In the instant case, Petitioner asserts that as to the claimed deficiencies of trial 
counsel, none can be attributed to anything other than lack of preparedness. The recent 
Idaho Appellate Court decision in Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 at 747-48, 139 P.3d 
741 (2006) included a clear statement of the law in a case with facts analogous to those in 
the instant matter. 
The benchmark for jUdging a claim of ineffectiveness is "whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 
result." It is well established that we will not attempt to second-guess trial 
counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions are made upon the 
basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 
181,184-85,579 P.2d 127,130-31(1978); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4,10, 
539 P.2d 556, 562 (1975). Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be 
sufficient to show deprivation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10, 539 P.2d at 562. Strategic choices made 
after incomplete investigations are reasonable only so far as reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510,533, 123 S.Ct. 2527,2541, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, 492 
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(2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2463, 
162 L.Ed.2d 360, 372 (2005) (failure to investigate material relied upon by 
prosecution was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 
120 S.Ct. 1495, 1514, 146 L.Ed.2d 389, 419 (2000) (unreasonable failure 
to conduct thorough investigation); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 
107 S.Ct. 3114,3125,97 L.Ed.2d 638,657 (1987). 
In addition to those standards and criteria referenced by the Murphy Court it 
should be noted that evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a close 
examination of the evidence, both the evidence which was admitted during trial and that 
which was not. Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649 at 653,946 P.2d 71 (Idaho App. 1997) 
Furthermore, in assessing the potential prejudice the Court will consider in aggregate the 
various decisions and omissions of defense counsel that are alleged to have been 
unreasonable. The Court should also take into account the totality of the evidence that 
was before the jury in the criminal trial. Milburn at 653. The Court cautioned that each 
case must be judged according to the significance of the evidence each witness has to 
offer. Id at 654. 
In State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975) the Supreme Court ofIdaho 
reversed and remanded denial of post-conviction relief when Trial Counsel failed to offer 
evidence of a tape favorable to Petitioner that should have been known, but for 
unpreparedness. The Court presented a lengthy description of the meaning and 
importance of adequate preparation by trial counsel. 
Given the complexities of the interaction between the prosecution 
function and the rights of the criminal defendant as is evident in this case, 
adequate preparation must be considered to be an integral element of the 
defense counsel's role in the adversary process. Adequate preparation for 
trial often may be a more important element in the effective assistance of 
counsel to which a defendant is entitled than the forensic skill exhibited in 
the courtroom. The careful investigation of a case and the thoughtful 
analysis of the information it yields may disclose evidence of which even 
the defendant is unaware and may suggest issues and tactics at trial which 
would otherwise not emerge." Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 
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(3d Cir. 1970). Without adequate preparation, defense counsel cannot 
properly discharge his advocate's duty. The ABA Standards furnish a 
guideline to the nature and the extent of the duty to investigate: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant 
to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always 
include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution 
and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless 
of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts 
constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty." ABA Standards, 
"The Defense Function", § 4.1 (1971). 
Tucker at 10-11. Trial Counsel for Tucker failed to interview, or otherwise inquire of, 
police officers and agents involved in the sting operation resulting in Tuckers arrest. The 
Court concluded that the tapes (which were later inadvertently erased and not available 
for review) were not discovered because of inadequate pre-trial investigation. Id at 11-12. 
In Milburn v. State, 13 0 Idaho 649, 946 P.2d 71 (1997) the Idaho Court of 
Appeals reversed summary dismissal of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief due to Trial 
Counsel's failure to adequately investigate and cross-examine witnesses regarding 
inconsistent statement and failure to present exculpatory evidence. The prosecution 
relied on a three (3) prong theory of proof, (1) ballistics; (2) Defendant was last person 
seen with victim and (3) Defendant made admission. The Court held that the right to a 
diligent and conscientious advocate was violated when Trial Counsel failed; to present 
evidence that the Defendant was not the last person seen with the victim before his death; 
failed to impeach witness, who testified that Defendant admitted killing, with inconsistent 
prior statements; and to present evidence of another's admission to the crime. The Court 
reasoned it was not reasonable for defense counsel to fail to present an alternative theory 
of the case implicating another individual in the murder. Milburn at 656. 
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The general statement of law relating to deference to informed strategic decision 
of trial counsel, and the notable exception, applicable here, was recited by the Milburn 
Court. " ... a court ordinarily will not second-guess informed strategic and tactical choices 
made by trial counsel. However, when counsel's trial strategy decisions are made upon 
the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation, the defendant may well have been denied the competent 
assistance of counsel. Moreover, even errors in strategy can be so grave that they 
represent circumstances in which an issue of ineffective assistance exists" Milburn at 
658. 
NEWL Y DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
Newly discovered evidence will warrant a new trial only if it satisfies a 
four-part test, showing that: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or 
impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the 
evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Hayes, 
144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d 288 (Idaho App. 2007) citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 
691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976); State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 146,730 P.2d 1064, 1066 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
In Hayes, the defendant was convicted of lewd conduct with a minor child, the 
trial attorney being unable to locate a key witness. Subsequent to trial the witness was 
found, who provided an alibi for the defendant. The Court of Appeals held the found 
witnesses testimony to be "material" and "newly discovered evidence," not presented due 
to no lack of diligence on the part of the defense. The Court found the newly discovered 
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evidence would probably produce an acquittal. State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d 
288 (Idaho App. 2007) It is important to note the Haves Court made this final 
determination after an analysis of the record as a whole, not merely the newly discovered 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
At the conclusion of the evidence, after having considered the testimony of the 
witnesses and proof submitted, this Court will unavoidably conclude trial counsel in the 
underlying criminal case were unprepared, leading to objective deficiencies in 
. presentation of the defense case, all concluding with an unjust result. Likewise, upon a 
considered review of the circumstances surrounding the new evidence confirming the 
person who last handled the tools of murder, the court will be left with the only possible 
conclusion; Sarah Johnson would probably have been acquitted if the evidence were 
presented to the jury. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS DATED 
A TTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
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Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 332~3096 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074 
NO, 141 . p, 2/7 
FILED ~:J.'3.1 s:z 
NOV 30 2010 
JO/ynnDra 
COUrt Sf, . ge, Clerk Distriot 
'Sine CountJ~ Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








) Case No. CV -06-324 
) 





COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits the following witness list for 
the evidentiary hearing scheduled December 7-10.2010. 
1. Tina Walthall 
700 S. Stratford 
Meridian, 1D 
(208) 884-7170 
2. Maria Eguren 
700 S. Stratford 
Meridian, 10 
(208) 884-7170 
RESPONDENT'S WITNESS LIST - 1 
NOV. 30. 2010 5: 04PM T~AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU 
3. Jason Pintler 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 1 00 
Boise. JD 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
4. Bobby Pangburn 
3042 S. Whitepost Way 
Eagle, 10 83646 
(208) 939-7514 
5. Jay Davis 
Jail Administrator, Blaine County 
(208) 788-5564 
6. Scott Smith 
Attorney General's Office 
700 W. State Street, 4th Floor 
Boise. 10 83720 
(208) 334-4529 
7. Christopher Hill 
46 E. Magic Road 
East Magic, 10 83313 
(208) 481-9009 
8. Mel Speegle 
3512 Tamarack Dr. 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 309-1041 
NO. 141 
DATED this 30th day of November, 2010, 
RESPONDENT'S WITNESS LIST - 2 
J SICA M. LORELLO 
o puty Attorney General 
pecial Prosecuting Attorney. 
P. 3/7 
NOV. 30. 2010 5: 04PM T~AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO. 141 P. 4/7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HERESY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of November, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Respondent's Witness List by the 
method indicated below: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax (208) 788-5527 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
191 Sun Valley Rd. 
Ketchum, 10 83340 
Fax (208) 788-2300 
RESPONDENT'S WITNESS LIST - 3 
_X_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_X_ Facsimile 
~ ~sean Newman, Legal Secretary 
NOV, 30, 2010 5: 04PM '~AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO, 141 p, 5/7 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Idaho Attorney General 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO IS8 #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN I$B #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074 
FILED ~':J. ¥:S1: 
r- Ie.... 
NOV 30 2010 
Jc°lynn Drage, Clerk District 
Durt Blaine County, idaho 
_.--...... -.-.1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-06-324 
) 
vs. ) RlSSPONDENT'$ EXHIBIT 
) LIST 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special Prosecuting 
Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits the attached exhibit list for the evidentiary hearing 
scheduled December 7-10,2010. 
DATED this 30th day of November, 2010, 
J SICA M. LORELLO 
D ty Attorney General 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
RESPONDENTS EXHIBIT LlST-1 
NOV, 30,2010 5:04PM T~AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO, 141 p, 6/7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of November, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the Respondenfs Exhibit List by the method indicated below: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax (208) 788-5527 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
191 Sun Valley Rd. 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax (208) 788-2300 
RESPONDENTS EXHIBIT LIST - 2 
_X_ U.S. Mall Postage Prepaid 
_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_X~ Facsimile 
gfLRllKYl,,==-
oseanNewman. Legal Secretary 
NOV. 30. 2010 5: 04PM T~AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU 
G. RICHARD BEVAN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
SHARIE COOPER, DEPUTY CLERK 
VIRGINIA BAILEY, COURT REPORTER 
EXHIBIT LIST 
CASE NO. CV-06-324 
DATE: November 30,2010 
NO. 141 
CASE: SARAH JOHNSON v. STATE OF IDAHO, Blaine County Case No. CV-06-324 
NO. DESCRIPTION DATE ID OFFD 
1000 Trial Transcript, State of Idaho'll. Sarah 
Marie Johnson., Blaine County Case No. 
CR-03-18200, Idaho Supreme Court 
Docket Nos. 32210 and 33312 
1001 Clerk's Record, including exhibits, State 
of Idaho v. Sarah Marie Johnson., Blaine 
County Case No. CR-03-18200, Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 32210 and 
33312 
AFIS print-out dated 11/29/2010 
1002 
AppeHant's Brief, State of Idaho v. Sarah 
1003 MaJ'ie Johnson, Idaho Supreme Court 
Docket No. 33312 
Reply Brief', State of Idaho v. Safah Marie 
1004 Johnson, Idaho Supreme Court Docket 
No. 33312 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT LIST - 3 
P. 7/7 
OBJ ADMIT. 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 FI LED ~:~. q. a« - \-
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
NOV 30 2010 PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 1 
Court Blaine County, Idaho . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 









________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=de=n=t ___________ ) 
Case No: CV -006-324 
PETITIONER'S FILING 
MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached documents in the above-
styled matter: Subpoena and Personal Return of Service for Officer Raul Ornelas; 
Subpoena and Personal Return of Service for Chief of Police Steve Harkins; Subpoena 
and Personal Return of Service for Retired ISP Officer Stuart Robinson; and Subpoena 
and Personal Return of Service for Maria Eguren, ISP Forensic Lab Technician. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 
//zq/7) 
DATED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM was 
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: 
Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile 
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail ---
Hand Deliver ---
~a facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 2 
1 WALT FEMLING 
(208) 788-5563 
SARAH M JOHNSON 
-- VS --
STATE OF IDAHO 
BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
1650 AVIATION DRIVE 
HAILEY, ID 83333 
PLAINTIFF(S) COURT: BCDC 
Paper ID: 201001179 
CASE NO: 2006-00324 
DEFENDANT(S) PAPER(S) SERVED: 
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA 
I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE 
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 10:06 O'CLOCK A.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING 
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON 
··*·*ORNELAS,RAUL***** 
PERSONALLY AT: HAILEY POLICE DEPT HAILEY ID 
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO. 
SHERIFF'S FEES: 
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE: 
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED: 
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS 
PO BOX 1861 




DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 




KYLE D. GREEN 
SERVING OFFICER 
GINGER M. CLEMENT 
RETURNING OFFICER 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
ISSt)'cl) 
DATE 1 \ ~ \ 5". I\). . 'CEIVED 
--'~-'~ 
.. "\ hariff's Office 
B~INE COUNTY 
~V 1 (p 20m 
Hr._~~~Min.,~~_ 
Jerry Femling, Sheriff 
By---___ Clvll De 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Officer Raul Ornelas 
Hailey Police Department 
115 Main Street South, Ste. H 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this I s= day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA 




J. WALT FEMLING 
(208) 788-5563 
SARAH M JOHNSON 
-- VS --
STATE OF IDAHO 
BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
1650 AVIATION DRIVE 
HAILEY, ID 83333 
PLAINTIFF(S) COURT: 
Paper ID: 201001178 
BCDC 
CASE NO: 2006-00324 
DEFENDANT(S) PAPER(S) SERVED: 
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA 
I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE 
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 17TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 2:00 O'CLOCK P.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING 
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS I N THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON 
* * * * • HARKINS, STEVE * * * * * 
PERSONALLY AT: BLAIEN COUNTY PSF, 1650 AVIATION DR, HAILEY ID 
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO. 
SHERIFF'S FEES: 
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE: 
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED: 
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS 





DATED THIS 17TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010. 




KYLE D. GREEN 
SERVING OFFICER 
GINGER M. CLEMENT 
RETURNING OFFICER 
OR\G\NAL 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 





~;)V~ G, 2010 
rlr. ___ ~Min6t FAX 208 788 2300 
Jeny~,She.riff 
gy---~j...g.~~I~QJ~C:"1I D~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









__________ =R=es~p=o=n=de=n=t,~ __________ ) 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Police Chief Steve Harkins 
Ketchum Police Department 
480 East A venue North 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 






SHE o F T WIN F 
RETURN OF SERVI 
County of Twin Falls 
ss. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
- L S COUNTY 
SHERIFF# 20105009 




I, SHERIFF TOM CARTER, Sheriff of the County of Twin Falls, State 
of Idaho, hereby certify that I received the attached SUBPOENA 
on the 17 day of November, 2010 1 and I further certify that in 
accordance with I.R.C.P. 4 and 5, I served a copy of the SUBPOENA, 
on STUART ROBINSON, he/she being the WITNESS named in said document{s 
on Thursday, the 18 day of November, 2010, at 11:29 a.m. at 
the following address: BURGER STOP, TWIN FALLS 1 ID 83301; by 
delivering a copy of the above named document to him/her personally; 
to which was attached: 
ORIG 
DATED this 19 day of November, 2010. 
SHERIFF .TOJJ!. CARTER 
Sheri.f .•J1l~o£.~~.~~al .. , / 
'f":r ~ .... > 
By . \, , Deputy 
=HAN~=K-=RA~T=H=B~UN~-----------------
<.:lSUED < . l i) 
DATE- H' \ 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









________ ~R==es~p=o=nd~e~n~t,~ __________ ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Stuart M. Robinson 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
712 2nd Avenue North 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the plac.e and time specifIed above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this I:> day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA 






SARAH M JOHNSON 
-VS-
STATE OF IDAHO 
BLAINE COUNTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SHERIFF'S RETURN ON SUBPOENA - SHERIFF'S# 1015063 
RECEIVED BY SHERIFF ON 11117/2010 
I CERTIFY THAT I SERVED A COPY OF THE SUBPOENA TO 
MARIA EGUREN-ISP FORENSIC LAB TECHNICIAN 
ON 11/22/2010 @ 11 :05 HRS, 
MARIA EGUREN 
700 S STRATFORD #120 
MERIDIAN, ID 83642 
CV20060324 
I RETURN THE SERVED SUBPOENA AND ASSESS MY FEES OF: $55.00 PAID 
BY ADVANCE FEES. 
GARY RANEY, SHERIFF 
ADA COUNTY, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS-ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1861 
HAILEY, 10 83333 
1/4254/4105 \~1j1-; 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
CIVIL SECTION 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
-VS-
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
BLAINE COUNTY -FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT CASE NO: CV20060324 
SHERIFF'S CASE NO 1015063 
SERVE TO: Maria Eguren-ISP FORENSIC LAB TECHNICIAN 
ADDRESS: 700 S STRATFORD DRIVE MERIDIAN, ID 83642 
I, ~Cc\\~r.v~ 'jrA:*t.~ ,CERTIFY THAT I PERSONALLY 
(DEPUTY'S PRINTED N E) 
SERVED A COPY OF THE 
• SUBPOENA 
TO: ~f\ c', (), E~~"V,-.\. 
(NAME OF INDIV1DUAL RECEIVING DOCUMENTS) 
AT: 160 '$. .s.h-A-t.t-ecJ. ~ \ 2.c::. .d' \ ~,J ~ __ ~ _______________________ r~-\e=.~~cQ~(~. l . 
(ADDRESS) 
ON: \ \ - '2.. 1... - \ ~ AT: ___ \ \....,.:u=--=-__ 
(DATE) (TIME) 
__ W--=_~ _  ·--;'~'\--tHt-'t' __ =- _____ ADA#: --,-_o_s:-' __ 
(SIGNA TURE) U 6 
o RIG I ~~ A L \\t~~ 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
__________ =R=es~p=o=n=de=n=t,~ __________ ) 
i~CSO CIt . .lIL '10HOUi 7Ailil1:5C 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: MARIA EGUREN 
Idaho State Police - Forensic Laboratory Technician 
700S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this 15 day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
NOV 30 2010 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County Id!!~._ .. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 









________ -=R=e=sp=o=n=de=n~t ___________ ) 
Case No: CV-006-324 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED 
TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Restated Trial Witness List, and 
states the following persons may be called, in the order listed herein, if feasible to testify 
on behalf of Petitioner during trial: 
1. Patrick Dunn, Defense Investigator 
4695 Arrowhead Way 
Boise, ID 83709 
2083622727 
2. Mark Rader, Trial Co-Counsel 
381 W. Idaho Avenue 
Ontario, OR 97914 
541 8892351 
3. Bobby Pangburn, Trial Counsel 
3042 S. Whitepost Way 
Eagle, ID 83646 
208 861 1886 
4. Officer Ross Kirtley 
700 W. Jefferson St. #228 
Boise, ID 83720 
208 8543013 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
5. Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling 
Blaine County Sheriffs Department 
1650 Aviation Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
6. Det. Steve Harkins 
480 East Avenue N. 
PO Box 2315 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
7. Stuart M. Robinson 
Retired Idaho State Police 
712 2nd Avenue North 
Twin Falls, Idaho 
(208) 420-8930 
8. Officer Raul Ornelas 
Hailey Police Department 
115 Main Street South, Ste. H 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
9. Julia Dupuis 
4522 West Beacon Light Road 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
10. Maria Eguren 
Idaho State Police Headquarters - Forensic Laboratory 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
(208) 884-7000 
11. Jane Lopez 
PO Box 3371 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Physical Address Unknown 
208.721.0477 
12. Consuelo Cedeno 
PO Box 1562 
820 Silver Star Driv 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
208.481.0104 
13. Bruno Antonio Santos 
c/o Blaine County Detention Facility 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 2 Ili1~ 
1650 Aviation Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
14. Robert Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert 
1235 N. Echohawk Way 
Eagle, ID 83616 
2089394914 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
DATED 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
was delivered by US Mail Postage Pre-paid to the Office of Attorney General & 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0010 and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, PO Box 126, 
Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126; and by Hand Delivery to The Office of the Blaine 
County Prosecuting Attorney, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 
83333. 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST 4 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
FI LED ~.~. st'.n 
[NOV 3 0 2010 I F..-
JO/ynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 









Case No: CV -006-324 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED 
TRlAL EXHIBIT LIST 
________ ~R~e~s~p~on~d~e~n=t------------) 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Restated Trial Exhibit List, and therefore 
recites as follows; 
Exhibit Number & Description 
1. Transcript from Grand Jury Proceedings 
2. Transcript of Trial Proceedings 
3. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn, Investigator for Defense . 
4. Photograph of Diagram of Glen Aspen Drive 
5. Photograph of Murder Weapon at Scene 
6. Photograph of Trash Can Johnson Residence 
7. Photograph of Removed Rifle Scope on Guest Bed Johnson Residence 
8. Photograph of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges 
9. Phone Records of Consuela Cedeno 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRlAL EXHIBIT LIST 1 
10. Jane Lopez Phone Record 
11. Bruno Santos Application for Travel Document 
12. Recording ofInitial Crime Scene Response 
13. Transcript of Police Interview of Consuela Cedeno and Jane Lopez 
14. Affidavit of Mark Rader 
15. Disciplinary Order Idaho Supreme Court Bobby E. Pangburn 
16. Suspended Status of Attorney Bobby Eugene Pangburn (Idaho Bar Association) 
17. Bobby E. Pangburn, Deposition Transcript 
18. Orchid Cellmark Laboratory Report Bates Nos 10017-10021 
19. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher 
Kevin Hill Bates Nos. 0003PC thru 0020PC 
20. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. 0021-PCt thru 0028PC 
21. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. 0029-PCt thru 0092PC 
22. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher 
Kevin Hill, with lab report Bates Nos. 00094 PC thru 001 06PC 
23. ISP Forensic Services Rpt- Bates Nos. 00108-PC thru 00123PC 
24. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher 
Kevin Hill, Bates Nos. 000124PC thru 00125PC 
25. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. 00126-PC thru 00132PC 
26. ISP Forensic Services Rpt- Bates Nos. 00133-PC thru 00139PC 
27. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 11/022009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher 
Kevin Hill, with suspect written alibi statement Bates Nos. 00014.oPC thru 00141C 
28. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. unknown Dates 1.27.09 - 2.11.09 
29. AudioNideo Recording of Interview with Mel Speegle 2/10/2009 
30. AudioNideo Recording ofInterview with Christopher Kevin Hill 211212009 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 2 
31. Written Statement of Julia Dupuis Bates No. 000201 
32. ISP Chain of Custody form last date 11/25/03 Bates No. 005988 
33. ISP Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes 11/25/03 Bates No. 004550 
34. Transcript of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/3/2003 Bates Nos. 002861-002922 
35. Blaine County Sheriffs Report ofInterview with Bruno Santos 9/2/2003 
36. Bruno Santos - Nikki Settle Transcript of Taped Telephone Call 
37. Police Report of Carlos Ayala Interview Bates No. 003087 
38. Resume of Robert J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert 
39. Latent Fingerprint Cards (w/o Bates Stamp) 
40. Qwest Telephone Records 
T PHERP. SIMMS 




PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST together with the 
physical exhibits referenced therein was delivered by US Mail Postage Pre-paid to the Office 
of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello, PO Box 83720, 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, PO Box 
126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126; and by Hand Delivery to The Office of the Blaine 
County Prosecuting Attorney, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 4 
DEC 1-2010 WED 05:39 PM 
11/16/2819 86:38 2BS7341B74 
FAX NO. 736 4155 
FILED ~...,..,..,., 
DEC - 1 2010 
Jotynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court B/alne County, Idaho 
IN nm DISTRICT CO~ OF nm FIFTH .rt:JDIClAL prSTRIeT 
OF me S't'A.1'B OF mAHo. IN AND OR THE COUNTY OF ~lAI'A-r: 
~Jf):~W " 
I hereby teqUUt approval to! 





, PreaidiD8 J'tI4ge.: 
llSQUBST TO OBTAIN APPR.OV At 
TO VIDEO RECORD. BROADCAST 
OR 'f'HOTOOP..APH A. COtJkt ' 
PROCE!J)'&lG , 
[ ] photograph tho followin.& oourt ~: 
b ..., 
dmiDjlttative R.ui. t'tptdini l;C1etaS ift the courtrooft.1, 
amd will eom:pl)' mill ~IS with the Gas of'that rule. aM will abo make certain that all otbt:v 
ped~ hm my OlgaDization pmioi in video or audio r~ Of broIdcutirJJ or 
pboto~ns oHM coUlt ~ httvc R-ul~ 45 ofb Idaho Corm A(bnmisttative Rules •. ,
will cornply in an ~ with the provtsio of that rule.' 
t 
P. 02 
IU""~ I~TYI~Tn llNno~ 3NIV1B Gl~SBBLaoz at' H O~OV~O/Zl 
DEc-nl-2010 WED 05:39 PM FAX NO, 08 738 4155 
11/1G/281B a5:38 2eS7i41074 
OJ.Y!IR 
THE COURT. having eoMidtm::d the abow ~ for Approval under Rulc 45 of the ldabo 
~
cotm Ac1mim&tatf."e~, hereby order! d'Iat permill8i~ to video recor4 the above hearing is: 
1U.NTED Ut\det tM foU0wirJ31'CStrlcnoD! ill addition to ~ Kt forth in !.W.C 45 ot the Idaho 
C ~veR.ules: , -
[ lDENlED. ... , 
••••••• , .................. "'" ............. , III ........... .,.~ ••••• ,II.I."~ ............ l1(li." ,., a ............. " ..... " ....... , .... , •••••• " •••• ,_" ,. .. .. 
THE COt)R,T, ba.vln& considered the aho\it: ~w:st tor Approval under R.ute 4~ or d1c Idaho 
Court AdmiJ:d.smltive 'Rules,. hQ1!lby ol'Clm tba1: ~Qtt to bl'94ldc;:ui the abovc ho~ is: 
r 1 GlUN'I'ED ~ ~ fotlowini mtrictions in addition to tbose $1:4 fd in Rule 4S of the Idaho 
C4utt Admlnist:tative R.Ule,: 
A4i 4 
• • 
I ]DENIED . 
••• ~ ...... , ." .............. , •••• "." •••••• ~ .. ,. ..... ··.-" .... <f.'.4,.." ._-,.., ..... "" ••• i •• " ............... 1.' .......... _'" ............. " ........... ... 
"l'BB COUl.T. bl.vmg ~ the eove Request for Appro'll81 under ltule 4S ot the Idaho 
Court Adm1ft1stmtivo RWcs, ~by 01'I.10r8 that -permission to photop'aph the: ~ve bHriztg is: . 
( ] GRANTED UII.def the following n;st:ri~ODS in addition to those set fOrth in Rul~ 45 ot the Idaho 
Court AclmiD.isuative Rules: 
wow -
[ ] DJ:NIED •. 
••• ........ 4 ........ "" ••••• " ..... " •••••• " ••••• ,.._ ..... ,~, •• , .... t ''''iii ................ ",.~ "" ...... ~ ............. _ t •••• t" ........... Il."' ................ , •• , 
~'fo OBT.\1l'i IV'PftDVAL TO vtIXO ~D. I)Jf.O,l..DC.UT 
OR ~IAllEt A <lOUIlT PRQCIiUi1:tXHO 
(1)..'. ~~V\~~~v S\~~S 
)CQ h ~ WZr<-V\.\.-(.V'-
l.Yv\ \iT r3'-\ - to-::rY ~i 
l~no~ !3IH1SID AIHno~ 3NIV1S 
04.06.DU 2 
p, 03 
NOv-30-2010 TUE 03:34 P ro MTN EXPRESS 
FAX NO. 8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIfTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BL>\INE 
P. 01102 
DEC - 1 2010 
~(C~~ 1-). 3~'A.~f'v\ ) JoJynn Drage, Clerk District 
) Court Blaine County, Idaho 
Pla.intiff, ) REQUEST TO OBTAIN APPROV AL 
) TO VIDEO RECORD, BROADCAST 
vs . ) OR PHOTOGRAPH A COURT 
) PROCEEDING 
) .:s I-A I-e c;-{ :r ck ~ 
Defendant. ) 
I hereby reqtlest approval to: 
] video record ] bl'oadcast [ vrPho~ograph the following court proceeding: 
Ca.se No.: .Q{L6~ - 3:b4 
Date: ·Dt'c. 7- 7)~c ICJ c2CJIO 
Time: 10 -.:=; re d-. C t-.. c-I 
Location: ;:;"'11 h I Is 0411 4 I[~(: ~ Cc.p..-f-
:::r::'j.e. &. J-/l.&dRJ 13eUCl.M Presidillg Judge: 
I have read Rule 4S of the Idaho Court Aaministrative Rules permitting cameras in the courtroom, and 
will comply in an respects with the provisions of that rule, and will also make ce.rtain that all other 
persons from l11y organi~ation participating in video or audio recording or broadcasting or photographing 
afthe court proceedings have read Rule 45 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules and will comply in 
all respects with the provisions of that rule. ( ( ~ .j C (lA 
~ i2&j -:S"";~/ ~j(t'i Gnal:: (Jd. (.It -.JPc" ~ 
c-p"n~ ~_~...,-
Signature 
T ~C11ro d~ lall'\ " € ,fitr:SS 7;16 -fct:,O 
News Organization Represented l'hone Number 
!(/tdU- 30 . D ClID 
Date / 
G£C-Ol-2010 wED 03:13 PM ~ISTRICT TCA 
NOV-30-2010 TUE 03:51 PM R1ME COUNTY JUDICIAL 
NOV-SO-2010 TVE 03136 PH IV HTN EXPRESS 
.. ,- '.. -, _. 1I I ,.., I ... •••• • ... ,, __ • _. , 
gpg 
FAX NO, 7':\6 4002 
FAX NO. buo527 
FAX NO. 7262329 ' 
THE C0tJ'R1\ bivins con5jclor~d th" above leque&t for API'l'OVid "ndor lluJt 45 Ofllu: Idatto 
~
co Aomillistrarlve T-ltJ\aQ, Ilorllby oJ'dm that J'Onntssion to video record ~e abovo hoarbllls: 
OJtANTBD und.r the fhl10wiag rcsuictloDs in adclitioCl to thOS6 sot forth h\ Rul. 4S of the Idaho 
Qurt dminisb'at!vo aUlDI: 
- - .- .... 
lDBNIEO. 
m COUR.T~ l\a.viJl~ ~on5ld.a the l'/bove ~ut&t for Approval uDder flute 45 of the Idabo 
Co= AdmfniitriJM ltules. hoQb)' ordm thlf pel'l\'li$llon to btclala.tthe abovo hetn'ing is: 
r 1 GIViN'l'BO unger tho following rertrj~ons in addition io tht'tSfl $et fortll in FWle 4S Qffhe Idaho 
Co'l~ A4mlnirtMivc R.ules: -... . 
• • v 
.. i' 
L lD£N1BD. 
THE COURT. blvln~ CoOftsldl!ll'¥c the abovo kcqu¢st tar Approval \1.l\der aulc:45 of the Idllho 
Court: Administrative lu.u, hereby ar41!1l1 that pencilJ~;D)l to p"olafp'Rph tbe above be"rlna i4: 
~ltA.NrsD I.Indfl!' tlte following remJetlou61n aMitiolll!:) tbo$t let forth in R.ule 45 oftl\eldaho 
.~urtAdfninjstrat.iye Rld •• : . .. .. 
f ...... IF"'lt II' 4 .. . - .... 4 • - .. .. ... I - -
] DENraD. 
DA'rSD this __ 1 __ _ 
,~ 
p, 02/02 
P. 02 
P. '02/02 
